In this study, we explore the impact of the establishment of environmental courts, an environmental justice system, on the cost of equity capital. Based on a quasi-natural experiment of establishing environmental courts in China, we find that they have a deterrent effect and reduce the cost of equity capital for heavily polluting firms in localities. We also find that a low proportion of managerial ownership, a low level of analyst attention, and high environmental uncertainty induce this deterrent effect. Furthermore, mechanism tests indicate that environmental courts enhance corporate environmental engagement and corporate ESG ratings, increase long-term institutional investor ownership, and reduce urban environmental violations to achieve a deterrent effect. The findings are more pronounced for the trial court sample, firms in cities with lower public participation in environmental protection, and firms with lower environmental information transparency. We also suggest the impacts and underlying mechanisms of the environmental justice system on the equity capital market, which is conducive to long-term planning by firm managers.

Motivated by prior literature on organizational identification and 23 semistructured interviews with a variety of US audit partners and directors, we examine whether the gender and ethnic diversity of an office's audit partners influences the retention of the office's audit professionals and the quality of the audits conducted by the office. Using hand‐collected data on US audit partners, we find that greater levels of (or changes in) diversity in office audit partners' gender and ethnicity are associated with lower (reduced) turnover among office audit professionals and higher (increased) office‐level audit quality. We conduct a path analysis based on the most common mechanisms highlighted in our interviews to provide further insight into the audit quality results. The results indicate partial mediation through increased retention, greater gender and ethnic diversity among office audit personnel, client continuity, and increased efficiency. Further tests reveal that the association with audit quality is incremental to, and distinct from, the effect of individual engagement partner characteristics and does not reflect client screening. The findings underscore the importance of gender and ethnic diversity among office audit partners to organizational outcomes and provide important practical implications for audit firms.

We examine the impact of the SEC’s Office of Minority and Women Inclusion (OMWI) on the role of employee gender in the Division of Corporation Finance’s filing review process. Gender bias theory suggests that women may work harder to compensate for perceived bias and discrimination. Consistent with this theory, we find that women reviewers issue longer comment letters, raise more issues, ask more accounting-specific questions, reference more authoritative guidance, request more filing amendments, follow up on more issues from prior rounds, and take longer to close the comment letter process. We also find that women are less prevalent in higher paygrades and leadership positions. These gender differences attenuate after the establishment of OMWI in 2011, but significant differences remain. Analyses of SEC employee survey data corroborate our comment letter results. Data Availability: All data are publicly available.

Whether audit firms should disclose financial statements is controversial among investors, practitioners, and regulators. The debate centers on whether audit firms’ financial statements provide information about audit quality. Using hand-collected data from U.K. audit firms’ financial statements, we construct four measures that capture audit firms’ resource investments (i.e., human capital, workplace environment, technologies) and risk exposures (i.e., litigation provisions). We find that increases in audit firms’ staff costs, investments in tangible assets and IT software, and reductions in litigation provisions are associated with improved audit quality. The information in audit firms’ financial statements is not contained in their transparency reports or regulatory inspection reports. Additional tests show that increases in audit firms’ staff costs and tangible assets, as well as reductions in litigation provisions, are associated with improved audit efficiency.

Although recent evidence suggests that individual audit partners explain a substantial portion of the variation in audit quality proxies, much less is known about what determines an audit partner's quality. Psychology and behavioral economics theories hold that an individual's experiences can have enduring impacts on subsequent behavior. We examine whether auditors' direct exposure to Arthur Andersen's collapse has a long‐term impact on the quality of their audits. Our evidence implies that audit partners who directly experienced Andersen's demise impose stricter monitoring evident in their clients exhibiting a lower propensity for misstatements and small profits, and paying higher audit fees. Importantly, these findings reconcile with research in finance and economics implying that firsthand experiences matter more to subsequent behavior than general economic conditions or secondhand or thirdhand experiences. Collectively, the results shed light on one facet of how partners' audit quality evolves over time. Our findings suggest that major failures associated with the audit firm in which an auditor works can ultimately result in these affected individuals later delivering higher audit quality, which should benefit audit committees in partner selection decisions and audit firms in designing partner assignment policies.

Our study is motivated by the theory of credence goods in the auditing setting. We propose that audit committee accounting expertise should reduce information asymmetries between the auditor and the client, thereby limiting auditors' ability to over-audit and under-audit. Consistent with this notion, our results indicate that when audit committees have accounting expertise, clients (1) pay lower fees when changes in standards decrease required audit effort; (2) pay a smaller fee premium in the presence of remediated material weaknesses; and (3) have a reduced likelihood of restatement when audit market competition is high. Our findings in the under-auditing setting generally are strongest among non-Big 4 engagements, consistent with non-Big 4 auditors being less sensitive to market-wide disciplining mechanisms such as reputation, legal liability, and professional regulation. We also provide evidence that the nature of audit committee members' accounting expertise differentially impacts the committee's ability to curtail over- and under-auditing.

This study examines the association between a shared common auditor among suppliers and customers and trade credit. Using hand-collected pairwise trade credit data, we find that a supplier extends more trade credit to a customer audited by a common auditor. This association is robust to alternative design specifications and various sample restrictions to alleviate selection bias. We then interview trade credit managers and executives as a prelude to archival analyses exploring multiple potential mechanisms to explain this association. The collective results are most consistent with the explanation that mutual third parties to a dyadic relationship can foster trust through social connections and increased salience of reputation effects rather than that a common auditor reduces information asymmetry about the rigor of the audit process. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.