This paper examines the performance of auditors in generating hypotheses in an analytical review case both prior to and after review. It partitions two possible sources of gain from the review process, namely the discussion effect and the rank effect. The discussion effect compares review groups with and without discussion. The rank effect compares seniors and audit managers. The study found that the review process results in more plausible hypotheses being generated. Discussion within the review process between reviewer and reviewee was found to be one source of gain from the review process. While there was no difference in the performance of the senior and manager reviewers, managers completed the task in less time.

This paper analyzes the behavior of U. S. governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation-building model of political behavior. We argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model. We find evidence that taxes, spending, and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a Democrat is in office. The result is a fiscal cycle in term-limit states, which lowers state income when the term limit binds.