Internalization happens when orders submitted through the same broker are intentionally matched to each other on-exchange or off-exchange. We study the impact of allowing (modes of) internalization on trading rates, investor welfare, and payment for order flow (PFOF). Internalization affects the choice between limit orders and market orders and the participation of dealers in trading. Greater dealer participation creates a greater scope for PFOF. A crucial determinant is the size of the tick. For small ticks, compared with the absence of internalization, its presence leads to higher trading rates, lower investor welfare, and more PFOF. The opposite holds for wide ticks.

Investors face reduced incentives to finance technological change that devalues their legacy investments. We formalize this “asset overhang” and apply our framework to the climate-banking nexus. Leveraging (1) firm-level data on green innovation and diffusion and (2) the sets of product and technology market peers, we implement a shift-share design that identifies banks’ credit facilities impacted by green firm activities. We find that green firms imposing an asset overhang across all lenders are 3 to 7 percentage points more likely to report tight credit supply conditions. The presence of legacy-free investors mitigates the asset overhang problem, thereby facilitating technological change.

[Assessing the impacts of bank mergers on small firms requires separating borrowers with single versus multiple banking relationships and distinguishing the three alternatives of "staying," "dropping," and "switching" of relationships. Single-relationship borrowers who "switch" to another bank following a merger will be less harmed than those whose relationship is "dropped" and not replaced. Using Belgian data, we find that single-relationship borrowers of target banks are more likely than other borrowers to be dropped. We track postmerger performance and show that many dropped target-bank borrowers are harmed by the merger. Multiple-relationship borrowers are less harmed, as they can better hedge against relationship discontinuations.]

Since 1990, London’s SEAQ International (SEAQ-I) has attracted considerable trading volume in Belgian equities. This paper investigates competition between the Brussels CATS market and London’s SEAQ-I. Toward this end, we gathered extensive limit order book data as well as transactions and quotation information. With regard to liquidity (indirect costs), measured by the quoted and effective bid–ask spread, the paper concludes that CATS outperforms SEAQ International for both measures. The effective spread is of course substantially smaller than the quoted spread, with the CATS effective spread showing a U-shaped form. This paper, unique in employing an extensive data set that includes all hidden orders and the whole limit order book, produces results in line with the different market microstructure models. Total trading costs on CATS are lower (higher) for small (large) trade sizes.

We investigate relationship lending using detailed contract information from nearly 18,000 bank loans to small Belgian firms operating within the continental European bank-based system. Specifically, we investigate the impact of different measures of relationship strength on price and nonprice terms of the loan contract. We test for the possibility of rent shifting by banks. The evidence shows two opposing effects. On the one hand, the loan rate increases with the duration of a bank–firm relationship. On the other hand, the scope of a relationship, defined as the purchase of other information-sensitive products from a bank, decreases the loan's interest rate substantially. Relationship duration and scope thus have opposite effects on loan rates, with the latter being more important. We also find that the collateral requirement is decreasing in the duration of the relationship and increasing in its scope. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21, G32.

Financial systems all over the world have grown dramatically over recent decades. But is more finance necessarily better? And what concept of financial system – a focus on its size, including both intermediation and other auxiliary “non-intermediation” activities, or a focus on traditional intermediation activity – is relevant for its impact on real sector outcomes? This paper assesses the relationship between the size of the financial system and intermediation, on the one hand, and GDP per capita growth and growth volatility, on the other hand. Based on a sample of 77 countries for the period 1980–2007, we find that intermediation activities increase growth and reduce volatility in the long run. An expansion of the financial sectors along other dimensions has no long-run effect on real sector outcomes. Over shorter time horizons a large financial sector stimulates growth at the cost of higher volatility in high-income countries. Intermediation activities stabilize the economy in the medium run especially in low-income countries. As this is an initial exploration of the link between financial system indicators and growth and volatility, we focus on OLS regressions, leaving issues of endogeneity and omitted variable biases for future research.

How do banks react to increased competition? Recent banking theory significantly disagrees regarding the impact of competition on bank orientation—i.e., the choice of relationship-based versus transactional banking. We empirically investigate the impact of interbank competition on bank branch orientation. We employ a unique data set containing detailed information on bank–firm relationships. We find that bank branches facing stiff local competition engage considerably more in relationship-based lending. Our results illustrate that competition and relationships are not necessarily inimical.

We study the effect of governments’ fiscal support on banks’ loan loss provisioning during the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, we decompose fiscal support into direct support and liquidity support to examine the effect of different types of support measures on banks’ loan loss provisioning. Direct support generally refers to cash transfers, tax reliefs, and tax deferrals, while liquidity support generally refers to government-backed loans and equity injections. We find that direct support reduced banks’ loan portfolio risk whereas liquidity support did not. Moreover, we find the effect goes beyond a macroeconomic stabilization effect, suggesting that direct support directly contributed to mitigating banks’ loan portfolio risk during the pandemic. Our results are robust to controlling for other policy interventions, alternative model specifications, and an instrumental variable approach. We further discuss the policy implications of our analysis.

We study whether banks’ involvement into different types of securitization activity – asset backed securities (ABS) and covered bonds – in Spain influences credit supply before and during the financial crisis. While both ABS and covered bonds were hit by the crisis, the former were hit more severely. Employing a disequilibrium model to identify credit rationing, we find that firms with banks that were more involved in securitization see their credit constraints more relaxed in normal periods. In contrast, only greater covered bonds issuance reduces credit rationing during crisis periods whereas ABS aggravates these firms’ credit rationing in crisis periods. Our results are in line with the theoretical predictions that a securitization instrument that retains risk (covered bond) may induce a more prudent risk behavior of banks than an instrument that provides risk transferring (ABS).