American Economic Review200595(3), 602-615open access
We model an international union as a group of countries deciding to centralize the provision of public goods, or policies, that generate externalities across union members. The trade-off between the benefits of coordination and the loss of independent policymaking endogenously determines size, composition, and scope of the union. Policy uniformity reduces the size of the union, may block the entry of new members, and induces excessive centralization. We study flexible rules with nonuniform policies that reduce these inefficiencies, focusing particularly on arrangements that are relevant to the ongoing debate on the institutional structure of the European Union.
We study time variation in expected excess bond returns. We run regressions of one-year excess returns on initial forward rates. We find that a single factor, a single tent-shaped linear combination of forward rates, predicts excess returns on one-to five-year maturity bonds with R 2 up to 0.44. The return-forecasting factor is countercyclical and forecasts stock returns. An important component of the return-forecasting factor is unrelated to the level, slope, and curvature movements described by most term structure models. We document that measurement errors do not affect our central results.
American Economic Review200595(5), 1688-1699open access
Questions remain as to whether results from experimental economics are generalizable to real decisions in nonlaboratory settings. Furthermore, questions persist about whether social capital helps mitigate information asymmetries in credit markets. I examine whether behavior in two laboratory games, Trust and a Public Goods, predicts loan repayments to a Peruvian group-lending microfinance program. Since this program relies on social capital to enforce repayment, this tests the external validity of the games. Individuals identified as “trustworthy” by the Trust Game are indeed less likely to default on their loans. No similar support is found for the game's identification of “trusting” individuals.
The rise of Western Europe after 1500 is due largely to growth in countries with access to the Atlantic Ocean and with substantial trade with the New World, Africa, and Asia via the Atlantic. This trade and the associated colonialism affected Europe not only directly, but also indirectly by inducing institutional change. Where “initial” political institutions (those established before 1500) placed significant checks on the monarchy, the growth of Atlantic trade strengthened merchant groups by constraining the power of the monarchy, and helped merchants obtain changes in institutions to protect property rights. These changes were central to subsequent economic growth.
American Economic Review200595(2), 127-131open access
We present a theoretical model of airport searches. The model extends previous work in the area in that detection conditional on search is imperfect. The hit rates tests for racial bias developed in Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001) is shown to apply even in the presence of imperfections in monitoring. We then study two channels for improving airport security: better targeting and better detection. We show that better targeting does not necessarily decrease the overall crime rate, although it will decrease crime in the group that is targeted. Improved detection rates unambiguously decrease crime. Group-specific improvements in detection do not necessarily increase the number of searches for those groups. The analysis is extended to allow for the possibility that criminal passengers disguise themselves as members of low-crime groups.
The Net Effect of an Alcohol Tax Increase on Death Rates in Middle Age by Philip J. Cook, Jan Ostermann and Frank A. Sloan. Published in volume 95, issue 2, pages 278-281 of American Economic Review, May 2005
Fellowship Stipend Support and the Supply of Science and Engineering Students: NSF Graduate Research Fellowships by Richard B. Freeman. Published in volume 95, issue 2, pages 61-65 of American Economic Review, May 2005
Understanding the nature and sources of human identity is an important objective in the study of a variety of social problems. Scholarly and popular writing on the cultural determinants of economic disadvantage underscores this point. Some analysts (e.g., Edward Banfield, 1970; Thomas Sowell, 1994; John McWhorter, 2000; John Ogbu, 2003) have hypothesized that a causal connection exists between the poor social performance of a group of people and their “culture.” That disadvantaged people harbor “dysfunctional” notions about identity has been offered as an explanation of a group’s welfare dependency, or its low academic proficiency. It has been said, for instance, that people fare poorly because they focus overly much on their own victimization, or because they disassociate themselves from their more successful fellows, and so on. At the root of such cultural criticism lies the presumption that the disadvantaged should “reform” themselves: If those people would only see themselves differently, the critics hint, they could be so much better off. This mode of social explanation easily accommodates racial overtones. With the present paper we intend to raise serious doubts about such normative criticisms of the poor when applied to their conceptions of identity. We show that the identities adopted by a group of people can be perfectly consistent with rational individual choices, even though feasible alternative configurations may exist under which everyone would be better off. Indeed, we argue that identity choice by interactive agents with ongoing economic relations has a “tragedy of the commons” quality about it: the profile of dominant strategies for the agents can yield a Pareto-inferior collective outcome. Preaching “identity reform” to such people is a bit like trying to counter an overfishing problem by lecturing fishermen on the moral need for forbearance! We wish to be explicit and clear at the outset about what we have in mind when using the term “identity.” Human identity includes both a personal and a social aspect. Social identity deals with how an individual is perceived and categorized by others (e.g., Erving Goffman, 1963). In contrast, personal identity, which is the subject of this paper, and which psychologists sometimes call “ego identity,” deals with a person’s answer to the question: “Who am I?” Our proposed model of personal identity posits that, to answer this question, an agent must provide a “narrative” about her personal history. That is, she has to summarize her life experiences. Because a full personal history is (necessarily) a very complex object, and since their cognitive capacities are limited, answering the “Who Am I?” question requires agents to project elaborate personal accounts onto manageable categories of self-description. We think of an agent’s identity as the mechanism she uses to convert complex personal history into a more simplified account of herself. A group’s “collective identity” is any self-representational mode of this sort which has been adopted in common by (most of) the agents in that group. We formalize the problem of selective selfrepresentation and use the resulting framework to study the efficiency implications of the “identity” choices people make. This, we believe, is one way that economic analysis can contribute to the study of identity-related issues.
American Economic Review200595(4), 981-1004open access
Organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model. Unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory, we find that each voter's expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight. An exception occurs when many high-weight voters exist, as low-weight voters may expect disproportionately high payoffs due to proposal power. The model also predicts that, ex post, the coalition formateur (the party chosen to form a coalition) will receive a disproportionately high payoff. Using data from coalition governments from 1946 to 2001, we find strong evidence of such formateur effects.
We measure the impact of China's decision to open its economy in 1980 on outsourcing from Hong Kong and the relative demand for less-skilled workers. We show that the relative demand for skilled workers in Hong Kong increased at the same time outsourcing to China began to increase. The reallocation of workers from manufacturing to “outsourcing services” can account for 15 percent, and increased utilization of skilled workers within manufacturing industries for 30 percent, of the aggregate relative demand shift. In addition, the rate of skill upgrading has been greater in manufacturing industries that have seen a greater degree of outsourcing to China.