ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether the business relations between mutual funds and brokerage firms influence sell‐side analyst recommendations. Using a unique data set that discloses brokerage firms’ commission income derived from each mutual fund client as well as the share holdings of these mutual funds, we find that an analyst's recommendation on a stock relative to consensus is significantly higher if the stock is held by the mutual fund clients of the analyst's brokerage firm. The optimism in analyst recommendations increases with the weight of the stock in a mutual fund client's portfolio and the commission revenue generated from the mutual fund client. However, this favorable recommendation bias toward a client's existing portfolio stocks is mitigated if the stock in question is highly visible to other mutual fund investors. Abnormal stock returns are significantly greater both for the announcement period and, in the long run, for favorable stock recommendations from analysts not subject to client pressure than for equally favorable recommendations from business‐related analysts. In addition, we find that, subsequent to announcements of bad news from the covered firms, analysts are significantly less likely to downgrade a stock held by client mutual funds. Mutual funds increase their holdings in a stock that receives a favorable recommendation but this impact is significantly reduced if the recommendation comes from analysts subject to client pressure.

This paper explores how the emergence of generative artificial intelligence is reshaping the information environment in capital markets. Leveraging an unexpected ban on ChatGPT in Italy, we examine its impact on the information processing capabilities of market participants. We employ metrics for AI-generated text detection to show that the ban coincides with decreased AI usage by domestic financial analysts and fewer earnings forecasts issued relative to foreign analysts covering the same firm. The negative effects are more pronounced among analysts whose pre-ban reports are more consistent with AI use or analysts with a technical background. The ban also diminishes forecast accuracy, increases reliance on industry-specific information, and reduces information efficiency. Furthermore, investor reactions to earnings announcements become more pronounced, and bid–ask spreads widen, reflecting lower market efficiency.

Abstract We study the role of state controlling shareholders in corporate payout policy. The State Capital Operation Program in China requires parent central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs) to contribute part of their consolidated income to a new fiscal fund. We find that listed CSOEs, partially controlled by parent CSOEs, experience significant reductions in dividend payouts as the income-contribution ratio increases. The dividend reductions are concurrent with increases in intragroup resource transfers— listed CSOEs’ loans to, and commercial trades with, group peers. The program yields adverse consequences for listed CSOEs’ investment and employment, yet being mitigated by group-level dividend reductions.

Real estate transactions are often established through financing. We study the effect of financing on property prices. We show that properties can transact at prices well above their collateral values. Therefore, the commonly used loan-to-value (LTV) ratio suffers a bias that can significantly understate credit risk. This bias is exacerbated when mortgages are originated with longer terms, at higher LTV ratios, or when sellers possess stronger bargaining power. Furthermore, this bias is larger under aggressive lending products, e.g. interest-only loans and mortgages allowing negative amortization. Our simulation results suggest that many mortgages originated at the peak of the housing bubble are, in fact, “under water” at origination. In particular, the loan amount of a 30-year mortgage at a 95% LTV can be 15% greater than the collateral value of the property, suggesting the mortgage is already deep “under water” at origination. These findings call into questions underwriting and risk control practices in mortgages and other collateralized debts.

Abstract This article studies how minimum-wage policies affect capital investment using the industrial census of manufacturing firms in China, where minimum-wage policies vary across counties. Exploiting discontinuities in minimum-wage policy at county borders, we find that minimum wages increase capital investment. The investment response to minimum wages is stronger for firms that are labor intensive, that have more room for technological improvement, and that cannot sufficiently pass on labor costs to consumers. A natural experiment based on county jurisdictional changes further assures the causal relationship.

This study examines how the Chinese state-owned banks allocate loans to private firms. We find that the banks extend loans to financially healthier and better-governed firms, which implies that the banks use commercial judgments in this segment of the market. We also find that having the state as a minority owner helps firms obtain bank loans and this suggests that political connections play a role in gaining access to bank finance. In addition, we find that commercial judgments are important determinants of the lending decisions for manufacturing firms, large firms, and firms located in regions with a more developed banking sector; political connections are important for firms in service industries, large firms, and firms located in areas with a less developed banking sector.

We study the effect of financial market frictions on managerial compensation. We embed a market microstructure model into an otherwise standard contracting framework, and analyze optimal pay-for-performance when managers use information they learn from the market in their investment decisions. In a less frictional market, the improved information content of stock prices helps guide managerial decisions and thereby necessitates lower-powered compensation. Exploiting a randomized experiment, we document evidence that pay-for-performance is lowered in response to reduced market frictions. Firm investment also becomes more sensitive to stock prices during the experiment, consistent with increased managerial learning from the market. (JEL D83, G12, G14, G32, G34, M12, M52)

We develop and test a model that investigates how controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives affect firm values during crisis and subsequent recovery periods. Consistent with the prediction of our model, we find that, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Asian firms with weaker corporate governance experience a larger drop in their share values but, during the post-crisis recovery period, such firms experience a larger rebound in their share values. We also find consistent evidence for Latin American firms during the 2001 Argentine economic crisis. Our results support the view that controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value.

ABSTRACT This paper documents that changes in litigation risk affect corporate voluntary disclosure practices. We make causal inferences by exploiting three legal events that generate exogenous variations in firms' litigation risk. Using a matching-based fixed-effect difference-in-differences design, we find that the treated firms tend to make fewer (more) management earnings forecasts relative to the control firms when they expect litigation risk to be lower (higher) following the legal event. The results are concentrated on the earnings forecasts conveying negative news and are robust to alternative specifications, samples, and outcome variables. JEL Classifications: D80; G14; K22; K41; M41.