We examine whether Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) financial statement disclosure alters local governments' economic decision-making. To do so, we exploit a recent GASB standard that eliminated differences in the disclosure requirements for county governments' pension obligations. The standard, GASB 68, had no effect on pension economics or the annual budget—it affected only whether and how information was presented on GASB financial statements. Using a broad hand-collected dataset, we document that counties that did not disclose information about their pension obligations before GASB 68 reduced public welfare expenditures, employment, and salary expenses relative to those that had disclosed such information. We conduct extensive field research and employ several cross-sectional analyses to conclude that the effects we document are in part driven by increased awareness of the financial costs of pension obligations by newly disclosing counties.

We examine the effect of IPO proceeds on post-IPO liquidity and market monitoring. To do so we exploit variation in the amount of proceeds raised that is unrelated to firm size and manager decisions using an instrumental variable approach. We find that marginal increases in IPO proceeds lead to large increases in liquidity, analyst coverage, and institutional ownership in the first two years a firm is public. Increases in IPO proceeds also lead to more frequent follow-on offerings and longer survival as a public firm. We find evidence that immediate shocks to ownership dispersion represent one plausible channel through which changes in IPO proceeds affect long-run liquidity and market monitoring. Overall, our findings support the theoretical liquidity and market quality benefits associated with reductions in ownership concentration.

We study the real effects on innovation of a transformative change in corporate disclosure dissemination, the implementation of the SEC’s EDGAR system. On the one hand, increased disclosure dissemination can lower firms’ cost of capital, thereby stimulating innovative activity. On the other hand, increased dissemination can exacerbate proprietary disclosure costs, reducing firms’ incentives to innovate. We show that treated firms reduce innovation investment following EDGAR’s implementation. In contrast, EDGAR reporting firms’ innovation investment cuts are met with an increase in innovation investment by their technology rivals. Consistent with an increase in proprietary costs, EDGAR-filers disclose less about their innovation activities. We also find evidence of a redistribution of innovative activity from public to private firms not subject to EDGAR disclosure requirements. Overall, our results are consistent with increased disclosure dissemination crowding out investment in innovative projects, whose returns negatively depend on information spillovers.

This paper examines the informativeness of special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) revenue forecasts. We document a positive association between the compound annual growth rate in revenue forecasts and abnormal returns, retail trading, and Twitter activity in the five-day window surrounding the disclosure of a merger announcement. By contrast, we find limited evidence that institutional investors and traditional information intermediaries respond to SPAC revenue forecasts. We also find evidence that SPAC revenue forecasts positively predict future operating underperformance, stock underperformance, and class action lawsuits. Overall, our results affirm the SEC’s concerns about the attractiveness of aggressive revenue projections to retail investors.