The increased equity lending supply (ELS) in the equity loan market, available for short sellers to borrow, exposes a firm to greater short selling threats. Considering short sellers' strong incentives to uncover firm-specific information and monitor managers, we hypothesize that short selling threats, proxied by ELS, enhance corporate investment efficiency. We find that ELS significantly reduces managerial tendencies to underinvest (overinvest) especially for firms prone to underinvest (overinvest). The effect of ELS on investment efficiency is stronger for firms with higher information asymmetry and weaker corporate governance, confirming short sellers' role in mitigating information and agency costs. However, short selling risk weakens the effect of ELS. Our evidence is robust to endogeneity checks and suggests that corporate investment can be driven by a particular capital market condition: the amount of lendable shares in the equity loan market.

Exploiting two quasi-natural experiments, we find that firms increase emissions of toxic pollution following decreases in analyst coverage. The effects are stronger for firms with low initial analyst coverage, poor corporate governance, and firms subject to less stringent monitoring by environmental regulators. Decreases in environmental-related questions raised in conference calls, an increased cost of monitoring to institutional shareholders, reductions in pollution abatement investment, and the weakening of internal governance related to environmental performance are channels through which reduced analyst coverage contributes to increases in firm pollution. Our study highlights the monitoring role analysts play in shaping corporate environmental policies.

This study uses the quality of coverage decisions as a new metric to evaluate the performance of star and non-star analysts. We find that the coverage decisions of star analysts are better predictors of returns than those of non-star analysts. The return predictability of star analysts’ coverage decisions is stronger for informationally opaque stocks. We further exploit the staggered short selling deregulations, Google’s withdrawal, and the anti-corruption campaign as three quasi-natural experiments that create plausibly exogenous variations in the quality of information environment. These experiments show that the predictive power of star analysts’ coverage decisions strengthens (weakens) following a sharp deterioration (improvement) in firms’ information environment, consistent with the notion that star analysts possess superior ability to identify mispriced stocks. Overall, star analysts make better coverage decisions and play a superior role as information intermediaries, especially in poor information environment.

We investigate how the government, as a customer, affects a supplier’s environmental policies. We find that government contractors have significantly lower levels of toxic pollution. Exploring the mechanisms, we show that government contractors reduce pollution by strengthening internal environmental governance and increasing investments in pollution abatement. Further analysis rules out alternative explanations related to reduced economic activities and financial constraints. Overall, our results highlight the government’s important role in disciplining corporate environmental misbehavior.

We find strong evidence that when a firm's customer base is more concentrated, the firm's CEO receives more risk-taking incentives in her compensation package. This finding is robust to numerous alternative measures, alternative specifications, alternative subsamples, and different attempts that mitigate endogeneity concerns. Further, the positive effect of customer concentration on CEO risk-taking incentive provision is more prominent when the CEO is more reluctant to take risks, when the firm has more investment opportunities, and when the firm is more prone to the costs of losing large customers. These findings are consistent with the notion that boards provide additional risk-taking incentives to offset the CEO's aversion to the risk of non-diversified revenue streams, thereby preventing excessive managerial conservatism at the expense of value maximization.

Firms with more competitive threats from the product market are less likely to commit violations and pay lower penalties. These findings are robust to alternative measures, specifications, and subsamples, as well as different attempts that mitigate endogeneity concerns. Further analyses reveal that the disciplining effect of competition is more pronounced when managers have greater incentives to shirk and when internal governance is weaker, and that violations are associated with poor product market performance only in the presence of competitive pressure. Firms under competitive pressure are more likely to adopt ESG-related incentives in executive compensation contracts and exhibit better worker safety practices. Overall, our evidence suggests that product market threats reduce managerial slack in combating misconduct by increasing the expected damage of violations.