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Optimal Procurement with Quality Concerns

American Economic Review 2023 113(6), 1505-1529
Adverse selection in procurement arises when low-cost bidders are also low-quality suppliers. We propose a mechanism called LoLA (lowball lottery auction) which, under some conditions, maximizes any combination of buyer’s and social surplus, subject to incentive compatibility, in the presence of adverse selection. The LoLA features a floor price, and a reserve price. The LoLA has a dominant strategy equilibrium that, under mild conditions, is unique. In a counterfactual analysis of Italian government auctions, we compute the gain that the government could have made, had it used the optimal procurement mechanism (a LoLA), relative to a first-price auction (the adopted format).

Time Allocation and Task Juggling

American Economic Review 2014 104(2), 609-623 open access
A single worker allocates her time among different projects which are progressively assigned. When the worker works on too many projects at the same time, the output rate decreases and completion time increases according to a law which we derive. We call this phenomenon “task juggling” and argue that it is pervasive in the workplace. We show that task juggling is a strategic substitute of worker effort. We then present a model where task juggling is the result of lobbying by clients, or coworkers, each seeking to get the worker to apply effort to his project ahead of the others’.

The Effect of Adolescent Experience on Labor Market Outcomes: The Case of Height

Journal of Political Economy 2004 112(5), 1019-1053
Taller workers receive a wage premium. Net of differences in family background, the disparity is similar in magnitude to the race and gender gaps. We exploit variation in an individual’s height over time to explore how height affects wages. Controlling for teen height essentially eliminates the effect of adult height on wages for white men. The teen height premium is not explained by differences in resources or endowments. The teen height premium is partially mediated through participation in high school sports and clubs. We estimate the monetary benefits of a medical treatment for children that increases height.

Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence

Journal of Political Economy 2001 109(1), 203-229
African American motorists in the United States are more likely than white motorists to have their cars searched by police checking for illegal drugs and other contraband. The courts are faced with the task of deciding on the basis of traffic-stop data whether police are basing their decisions to stop cars on the race of the driver. We develop a model of law enforcement for a population with two racial types who also differ along other dimensions relevant to criminal behavior. We discuss why a simple test commonly applied by the courts is inadequate when the econometrician observes only a subset of the characteristics observed by the policemen. Next, we show how to construct a test for whether di¤erential treatment is motivated purely out of e¢ciency grounds, i.e. to maximize the number of arrests, or re‡ects racial prejudice. The test is valid even when the set of characteristics observed by the policemen are only partially observable by the econometrician. We apply the tests for discrimination to traffic stop data from Maryland. Finally, we present a

A Theory of Optimal Random Crackdowns

American Economic Review 2010 100(3), 1104-1135 open access
An incentives based theory of policing is developed which can explain the phenomenon of random “crackdowns,” i.e., intermittent periods of high interdiction/surveillance. For a variety of police objective functions, random crackdowns can be part of the optimal monitoring strategy. We demonstrate support for implications of the crackdown theory using traffic data gathered by the Belgian Police Department and use the model to estimate the deterrence effect of additional resources spent on speeding interdiction.

Factions and Political Competition

Journal of Political Economy 2011 119(2), 242-288
This paper presents a new model of political competition in which candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party to the allocation of resources. In doing so, the model provides a unified explanation of two prominent features of public resource allocations: the persistence of (possibly inefficient) policies and the tendency of public spending to favor incumbent party strongholds over swing constituencies.