Recently a new type of institution has emerged, crowd funders. These entities: 1) channel capital to create intellectual property; 2) gather information on project and entrepreneur quality; and 3) gauge demand information directly from individuals to improve the efficiency of capital allocation. Data from crowd funder Kickstarter allows new insights on capital formation and the role of entrepreneurial reputation formation in the venture funding process. This funding method includes all cases where entrepreneurs try yet fail to raise funds, a feature heretofore unavailable to researchers. We find that both positive and negative reputation acquisition significantly change measures of capital raising success.

A seller has a fixed number of goods to sell by a deadline. At each time, he posts a regular price and decides whether to hold a flash sale. Over time, buyers privately enter the market and strategically time their purchases. If a buyer does not purchase when she arrives, she can pay an attention cost to recheck the regular price afterwards, or she can wait for future flash sales where she may obtain a good at a discounted price. In the unique Markov perfect equilibrium, the seller sporadically holds flash sales to lower the stock of goods. A flash sale increases the willingness to pay of future buyers, but decreases the willingness to pay of buyers who arrive early in the game. When it is very likely that a buyer will obtain a good in a flash sale, the seller holds a “big” initial flash sale for all but one unit of the good.

The majority of innovations are developed by multi-sector firms. The knowledge needed to invent new products is more easily adapted from some sectors than from others. We study this network of knowledge linkages between sectors and its impact on firm innovation and aggregate growth. We first document a set of sectoral-level and firm-level observations on knowledge applicability and firms’ multi-sector patenting behaviour. We then develop a general equilibrium model of firm innovation in which inter-sectoral knowledge linkages determine the set of sectors a firm chooses to innovate in and how much R&D to invest in each sector. It captures how firms evolve in the technology space, accounts for cross-sector differences in R&D intensity, and describes an aggregate model of technological change. The model matches new observations as demonstrated by simulation. It also yields new insights regarding the mechanism through which sectoral fixed costs of R&D affect growth.

We examine how hometown, school, and workplace ties between financial analysts and mutual fund managers affect their business decisions. We show that a fund manager is more likely to hold stocks covered by analysts with whom she is socially connected, and that she also makes higher profits from these holdings. Such social tie-related holding returns are higher among more opaque firms. In return, a fund manager tends to cast her star analyst votes in favor of her connected analysts, and her fund company is more likely to allocate trading commissions to her connected analysts' brokerages. Additional tests indicate that analysts more actively acquire information (through conducting corporate site visits) and issue more optimistically biased recommendations for stocks held by fund managers with whom they are connected. Overall, our results illustrate the pronounced influence of social networks on the behaviors of analysts and fund managers. JEL Classifications: G10; G23; M40. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Relative performance evaluation (RPE) compensates managers on their relative performance against a peer group. Since observing more peers’ performance allows managers to better estimate the performance level required to achieve RPE targets, we conjecture that releasing earnings later than peers facilitates managers to achieve targets by exploiting last-minute reporting discretion. Empirical evidence is consistent with our conjecture. Further, managers tend to select peers that release earnings more timely and delay own firms’ earnings releases to be later than peers’ after RPE adoption. Our evidence suggests strategic timing of earnings release and discretionary reporting in response to relative performance evaluation.

We derive a model with qualitative implications for options pricing under counterparty credit risk and provide empirical evidence using the data from the Hong Kong derivatives market during 2005–2014. We find that the log-price difference between a derivative warrant with counterparty credit risk and an otherwise identical option without counterparty credit risk is significantly and negatively associated with the credit default swap spread on the warrant issuer. We also find that the prices of out-of-the-money put warrants are more sensitive to credit risk than those of other warrants. Our results show counterparty credit risk matters for derivative pricing.

Using national elections as sources of exogenous variation in uncertainty, we show that political uncertainty affects the volume and outcome of cross-border acquisitions. When a country is about to hold a national election, this deters foreign firms’ inbound acquisitions, especially when the host country poses greater expropriation risk. An upcoming home country election encourages firms to conduct outbound cross-border acquisitions, especially to target countries with free-trade agreements, military allies, or countries with better governance. At transaction level, we show that announcement returns to cross-border deals incorporate political uncertainty considerations. Overall, these results shed light on the effects of political uncertainty through the cross-border acquisition channel.

This study examines the impact of trust on initial public offering (IPO) underpricing using a large sample of IPO firms in China. We find that firms in regions of high social trust have lower underpricing, consistent with the notion that IPO firms in low-trust regions have to offer greater underpricing to secure participation. This result is robust to a battery of sensitivity tests and after controlling for endogeneity using instrumental variables. We also find that the negative relation between social trust and underpricing is more prominent for small and growth firms, and firms in high-tech industries, consistent with trust playing a more important role in asymmetric information environments. This relation is less pronounced for firms with high insider ownership and political connections, suggesting that investors rely less on trust in these cases; it is less salient when firms are in regions with high quality legal institutions and high average education levels, consistent with trust being a substitute for formal institutions.

We present evidence of investors underreacting to the absence of events in financial markets. Routine-based insiders strategically choose to be silent when they possess private information not yet reflected in stock prices. Consistent with our hypothesis, insider silence following a routine sell (buy) predicts positive (negative) future returns, as well as fundamentals. The return predictability of insider silence is stronger among firms with a poor information environment and facing higher arbitrage costs, and a large fraction of abnormal returns concentrates on future earnings announcements. A long–short strategy that exploits insiders’ strategic silence behavior generates abnormal returns of 6% to 10% annually.

We empirically examine whether adopting a uniform set of accounting standards mitigates information frictions in financial markets and facilitates market integration. Using a difference‐in‐difference design, we find that after the mandatory adoption of IFRS local stock returns incorporate more global information and at a faster speed. The effect of IFRS adoption is stronger in countries where there are larger improvements in accounting comparability and for firms with a larger increase in foreign ownership. Overall, our results suggest that accounting standards harmonization facilitates financial market integration.