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The Choice of Performance Measures in Annual Bonus Contracts

The Accounting Review 1997 72(2), 231-255
[This paper examines the factors influencing the relative weights placed on financial and non-financial performance measures in CEO bonus contracts. We find that the use of non-financial measures increases with the level of regulation, the extent to which the firm follows an innovation-oriented strategy, the adoption of strategic quality initiatives, and the noise in financial measures. We find no evidence that the choice of performance measures in bonus contracts is associated with the level of financial distress or the value of CEO equity holdings relative to salary and bonus. Our results also provide no support for the hypothesis that CEOs with greater influence over the board of directors are more likely to be compensated based on non-financial measures.]

Assessing empirical research in managerial accounting: a value-based management perspective

Journal of Accounting and Economics 2001 32(1-3), 349-410 open access
This paper applies a value-based management framework to critically review empirical research in managerial accounting. This framework enables us to place the exceptionally diverse set of managerial accounting studies from the past several decades into an integrated structure. Our synthesis highlights the many consistent results in prior research, identifies remaining gaps and inconsistencies, discusses common methodological and econometric problems, and suggests fruitful avenues for future managerial accounting research.

Determinants of Performance Measure Choices in Worker Incentive Plans

Journal of Labor Economics 2002 20(S2), S58-S90
This study examines the determinants of performance measure choices in worker incentive plans. The results indicate that informativeness issues such as those addressed in economic theories have a significant effect on measurement choices. However, other reasons for adopting the plans, such as upgrading the workforce and linking bonuses to the firm’s ability to pay, also influence measurement choices, as do union representation and management participation in plan design. Moreover, the factors influencing the use of specific measures vary, suggesting that the aggregate performance measure classifications commonly used in compensation research provide somewhat misleading inferences regarding performance measurement choices.