We investigate how firms' use of derivatives impacts voluntary disclosure and offer four main findings. First, we find that when firms begin using derivative instruments, they increase the frequency of management earnings forecasts. Second, using path analysis, we find a direct link between derivative usage and forecast frequency, as well as an indirect link through reduced earnings volatility. Third, we find that CEOs with more pronounced career concerns increase forecast frequency only when derivatives make earnings easier to forecast and find no evidence that investor demand drives the decision to provide a forecast. These results suggest that the primary mechanism for the association between derivative usage and forecast frequency is a reduction in the manager's costs of providing the forecasts. Finally, we find that the majority of derivative‐induced forecasts are uninformative to capital market participants, especially after FAS 161 provided the necessary underlying data to understand how firms use derivatives. Overall, we provide the first empirical evidence that firms that use derivatives issue more management forecasts, but we also find that these incremental forecasts are largely uninformative and appear driven by managerial career concerns.

Cash flow hedge derivatives are an example of an economic transaction that is not fully portrayed in the financial statements in two key ways. First, while changes in the fair value of the derivative are recorded at each reporting date, changes in the value of the underlying purchase or sale commitment are not recorded or disclosed until that transaction occurs. Therefore, until the purchase or sale occurs, the financial statements only portray half of the economic transaction. Second, the gains/losses associated with these derivatives provide an inverse signal about the persistence of firm profitability. We document a method by which financial statement users can partially adjust for these distortions and find evidence that debt investors incorporate information conveyed by cash flow hedge gains/losses into their pricing of new debt issuances. We also find evidence that credit analysts incorporate these adjustments into their firm‐level credit ratings but are unable to find consistent evidence of similar adjustments to credit ratings on new debt issuances. Overall, our results suggest that a subset of sophisticated investors (i.e., those in public debt markets) appear to incorporate information from cash flow hedge accounting into their assessments of firm risk, and that users may benefit from enhanced disclosure about the amount and timing of a firm's future transactions that are exposed to foreign currency, interest rate, or commodity price risk as well as the amount and timing of derivatives that protect the firm from those risks.

This paper estimates the cross‐sectional distribution of Epstein‐Zin preferences using the wealth and risky portfolio shares of a large panel of Swedish households. We find modestly heterogeneous risk aversion (standard deviation 0.97, median 7.50) and a meaningfully heterogeneous and right‐skewed time preference rate (TPR; standard deviation 7.31%, median 4.08%) and elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS; standard deviation 3.17, median 0.70). Risk aversion and the EIS are only very weakly negatively correlated. We estimate lower risk aversion for households with riskier labor income, and a higher TPR and lower EIS for households that enter our sample with low wealth.

This paper uses data on all house transactions in Massachusetts over the last 20 years to show that houses sold after foreclosure, or close in time to the death or bankruptcy of a seller, are sold at lower prices than other houses. Foreclosure discounts are on average at 27 percent of the value of a house. Moreover, foreclosures that take place within small local geographies of a house lower the price at which it is sold. Our preferred estimate is that a foreclosure at a distance of 0.05 miles lowers the price of a house by about 1 percent. JEL: D14, R31

Most research on non-GAAP financial measures focuses on earnings or earnings per share, although non-GAAP revenue disclosure has recently attracted SEC scrutiny. It is unclear ex ante what non-GAAP adjustments could improve revenue's usefulness because, unlike earnings, revenue is a top-line number related primarily to core (i.e., persistent) business activities. We present the first archival analysis of non-GAAP revenues using a large, hand-collected sample of disclosures from 2015 to 2018. Approximately one in five earnings announcements contains a non-GAAP revenue disclosure, focused on revenue growth. Our evidence suggests that firms disclose non-GAAP revenue when GAAP revenue is incomparable with prior periods, and not to compensate for poor GAAP performance. Furthermore, non-GAAP revenue growth predicts future revenue growth better than GAAP revenue growth, and the market responds to this information. Overall, non-GAAP revenue disclosures are motivated by economic fundamentals rather than opportunism, on average, and they provide investors with relevant information.

Prior research finds that unrealized gains/losses on cash flow hedges are negatively associated with future earnings, and that investors and analysts fail to anticipate this association. These studies speculate that this mispricing is due to either poor derivatives disclosures or the accounting model for cash flow hedges. We examine whether enhanced mandatory derivatives disclosures set forth in FAS 161 improve users' understanding of firms' hedging activities and offer three main findings. First, we find that this mispricing does not persist after FAS 161. Second, we find that the correction of mispricing is greatest when disclosure might help investors most. Finally, we find that analyst forecast accuracy improves after FAS 161. Overall, our results suggest that the enhanced mandatory derivative disclosures required by FAS 161 improved users' understanding of the effects of derivative and hedging activities on future firm performance and firm value—and consequently mitigated investor mispricing.

This paper uses a disaggregated approach to study the volatility of common stocks at the market, industry, and firm levels. Over the period from 1962 to 1997 there has been a noticeable increase in firm‐level volatility relative to market volatility. Accordingly, correlations among individual stocks and the explanatory power of the market model for a typical stock have declined, whereas the number of stocks needed to achieve a given level of diversification has increased. All the volatility measures move together countercyclically and help to predict GDP growth. Market volatility tends to lead the other volatility series. Factors that may be responsible for these findings are suggested.

Boards of directors encourage risk-averse managers to take risky actions by providing stock options and severance pay. We demonstrate that the ability of these incentives to encourage risk-taking hinges on the level of uncertainty facing the manager. We confirm prior findings that stock option convexity encourages risk-taking but find that this relation only holds when market-wide uncertainty is low. We also confirm prior findings that severance pay encourages risk-taking but find that this relation only holds during high market-wide uncertainty and negative market-wide performance. Finally, we find that compensation committees respond to variation in uncertainty by adjusting the level of option grants. Our results suggest that the effectiveness of incentives to take risk varies with the market-wide uncertainty, and that boards consider this in annual compensation design. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

We build an empirical model to attribute delays in mortgage refinancing to psychological costs inhibiting refinancing until incentives are sufficiently strong; and behavior, potentially attributable to information-gathering costs, lowering the probability of household refinancing per unit time at any incentive. We estimate the model on administrative panel data from Denmark, where mortgage refinancing without cash-out is unconstrained. Middle-aged and wealthy households act as if they have high psychological refinancing costs; but older, poorer, and less-educated households refinance with lower probability irrespective of incentives, thereby achieving lower savings. We use the model to understand frictions in the mortgage channel of monetary policy transmission.