The adoption of common accounting standards generates both a precision effect and a network effect. When firms use common standards, investors can leverage their knowledge about the standards to process more financial reports. Embedding both effects into the economic framework of Baiman and Verrecchia (1995, 1996), we study the adoption’s effects on reporting precision, firm value, and liquidity of both the switcher and the early adopter. The model helps address the identification challenge and reconcile some existing results in the empirical literature on IFRS adoption. It also generates implications for standardizing disclosure and accounting methods.

We study the role of reporting systems in the context of bank runs. In our model, a bank receives an early but imprecise estimate of its investment performance, and its financial reporting system generates a report. We find that, from a financial-stability standpoint, the optimal reporting system requires full disclosure when the bank’s early estimate is below a certain threshold, but no disclosure otherwise. Importantly, such optimal reporting threshold should be tailored to the bank’s exposure to bank-run risk. In particular, the threshold is nonmonotonic and U-shaped in the bank-run risk. We also relate our results to current accounting standards and discuss their implications for policy-making and empirical research.

We study firms' investment in internal controls to reduce accounting manipulation. We first show that peer managers' manipulation decisions are strategic complements: one manager manipulates more if he believes that reports of peer firms are more likely to be manipulated. As a result, one firm's investment in internal controls has a positive externality on peer firms. It reduces its own manager's manipulation, which, in turn, mitigates the manipulation pressure on managers at peer firms. Firms do not internalize this positive externality and, thus, underinvest in their internal controls over financial reporting. The problem of underinvestment provides one justification for regulatory intervention in firms' internal controls choices.

We propose a model to study how auditing standards affect audit quality. We posit that both auditors' incentives and expertise are relevant for audit effectiveness. Auditing standards are useful in mitigating the auditors' possible misalignment of interest with investors. However, auditing standards also restrict auditors' exercise of professional judgment, which, in turn, leads to compliance mentality and reduces auditors' incentives to become competent in the first place. We identify the conditions under which stricter auditing standards increase or decrease audit quality. Moreover, stricter auditing standards always increase audit fees, but can benefit auditors at firms' expense. The model also generates many testable empirical predictions.

We study the investment efficiency of the historical cost and fair value measurement rules when a reporting firm and its investors confront higher-order uncertainty inferring the behavior of others. Although all investors are attentive to the firm’s report, the firm and investors incorrectly believe only some investors are attentive. We find that a report prepared under the historical cost rule yields greater investment efficiency than under the fair value rule if and only if (1) the investors are badly calibrated, (2) the firm’s production technology exhibits sufficiently strong returns to scale, (3) the firm’s productivity realization is sufficiently negatively correlated with market returns, and (4) the firm is sufficiently well calibrated about its investors’ attentiveness.

In this paper, we analyze the social value of accounting objectivity in maintaining financial stability. Building on an early influential accounting study by Ijiri and Jaedicke (1966), we operationalize two informational properties, accuracy (free of collective bias) and objectivity (degree of consensus), in a correlated information structure and embed them into a model of runs on financial institutions. We show that when compared with the accuracy property, the objectivity property exhibits an advantage in mitigating inefficient panic-based runs. In fact, it is possible that improving objectivity discourages such runs, whereas improving accuracy encourages them. Our model also sheds light on the design of optimal accounting systems to enhance objectivity. We find that to generate a more objective accounting report, accounting systems should be designed to be less vulnerable to intentional managerial intervention.

We examine the impact of increasing whistleblowing bounties on whistleblowers' strategy and regulatory efficiency in detecting fraud. Our analysis shows the regulator extracts information about the incidence of fraud from whistleblowers' actions, and the quality of such information depends on the size of whistleblowing bounties. With a larger bounty, upon receiving a whistleblowing report, the quality of the regulator's information about fraud deteriorates, whereas upon observing no whistleblowing, the information quality about no fraud improves. Although the informational improvement upon no whistleblowing has not been widely discussed, we demonstrate it is a key determinant of the optimal whistleblowing program. We show, considering the informational value of whistleblowing and no whistleblowing, the regulator should set the bounty to encourage more whistleblowing when the prior belief of fraud is stronger and the insider is better informed. Our analysis generates policy and empirical implications for designing and studying whistleblowing programs.

We adopt a financial‐materiality approach in studying the costs and benefits of measuring greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on social welfare. Production by firms internally generates direct GHG emissions (Scope 1 emissions) whereas outsourcing to suppliers generates indirect emissions (Scope 3 emissions). Our analysis incorporates two frictions: (1) long‐term negative environmental externalities caused by emissions and (2) fragmentation in regulating emissions disclosures across jurisdictions. We show firms' failure to internalize the environmental externalities provides a rationale for mandating Scopes 1 and 3 emissions disclosures. However, such disclosures induce emissions leakage. Disciplining emissions leakage calls for setting complementary—rather than independent—disclosure requirements for Scopes 1 and 3 emissions. Our analysis underscores the importance of improving the reliability of Scope 3 emissions measurements given that measurements of Scope 1 emissions are highly reliable for public firms in Europe and the United States. Regulators can further enhance the disciplinary effects of Scope 3 emission measurements by requiring the allocations of Scope 3 emissions in supply chains to individual firms, especially when allocating Scope 3 emissions is more reliable, and for firms/industries that are more prone to transition climate risk relative to physical climate risk.

We investigate how provisioning models interact with bank regulation to affect banks' risk‐taking behavior. We study an accuracy versus timeliness trade‐off between an incurred loss model (IL) and an expected loss model (EL) such as current expected credit loss model or International Financial Reporting Standards 9. Relative to IL, even though EL improves efficiency by prompting earlier corrective action in bad times, it induces banks to originate either safer or riskier loans. Trading off ex post benefits versus ex ante real effects, we show that more timely information under EL enhances efficiency either when banks are insufficiently capitalized or when regulatory intervention is likely to be effective. Conversely, when banks are moderately capitalized and regulatory intervention is sufficiently costly, switching to EL impairs efficiency. From a policy perspective, our analysis highlights the roles that regulatory capital and the effectiveness of regulatory intervention play in determining the economic consequences of provisioning models. EL spurs credit supply and improves financial stability in economies where intervening in banks' operations is relatively frictionless and/or regulators can tailor regulatory capital to incorporate information about credit losses.

We examine whether stress tests distort banks' risk‐taking decisions. We study a model in which a regulator may choose to rescue banks in the event of concurrent bank failures. Our analysis reveals a novel coordination role of stress tests. Disclosure of stress‐test results informs banks of the failure likelihood of other banks, which can reduce welfare by facilitating banks' coordination in risk‐taking. However, conducting stress tests also enables the regulator to more effectively intervene banks, coordinating them preemptively into taking lower risks. We find that, if the regulator has a strong incentive to bail out, stress tests improve welfare, whereas if the regulator's incentive to bail out is weak, stress tests impair welfare.