China’s venture capital (VC) market features significant government ownership of VCs. We examine the impact of government-owned VCs on the exit success of entrepreneurial firms. We distinguish between types of government VC according to the degree of government ownership (whole versus partial) and the level of government (central versus provincial). We find that partially government-owned VCs increase the likelihood of a successful exit, especially via initial public offering (IPO) in mainland China, where the IPO process is discretionary and heavily regulated. Entrepreneurial firms backed by partially government-owned VCs also have a higher likelihood of exit at times of policy uncertainty and the timing of exit is less sensitive to prevailing market conditions. Provincial government-owned VCs increase exit likelihood; however, the positive effect decreases when multiple provincial government-owned VCs invest in a firm. Our findings suggest that entrepreneurial firms may benefit from government VC investment, but that complete government control of a VC can lead to inefficiencies.

This paper examines the role of firm-level experience in the context of divestitures. We find that divesting firms that have recent divestiture experience (hereafter, experienced divestors) are more likely to sell peripheral or underperforming units, and to divest during industry merger waves. Experienced divestors earn higher returns on divestiture announcement, have stronger operating performance post-divestiture, and tend to reinvest sale proceeds in expansion programs using acquisitions. Importantly, we show that divestiture experience at the firm level dominates other measures of experience, including divestiture experience of CEOs or boards, and experience in acquisitions. We take steps to mitigate concerns about econometric and sampling issues. These findings suggest that a strategy of restructuring through divestitures can improve firm value.

Prior work has established that entrenched managers make value-decreasing acquisitions. In this study, we determine how they destroy that value. Overall, we find that value destruction by entrenched managers comes from a combination of factors. First, they disproportionately avoid private targets, which have been shown to be generally associated with value creation. Second, when they do buy private targets or public targets with blockholders, they tend not to use all-equity offers, which has the effect of avoiding the transfer of a valuable blockholder to the bidder. We further test whether entrenched managers simply overpay for good targets or choose targets with lower synergies. We find that while they overpay, they also choose low synergy targets in the first place, as shown by combined announcement returns and post-merger operating performance.

The literature posits that some CEO overconfidence benefits shareholders, though high levels may not. We argue that adequate controls and independent viewpoints provided by an independent board mitigates the costs of CEO overconfidence. We use the concurrent passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and changes to the NYSE/NASDAQ listing rules (collectively, SOX) as natural experiments, to examine whether board independence improves decision making by overconfident CEOs. The results are strongly supportive: after SOX, overconfident CEOs reduce investment and risk exposure, increase dividends, improve postacquisition performance, and have better operating performance and market value. Importantly, these changes are absent for overconfident-CEO firms that were compliant prior to SOX.

Overconfident CEOs/senior executives tend to have excessively positive views of their own skills and their company’s future performance. We hypothesize that overconfident managers are more likely to engage in reckless or intentional actions/disclosures that give rise to securities class actions (SCAs). Empirical evidence is supportive: Overconfident CEOs/senior executives increase SCA likelihood, though litigation risk is ameliorated through improved governance, such as following the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. Post-SCA, companies are less likely to hire an overconfident CEO. Following an SCA, overconfident CEOs appear to moderate behavior and to reduce their litigation risk.

We compare the motivations for switching underwriters between seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) for both shelf offerings and traditional offerings. Shelf offerings have risen in importance and accounted for more than 90% of SEOs in 2015. In traditional offerings, the underwriter is selected before the terms and pricing of the deal are set. In contrast, shelf issuers request proposals or bids from underwriters for the sale of securities and the underwriter is selected based on the pricing, terms and services offered in the bid. The competitive and transactional nature of the shelf registered market may reduce switching costs for the issuer and potentially increases the issuer's bargaining power. This suggests that underwriter switching in shelf offerings might have different, heretofore unexplored, drivers from traditional offerings. The results suggest that cost-considerations motivate switching in shelf offerings whereas underwriter reputation motivates switching in traditional offerings. However, changes in underwriter reputation can themselves be associated with changes in cost. Cost considerations also impact switching from traditional offerings to shelf offerings.

We propose and test the hypothesis that overconfident-CEOs, with upwardly-biased estimates of own firm-value, are more predisposed to repurchasing stock. An implication is that the stock-market, recognizing overconfident-CEO behavior, will react less positively to repurchase announcements. The hypothesis is strongly supported: Overconfident managers repurchase stock at lower levels of cash holdings, and respond more to stock-price declines. Entrenchment exacerbates this behavior. Interestingly, institutional investors appear to encourage repurchases, perhaps to curb excessive investment. Overconfident-CEOs are also more likely to substitute repurchases for dividends or capital expenditure. Consistent with our hypothesis, the stock-market reaction to these share repurchase announcements is less positive.

We hypothesize and show that the impact of a regulatory shock depends both on the shock itself and on how firms respond, which can itself depend on the firm's governance attributes. To explore this, we use the staggered passage of Universal Demand (UD) laws, which insulate managers from derivative lawsuits. We find that, on average, firms respond to UD laws by increasing risk-taking incentives (vega), thereby compensating for weaker external discipline, and incentivizing valuable risky investments. Corporate governance, institutional ownership, and CEO power influences the likelihood of adjusting compensation. The firms that do boost vega subsequently experience greater innovation, and a stronger market response to new product announcements. Our results help to reconcile extant findings on the effects of UD laws by showing that the beneficial impact of the laws is conditional on firms’ strengthening their CEOs’ risk-taking incentives, a choice affected by their latent governance arrangements.

We examine the impact of overconfidence on compensation structure. Our findings support the exploitation hypothesis: firms offer incentive-heavy compensation contracts to overconfident Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) to exploit their positively biased views of firm prospects. Overconfident CEOs receive more option-intensive compensation and this relation increases with CEO bargaining power. Exogenous shocks (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R) provide additional support for the findings. Overconfident non-CEO executives also receive more incentive-based pay, independent of CEO overconfidence, buttressing the notion that firms tailor compensation contracts to individual behavioral traits such as overconfidence.