To investigate CEOs' incentives to liquidate their firms, we examine the effects of insider ownership and compensation in stock options on 30 voluntary liquidation decisions by industrial firms in the period 1975–1986. We find that liquidation decisions are influenced by CEO incentive plans and increase shareholder value. Firms with more outside board members, smaller market-to-book ratios, and attempts by outsiders to gain control are more likely to be liquidated. Although few top executives of liquidating firms subsequently take comparable jobs, at least 41% of CEOs who downsize are made better off by liquidation.

We develop a dynamic model of bank capital structure in an acquisitions context which predicts: (i) total bank value and the bank's equity capital are positively correlated in the cross-section, and (ii) the various components of bank value are also positively cross-sectionally related to bank capital. Our empirical tests provide strong support for these predictions. The results are robust to a variety of alternative explanations--growth prospects, desire to acquire toe-hold positions, desire of capital-starved acquirers to buy capital-rich targets, market timing, pecking order, the effect of banks with binding capital requirements, Too Big To Fail, target profitability, risk, and mechanical effects. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

We shed light on the narrative that listing contributes to risk-taking by examining the risk characteristics of listed BHCs, small enough to be private, against a sample of comparable private BHCs, large enough to be listed, over the 1987–2019 period. We measure our proxies for risk characteristics over different intervals in the sample period to account for the effect of new regulations and variation in the intensity of information production by regulators, markets, and financial firms. We document that listed banks are riskier than private banks over the 22-year sample period. Examining the subperiods, we find that listed banks are riskier than private banks before the crisis, but they may not be as risky following the crisis. While risk increases for all banks during the crisis, the increase in risk for listed banks during the crisis is greater than that for private banks. Our findings are both statistically and economically significant and suggest that financial reforms and regulatory expectations facing banks post-crisis might have contributed to the risk reduction for listed banks relative to private banks.

This paper examines firm performance around announcements of common stock issues. We study the banking industry in which some stock issues are made voluntarily by managers, and other issues are involuntary. We find that banks that voluntarily issue common stock experience a significant drop in the matched adjusted operating performance following the issue, a significant drop in benchmark firms' adjusted stock prices following the issue, and systematically negative market reactions to post‐issue quarterly earnings announcements. Banks that issue common stock involuntarily experience values for these measures that are not significantly different from those of the benchmark firm(s).

This paper examines firm performance around announcements of common stock issues. We study the banking industry in which some stock issues are made voluntarily by managers, and other issues are involuntary. We find that banks that voluntarily issue common stock experience a significant drop in the matched adjusted operating performance following the issue, a significant drop in benchmark firms' adjusted stock prices following the issue, and systematically negative market reactions to post-issue quarterly earnings announcements. Banks that issue common stock involuntarily experience values for these measures that are not significantly different from those of the benchmark firm(s).

A conflict of interest exists when a party to a transaction can gain by taking actions that are detrimental to its counterparty. This paper examines the growing empirical literature on the economics of conflicts of interest in financial institutions. Economic analysis shows that, although conflicts of interest are omnipresent when contracting is costly and parties are imperfectly informed, there are important factors that mitigate their impact and, strikingly, it is possible for customers of financial institutions to benefit from the existence of such conflicts. The empirical literature reaches conclusions that differ across types of conflicts of interest but are overall more ambivalent and certainly more benign than the conclusions drawn by journalists and politicians from mostly anecdotal evidence.

We find the financial condition of states impacts bank credit supply through their municipal bond holdings. In particular, we treat sudden political and statutory actions during the 2011 union bargaining rights debates in Wisconsin and Ohio as exogenous shocks to state solvency. We show bank valuations and municipal bond spreads adjust to the announcements, and, over longer horizons, a new lending channel linked to state solvency emerges, whereby banks supply credit as municipal bond appreciations free up capital.

The critical role played by financial institutions in the recent financial crises has generated renewed interest on the corporate finance of the banking firm and the impact of the banking sector on the real economy. This paper introduces the special issue of the Review of Financial Studies dedicated to “The Value of Bank Capital and the Structure of the Banking Industry.” The special issue combines papers presented at the conference on “Corporate Finance of Financial Intermediaries” in September 2006, which was jointly organized by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Wharton Financial Institutions Center of the University of Pennsylvania, and the Review of Financial Studies, with other related papers.

We develop a theory of optimal bank leverage in which the benefit of debt in inducing loan monitoring is balanced against the benefit of equity in attenuating risk shifting. However, faced with socially costly correlated bank failures, regulators bail out creditors. Anticipation of this generates multiple equilibria, including one with systemic risk in which banks use excessive leverage to fund correlated, inefficiently risky loans. Limiting leverage and resolving both moral hazards—insufficient loan monitoring and asset substitution—requires a novel two-tiered capital requirement, including a “special capital account” that is unavailable to creditors upon failure. Received April 23, 2015; accepted September 16, 2015 by Editor Paolo Fulghieri.

Abstract This article studies the connection between risk taking and executive compensation in financial institutions. A model of shareholders, debtholders, depositors, and an executive demonstrates that (i) excess risk taking can be addressed by basing compensation on both stock price and the credit default swaps (CDS) spread, (ii) shareholders may not be able to commit to design such contracts, and (iii) they may not want to due to distortions from deposit insurance or unobservable tail risk. The advantage of using the CDS spread rather than deferred compensation or debt is due to the fact that it is a market price and reduces agency costs.