Knowledge that Transforms

I study the welfare and price implications of consumer privacy. A consumer discloses information to a multiproduct seller, which learns about his preferences, sets prices, and makes product recommendations. Although the consumer benefits from accurate recommendations, the seller may use the information to price discriminate. I show that the seller prefers to commit to not use information for pricing in order to encourage information disclosure. However, this commitment hurts the consumer, who could be better off by precommitting to withhold some information. In contrast to single-product models, total surplus may be lower if the seller can base prices on information. (JEL D11, D83, L81, M31)

School choice may lead to improvements in school productivity if parents’ choices reward effective schools and punish ineffective ones. This mechanism requires parents to choose schools based on causal effectiveness rather than peer characteristics. We study relationships among parent preferences, peer quality, and causal effects on outcomes for applicants to New York City’s centralized high school assignment mechanism. We use applicants’ rank-ordered choice lists to measure preferences and to construct selection-corrected estimates of treatment effects on test scores, high school graduation, college attendance, and college quality. Parents prefer schools that enroll high-achieving peers, and these schools generate larger improvements in short- and long-run student outcomes. Preferences are unrelated to school effectiveness and academic match quality after controlling for peer quality. (JEL D12, H75, I21, I26, I28)

Using a rich panel of owner-operated New York dairy farms, we provide new evidence on entrepreneurial behavior. We formulate a dynamic model of farms facing uninsured risks and financial constraints. Farmers derive nonpecuniary benefits from operating their businesses. We estimate the model via simulated minimum distance, matching both production and financial data. We find that financial factors and nonpecuniary benefits are of first-order importance. Collateral constraints and liquidity restrictions inhibit borrowing and the accumulation of capital, especially among high-productivity firms seeking to expand. The nonpecuniary benefits to farming are large and keep small, low-productivity farms in business. Although farmers are risk averse, eliminating uninsured production risk has only modest effects on capital and output. (JEL C51, D24, G32, Q12, Q14)

We study the design of child care subsidies in an optimal welfare problem with heterogeneous private market productivities. The optimal subsidy schedule is qualitatively similar to the existing US scheme. Efficiency mandates a subsidy on formal child care costs, with higher subsidies paid to lower income earners and a kink as a function of child care expenditure. Marginal labor income tax rates are set lower than the labor wedges, with the potential to generate negative marginal tax rates. We calibrate our simple model to features of the US labor market and focus on single mothers with children aged below 6. The optimal program provides stronger participation but milder intensive margin incentives for low-income earners with subsidy rates starting very high and decreasing with income more steeply than those in the United States. (JEL D82, H21, H24, J13, J16, J32)

The credibility revolution in economics has promoted causal identification using randomized control trials (RCT), difference-in-differences (DID), instrumental variables (IV) and regression discontinuity design (RDD). Applying multiple approaches to over 21,000 hypothesis tests published in 25 leading economics journals, we find that the extent of p-hacking and publication bias varies greatly by method. IV (and to a lesser extent DID) are particularly problematic. We find no evidence that (i) papers published in the Top 5 journals are different to others; (ii) the journal “revise and resubmit” process mitigates the problem; (iii) things are improving through time. (JEL A14, C12, C52)

To overcome the limits on traditional monetary policy imposed by the effective lower bound on short-term interest rates, in recent years the Federal Reserve and other advanced-economy central banks have deployed new policy tools. This lecture reviews what we know about the new monetary tools, focusing on quantitative easing (QE) and forward guidance, the principal new tools used by the Fed. I argue that the new tools have proven effective at easing financial conditions when policy rates are constrained by the lower bound, even when financial markets are functioning normally, and that they can be made even more effective in the future. Accordingly, the new tools should become part of the standard central bank toolkit. Simulations of the Fed’s FRB/US model suggest that, if the nominal neutral interest rate is in the range of 2–3 percent, consistent with most estimates for the United States, then a combination of QE and forward guidance can provide the equivalent of roughly 3 percentage points of policy space, largely offsetting the effects of the lower bound. If the neutral rate is much lower, however, then overcoming the effects of the lower bound may require additional measures, such as a moderate increase in the inflation target or greater reliance on fiscal policy for economic stabilization. (JEL D78, E31, E43, E52, E58, E62)

The rise of social media has provoked both optimism about potential societal benefits and concern about harms such as addiction, depression, and political polarization. In a randomized experiment, we find that deactivating Facebook for the four weeks before the 2018 US midterm election (i) reduced online activity, while increasing offline activities such as watching TV alone and socializing with family and friends; (ii) reduced both factual news knowledge and political polarization; (iii) increased subjective well-being; and post-experiment Facebook use. Deactivation reduced post-experiment valuations of Facebook, suggesting that traditional metrics may overstate consumer surplus. (JEL D12, D72, D90, I31, L82, L86, Z13)

I study a mechanism design problem involving a principal and a single, boundedly rational agent. The agent transitions among belief states by combining current beliefs with up to K pieces of information at a time. By expressing a mechanism as a complex contract—a collection of clauses, each providing limited information about the mechanism—the principal manipulates the agent into believing truthful reporting is optimal. I show that such bounded rationality expands the set of implementable functions and that optimal contracts are robust not only to variation in K, but to several plausible variations on the agent’s cognitive procedure. (JEL D82, D86)

In 2001, Norwegian tax records became easily accessible online, allowing everyone in the country to observe the incomes of everyone else. According to the income comparisons model, this change in transparency can widen the gap in well-being between richer and poorer individuals. Using survey data from 1985–2013 and multiple identification strategies, we show that the higher transparency increased the gap in happiness between richer and poorer individuals by 29 percent, and it increased the life satisfaction gap by 21 percent. We provide back-of-the-envelope estimates of the importance of income comparisons, and discuss implications for the ongoing debate on transparency policies. (JEL D31, H24, I31, K34)

We explore the role of charitable giving as a means of political influence. For philanthropic foundations associated with large US corporations, we present three different identification strategies that consistently point to the use of corporate social responsibility in ways that parallel the strategic use of political action committee (PAC) spending. Our estimates imply that 6.3 percent of corporate charitable giving may be politically motivated, an amount 2.5 times larger than annual PAC contributions and 35 percent of federal lobbying. Absent of disclosure requirements, charitable giving may be a form of corporate political influence undetected by voters and subsidized by taxpayers. (JEL D22, D64, D72, L31)