Using cash flows from a large sample of buyout and venture funds, I show that private equity (PE) distributions predict returns in the industries of funds’ specialization. My tests distinguish timing skill from reactions to market conditions and spillover effects of PE activity. Fund managers foresee comparable public firms’ earnings but sell at the industry peaks only if they have performance fees to harvest. These results have implications for manager selection and improve our understanding of PE fund returns and the role of PE in capital markets.

We propose a simple and intuitive measure of the annualized excess return of investments in private equity (PE) funds, as well as in similar vehicles that hold hard-to-values assets. Our ‘Direct Alpha’ method is well-founded in theory and dominates the existing approaches to convert fund lifetime returns into inputs amenable for portfolio-wide optimization. Existing Public Market Equivalent (PME) approaches are either heuristic or involve significant approximation errors. Using real-world PE fund cash flow data, we juxtapose Direct Alpha against nearly all PME methods that have been in broad use.

Private equity funds hold assets that are hard to value. Managers have incentives to distort reported valuations if these reports are used by investors to decide on commitments to subsequent funds. Using a large dataset of buyout and venture funds, we test for the presence of return manipulations. We find that some underperforming managers inflate reported returns during fundraising. However, those managers are less likely to raise a next fund, suggesting that investors can see through the manipulation. In contrast, top-performing funds appear to understate valuations. A simple theoretical framework rationalizes our empirical results as well as those of related papers.