There is an extensive empirical literature on political business cycles, but its theoretical foundations are grounded in pre-rational expectations macroeconomic theory. Here we show that electoral cycles in taxes, government spending and money growth can be modeled as an equilibrium signaling process. The cycle is driven by temporary information asymmetries which can arise if, for example, the government has more current information on its performance in providing for national defence. Incumbents cheat least when their private information is either extremely favourable or extremely unfavourable. An exogeneous increase in the incumbent party's popularity does not necessarily imply a damped policy cycle.

In recent years, economists have increasingly debated whether multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank, should switch from making subsidized loans to giving outright grants. It is no small question. The combined loans of the World Bank Group and brethren regional entities such as the Asian and Inter-American Development Banks, approach $300 billion. Their funds constitute a main channel through which rich country governments provide assistance to developing country governments. In Bulow and Rogoff (1990), we first developed the case for a shift to outright grants. We argued that under the status quo, a vastly disproportionate share of aid goes to middle income countries via disguised interest subsidies, rather than to the poorest countries. We also argued that a shift to grants would protect donor banks from sometimes having to play a “bad cop” role when trying to collect net repayments rather than fully rolling over loans. The “Meltzer Commission” (International Financial Institution Advisory Commission, 2000) report on government sponsored international lending institutions famously took a similar view. Supporters of the status quo often argue that development bank loans to middle income countries are in fact highly profitable, and are essential for allowing institutions like the World Bank to subsidize aid to poor countries. We shall argue that the Bank’s profitability is an accounting artifice that greatly underestimates the risks of the Bank’s portfolio. Another argument for loans is that multilateral development banks have a superior enforcement technology that helps international debt markets to function more efficiently. Thus loans allow financially strapped governments, including in middle-income countries, to borrow more than they could otherwise. We will argue that this benefit, too, is an illusion. In those cases when official lending does expand a developing country government’s borrowing capacity, it effectively enables the government to commit the country to repayment levels beyond that supported by domestic political consensus, creating moral hazard for shortsighted rulers. In theory, better credit access to finance, say, public infrastructure projects can be highly beneficial. In practice, however, the increased risk of debt crisis all too often outweighs any gain ordinary citizens might enjoy from the loans. Furthermore, moral hazard on the part of lenders, who may be able to induce rich countries into subsidizing the bailout of troubled middle-income borrowers, may mean that aggregate lending is excessive even if multilaterals merely displace equivalent private debt. We do not argue for eliminating assistance to middle-income countries. On the contrary, we would favor expanding aid in general, albeit in far greater proportion to the world’s poorest countries. Note that in principle, any country with market access could use grant flows to help defray interest rate costs on loans if it so chose, but development banks would never need to assume a “bad cop” role in enforcing debt.

In this paper, we explore the relationship between real exchange rates and real interest rate differentials in the United States, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Contrary to theories based on the joint hypothesis that domestic prices are sticky and monetary disturbances are predominant, we find little evidence of a stable relationship between real interest rates and real exchange rates. We consider both in-sample and out-of-sample tests. One hypothesis that is consistent with our findings is that real disturbances (such as productivity shocks) may be a major source of exchange rate volatility.

Few sovereign debtors have repudiated their obligations entirely. But despite the significant sanctions at the disposal of lenders, many borrowers have been able to consistently negotiate for reduced repayments. This paper presents a model of the on-going bargaining process that determines repayment levels.

Abstract Can massive online retailers such as Amazon and Alibaba issue digital tokens that potentially compete with bank debit accounts? There is a long history of trading stamps and loyalty points, but new technologies are poised to sharply raise the significance of redeemable assets as a store of value. Here, we develop a simple stylized model of redeemable tokens that can be used to study sales and pricing strategies for issuing tokens, including ICOs. Our central finding is that platforms can potentially earn higher revenues by making tokens non-tradable unless they can generate a sufficiently high outside-platform convenience yield.

Optimal monetary policy rules are derived in a rational expectations cum contracting framework. Monetary policy is redundant if wage setters exploit the incomplete current information embodied in today's nominal interest rate. However, the monetary authorities can save wage setters the costs of “indexing†to the interest rate. A contemporaneous money supply feedback rule is as effective as wage indexation. A lagged rule, relevant under a regime of money supply targeting, is also as effective if investors use the interest rate. Both rules have the same implications for the real interest rate as Poole's combination policy. However, the two rules have strikingly different implications for the nominal interest rate.

This paper studies the implications of central bank credibility for long-run inflation and inflation dynamics. We introduce central bank lack of commitment into a standard nonlinear New Keynesian economy with sticky-price monopolistically competitive firms. Inflation is driven by the interaction of lack of commitment and the economic environment. We show that long-run inflation increases following an unanticipated permanent increase in the labor wedge or decrease in the elasticity of substitution across varieties. In the transition, inflation overshoots and then gradually declines. Quantitatively, inflation overshooting is persistent, and the welfare loss from lack of commitment relative to inflation targeting is large. (JEL D43, E12, E23, E24, E31, E52, E58)

We develop an analytically tractable two-country model that marries a full account of global macroeconomic dynamics to a supply framework based on monopolistic competition and sticky nominal prices. The model offers simple and intuitive predictions about exchange rates and current accounts that sometimes differ sharply from those of either modern flexible-price intertemporal models or traditional sticky-price Keynesian models. Our analysis leads to a novel perspective on the international welfare spillovers due to monetary and fiscal policies.

This paper uses an infinite-horizon model based on individual maximizing behavior to study whether explosive price-level paths unrelated to monetary growth--speculative hyperinflations--can be equilibrium paths under rational expectations. In a pure fiat money regime, speculative hyperinflations can be excluded only through severe restrictions on individual preferences; but when the government fractionally backs the currency by guaranteeing a minimal real redemption value for money, speculative hyperinflations are impossible, even if agents are not completely certain that they can redeem their money in any given period. The analysis also confirms that implosive price-level paths and divergent paths for capital asset prices are not equilibria under either monetary regime.

The historical frequency of banking crises is similar in advanced and developing countries, with quantitative parallels in both the run-ups and the aftermath. We establish these regularities using a dataset spanning from the early 1800s to the present. Banking crises weaken fiscal positions, with government revenues invariably contracting. Three years after a crisis central government debt increases by about 86%. The fiscal burden of banking crisis extends beyond the cost of the bailouts. We find that systemic banking crises are typically preceded by asset price bubbles, large capital inflows and credit booms, in rich and poor countries alike.