We study the impact of political relations on media coverage. Using a sample of 3,290 American Depository Receipts (ADRs) from 45 countries, we find that deteriorating political relations between the US and an ADR firm's home country induce negative coverage by the US media of the ADR firm. To alleviate endogeneity, we adopt France's and Germany's opposition to the Iraq War and the inauguration of the US president as two shocks to bilateral political relations between the US and foreign countries. In placebo tests, we show no negative effect of political relations on ADR firms’ press releases or non-US media coverage. We further document the three economic mechanisms underlying the impact of political relations on media coverage: US journalists’ country sentiment, a country's popularity among US readers, and the US media's political beliefs. Finally, we document two consequences of negative coverage by the US media: investors respond less to negative news of firms from countries with deteriorating political relations with the US, and negative coverage leads to a greater likelihood of firms terminating their ADRs.

This study examines the empirical controversy over the pricing effect of the Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O׳Hara (2002) probability of information-based trading, PIN, on a sample of 30,095 firms from 47 countries worldwide. Contrary to the empirical evidence of Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O׳Hara, but consistent with that of Duarte and Young (2009), we do not find that PIN exhibits a positive effect on a cross section of expected stock returns in international markets. Alternative information-based trading measures also display no effect on expected stock returns, corroborating our finding that information risk proxied by PIN, in general, has no pricing effect in world markets.

We examine whether the immigration status of entrepreneurs is a concern for creditors when extending trade credit. Utilizing the disclosure of overseas residence rights of controlling shareholders in China, we show that overseas residence rights negatively affect firms' ability to obtain trade credit. This negative association is attenuated if the overseas jurisdiction has an extradition treaty with China. Our results are robust to the introduction of the Hong Kong national security law as a source of exogenous variation in the boundary of domestic law. The decrease in trade credit provision is more pronounced in firms that are perceived as less trustworthy (i.e., with less social trust or higher expropriation risk). Our results offer new insights into how the reach of law across borders can affect firms' financing activities.

We hypothesize that short selling has a disciplining role vis-à-vis firm managers that forces them to reduce earnings management. Using firm-level short-selling data for thirty-three countries collected over a sample period from 2002 to 2009, we document a significantly negative relationship between the threat of short selling and earnings management. Tests based on instrumental variable and exogenous regulatory experiments offer evidence of a causal link between short selling and earnings management. Our findings suggest that short selling functions as an external governance mechanism to discipline managers.

We examine the governance transfer effect of corporate blockholders in a sample of 892 block acquisitions across 42 countries from 1990 to 2008. Using earnings management as a proxy for corporate governance outcome, we find that target firms' earnings management is aligned with that of block acquirers after acquisitions, implying that blockholders transfer their own governance quality to investee firms. We further identify three economic mechanisms that underlie the governance transfer effect, namely, monitoring effectiveness, monitoring cost, and monitoring environment. Our findings provide new insights into the governance role of blockholders.

We examine the effect of foreign institutional investors on firm innovation. Using firm-level data across 26 non-U.S. economies between 2000 and 2010, we show that foreign institutional ownership has a positive, causal effect on firm innovation. We further explore three possible underlying mechanisms through which foreign institutions affect firm innovation: Foreign institutions act as active monitors, provide insurance for firm managers against innovation failures, and promote knowledge spillovers from high-innovation economies. Our article sheds new light on the real effects of foreign institutions on firm innovation.

We show that global political uncertainty, measured by the U.S. election cycle, on average, leads to a fall in equity returns in fifty non-U.S. countries. At the same time, market volatilities rise, local currencies depreciate, and sovereign bond returns increase. The effect of global political uncertainty on equity prices increases with the level of uncertainty in U.S. election outcomes and a country’s equity market exposure to foreign investors, but does not vary with the country’s international trade exposure. These findings suggest that global political uncertainty increases investors’ aggregate risk aversion, leading to a flight to safety.

We examine the impact of the media on firms’ leverage adjustments. Using a comprehensive sample of global news across 33 countries, we find that greater news coverage and more positive news sentiment are associated with greater leverage adjustment speeds. This finding is consistent with the argument that media coverage and content help lower the cost of firms’ adjustment toward target leverage. We further find evidence supporting two mechanisms through which the news media affects leverage adjustments: information dissemination and monitoring. Overall, our results are consistent with the dynamic trade-off theory of capital structure.