ABSTRACT Both IPO volume and average initial returns are highly autocorrelated. Further, more companies tend to go public following periods of high initial returns. However, we find that the level of average initial returns at the time of filing contains no information about that company's eventual underpricing. Both the cycles in initial returns and the lead‐lag relation between initial returns and IPO volume are predominantly driven by information learned during the registration period. More positive information results in higher initial returns and more companies filing IPOs soon thereafter.

We examine the relation between risk and IPO underpricing and test two aspects of the litigation-risk hypothesis: (1) firms with higher litigation risk underprice their IPOs by a greater amount as a form of insurance (insurance effect) and (2) higher underpricing lowers expected litigation costs (deterrence effect). To adjust for the endogeneity bias in previous studies, we use a simultaneous equation framework. Evidence provides support for both aspects of the litigation-risk hypothesis.

Securities litigation poses large costs to firms. The risk of litigation is heightened when firms have unexpectedly large earnings disappointments. Previous literature presents mixed evidence on whether voluntary disclosure of the bad news prior to scheduled earnings announcements deters or triggers litigation. We show that the counterintuitive finding in prior literature that disclosure triggers litigation could be driven by the endogeneity between disclosure and litigation. Using a simultaneous equations methodology, we find no evidence that disclosure triggers litigation. In fact, consistent with economic arguments, our evidence suggests that disclosure potentially deters certain types of litigation.

Mutual funds vary greatly in their reliance on proxy advisory recommendations. Over 25% of funds rely almost entirely on Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recommendations, while other funds place little weight on them. Funds with higher benefits and lower costs of researching the items up for vote are less likely to rely on ISS. These actively voting funds are less likely to vote in a “one-size-fits-all” manner, and they earn higher alphas, consistent with benefits from this allocation of resources. For the underlying firms, the presence of actively voting funds mitigates the influence of ISS and helps sway shareholder votes toward value-maximizing outcomes.

In about one-third of US IPOs between 1996 and 2000, executives received stock options with an exercise price equal to the IPO offer price rather than a market-determined price. Among firms with such “IPO options”, 58% of top executives realize a net benefit from underpricing: the gain from the options exceeds the loss from the dilution of their pre-IPO shareholdings. If executives can influence either the IPO offer price or the timing and terms of their stock option grants, there should be a positive relation between IPO option grants and underpricing. We find no evidence of such a relation. Our results contrast sharply with the emerging literature on managerial self-dealing at shareholder expense.

Busy directors have been widely criticized as being ineffective. However, we hypothesize that busy directors offer advantages for many firms. While busy directors may be less effective monitors, their experience and contacts arguably make them excellent advisors. Among IPO firms, which have minimal experience with public markets and likely rely heavily on their directors for advising, we find busy boards to be common and to contribute positively to firm value. Moreover, these positive effects of busy boards extend to all but the most established firms. Benefits are lowest among Forbes 500 firms, which likely require more monitoring than advising.

Strong conflicts of interest exist within investment banks: the investment banking division possesses substantial private information, and the asset management division seeks such information. This raises the question of whether the asset management division benefits from an information advantage on client firms. While prior examinations of advisor bank trading in client firms have focused on stocks and found mixed results, we argue that the options market represents a more attractive venue for such trading. We find significant evidence of advisor banks trading in client firm options ahead of merger announcements, but no evidence of similar trading in client firm stock. Received October 22, 2015; editorial decision June 5, 2018 by Editor Philip Strahan. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract The decrease in companies going public has received widespread attention, and the associated costs are widely debated. We document that high local initial public offering (IPO) activity leads to increases in stock market participation of 5–6 percent. This is striking, given that such participation represents a key factor toward building wealth. Local IPOs increase both households’ propensity to own stock and their percent equity holdings. The attention channel drives effects: local IPOs attract attention to the market, through increased information production and publicity. The wealth channel has little influence, consistent with local IPOs not generating wealth shocks for most households.

ABSTRACT Contrary to conventional wisdom, we document that approximately 15% of venture capitalist (VC)‐backed firms raise additional capital from VCs in the five years after going public. We propose two explanations for why firms revert to VC financing post‐IPO (initial public offering). First, we hypothesize that VC participation in post‐IPO financing represents an efficient solution to informational problems that would otherwise constrain firms’ abilities to exploit value‐increasing investments. Analyses of firm and VC characteristics, together with the finding that these investments are value‐increasing for both VCs and the underlying companies, support this hypothesis. We find no support for the alternative that agency conflicts motivate these investments.

ABSTRACT The monthly volatility of IPO initial returns is substantial, fluctuates dramatically over time, and is considerably larger during “hot” IPO markets. Consistent with IPO theory, the volatility of initial returns is higher for firms that are more difficult to value because of higher information asymmetry. Our findings highlight underwriters’ difficulty in valuing companies characterized by high uncertainty, and raise serious questions about the efficacy of the traditional firm‐commitment IPO process. One implication of our results is that alternate mechanisms, such as auctions, could be beneficial for firms that value price discovery over the auxiliary services provided by underwriters.