Data is nonrival: a person’s location history, medical records, and driving data can be used by many firms simultaneously. Nonrivalry leads to increasing returns. As a result, there may be social gains to data being used broadly across firms, even in the presence of privacy considerations. Fearing creative destruction, firms may choose to hoard their data, leading to the inefficient use of nonrival data. Giving data property rights to consumers can generate allocations that are close to optimal. Consumers balance their concerns for privacy against the economic gains that come from selling data broadly.

Using country-level data, we study the relation between institutionalization of capital and various measures of reliance on public equity markets. For developed and developing countries, assets under institutional management (mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies) are negatively related to the number of listed companies, market capitalization, and trading volume. The negative relationships are estimated on the margin, as other factors such as GDP have countervailing positive partial effects and are generally stronger for more highly developed countries. Results indicate that as direct ownership of equity by retail investors is displaced by investing through institutions, financial systems become less public-market-centric.

We study whether the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms varies depending on the characteristics of the executives subject to these mechanisms, namely their “psychological type,” as proxied by their history of legal infractions. In particular, we examine insider trading, where we can compare the trading behavior of different types of executives in the same firm. We find that “recordholder” executives, that is, those with prior legal infractions, earn significantly higher profits from purchases and sales than nonrecordholder executives. Furthermore, the profitability of both purchases and sales is significantly increasing in the severity of the infraction. Governance mechanisms, such as blackout policies, lower profits of executives with only traffic infractions; however, profits for executives with serious infractions appear insensitive to blackout policies. Insiders with serious infractions are also more likely to trade during blackout periods and before large information events and are more likely to report their trades to the SEC after the filing deadline. Collectively, our evidence suggests that while governance mechanisms can discipline executives with minor offenses, they appear largely ineffective for those with more serious infractions.

Using NYSE short-sale order data, we investigate whether short sellers’ informational advantage is related to firm earnings and analyst-related events. With a novel decomposition method, we find that while these fundamental event days constitute only 12% of sample days, they account for over 24% of the overall underperformance of heavily shorted stocks. Importantly, short sellers use both public news and private information to anticipate news regarding earnings and analysts. Shorting’s predictive ability remains significant after controlling for information in analyst actions and displays no reversal patterns, indicating that short sellers know more than analysts, and the nature of their information is long term.

Using a rich panel of owner-operated New York dairy farms, we provide new evidence on entrepreneurial behavior. We formulate a dynamic model of farms facing uninsured risks and financial constraints. Farmers derive nonpecuniary benefits from operating their businesses. We estimate the model via simulated minimum distance, matching both production and financial data. We find that financial factors and nonpecuniary benefits are of first-order importance. Collateral constraints and liquidity restrictions inhibit borrowing and the accumulation of capital, especially among high-productivity firms seeking to expand. The nonpecuniary benefits to farming are large and keep small, low-productivity farms in business. Although farmers are risk averse, eliminating uninsured production risk has only modest effects on capital and output.

Long-run growth in many models is the product of two terms: the effective number of researchers and their research productivity. We present evidence from various industries, products, and firms showing that research effort is rising substantially while research productivity is declining sharply. A good example is Moore’s Law. The number of researchers required today to achieve the famous doubling of computer chip density is more than 18 times larger than the number required in the early 1970s. More generally, everywhere we look we find that ideas, and the exponential growth they imply, are getting harder to find.

We study the sources of racial disparities in income using anonymized longitudinal data covering nearly the entire U.S. population from 1989 to 2015. We document three results. First, black Americans and American Indians have much lower rates of upward mobility and higher rates of downward mobility than whites, leading to persistent disparities across generations. Conditional on parent income, the black-white income gap is driven by differences in wages and employment rates between black and white men; there are no such differences between black and white women. Hispanic Americans have rates of intergenerational mobility more similar to whites than blacks, leading the Hispanic-white income gap to shrink across generations. Second, differences in parental marital status, education, and wealth explain little of the black-white income gap conditional on parent income. Third, the black-white gap persists even among boys who grow up in the same neighborhood. Controlling for parental income, black boys have lower incomes in adulthood than white boys in 99% of Census tracts. The few areas with small black-white gaps tend to be low-poverty neighborhoods with low levels of racial bias among whites and high rates of father presence among blacks. Black males who move to such neighborhoods earlier in childhood have significantly better outcomes. However, less than 5% of black children grow up in such areas. Our findings suggest that reducing the black-white income gap will require efforts whose impacts cross neighborhood and class lines and increase upward mobility specifically for black men.