In this article, we review the book Economic Interdependence and War by Dale C. Copeland, and take this opportunity to describe and discuss the current debate on the topic from an interdisciplinary perspective. We also provide novel insights on the measurability of dependence expectations' effects on conflict, using the interaction with geography and endowment asymmetries. (JEL D74, D84, F14, F51, Q34)

Austen-Smith (2000) reports a theoretical result that if the cost of entering the workforce is sufficiently low, winner-take-all political systems induce endogenous redistribution levels that are systematically lower than those determined by proportional representation systems (Proposition 6). The proof in Austen-Smith (2000) has a mistake. We explain the mistake and offer an alternative proof. The conclusion of the original paper continues to hold.

We establish a theoretical and empirical framework to assess the role of resource endowments and their geographic location in interstate conflict. The main predictions of the theory are that conflict is more likely when at least one country has natural resources, when the resources in the resource-endowed country are closer to the border, and, in the case where both countries have natural resources, when the resources are located asymmetrically vis-à-vis the border. We test these predictions on a novel data set featuring oilfield distances from bilateral borders. The empirical analysis shows that the presence and location of oil are significant and quantitatively important predictors of interstate conflicts after World War II.

We examine how countries' incentives to go to war depend on the “political bias” of their pivotal decision makers. This bias is measured by a decision maker's risk/reward ratio from a war compared to that of the country at large. If there is no political bias, then there are mutually acceptable transfers from one country to the other that will avoid a war in the presence of commitment or enforceability of peace treaties. There are cases with a strong enough bias on the part of one or both countries where war cannot be prevented by any transfer payments. Our results shed some new light on the uneven contender paradox and the interpretation of the “democratic peace.” We examine countries' choices of the bias of their leaders and show that when transfers are possible, at least one country will choose a biased leader, as that leads to a strong bargaining position and extraction of transfers. (JEL D72, D74)

With inefficient bureaucratic institutions, the effects of laws are hard to assess and incompetent politicians may pass laws to build a reputation as skillful reformers. Since too many laws curtail bureaucratic efficiency, this mechanism can generate a steady state with Kafkaesque bureaucracy. Temporary surges in political instability heighten the incentives to overproduce laws and can shift the economy towards the Kafkaesque state. Consistent with the theory, after a surge in political instability in the early 1990s, Italy experienced a significant increase in the amount of poor-quality legislation and a decrease in bureaucratic efficiency. (JEL D72, D73)

This paper analyzes the conditions under which more legislation contributes to economic growth. In the context of US states, we apply natural language processing tools to measure legislative flows for the years 1965–2012. We implement a novel shift-share design for text data, where the instrument for legislation is leave-one-out legal topic flows interacted with pretreatment legal topic shares. We find that at the margin, higher legislative output causes more economic growth. Consistent with more complete laws reducing ex post holdup, we find that the effect is driven by the use of contingent clauses, is largest in sectors with high relationship-specific investments, and is increasing with local economic uncertainty.

We provide a model of conflict and mass killing decisions to identify the key variables and situations that make mass killings more likely to occur. We predict that mass killings are most likely in countries with large amounts of natural resource rents, polarization, institutional constraints regarding rent sharing, and low productivity of labor. The role of resources such as oil, gas, and diamonds and other key determinants of mass killings is confirmed by our empirical results based on country-level as well as ethnic group–level analysis.