This study uses a new database to describe the composition and compensation of boards of directors of U.S. open-end mutual funds. We use these data to examine the relation between board structure and the fees charged by a fund to its shareholders. We find that shareholder fees are lower when fund boards are smaller, have a greater fraction of independent directors, and are composed of directors who sit on a large fraction of the fund sponsor's other boards. We find some evidence that funds whose independent directors are paid relatively higher directors' fees approve higher shareholder fees.

In 1987, Lo derived an upper bound on the price of a European call option on a single asset. Lo's bound depends only on the mean and variance of the terminal asset price and is termed a semi-parametric bound. This paper derives similar semi-parametric bounds on a European call on the maximum of any number of assets. A distribution-free bound for the price of this option is obtained. The bound depends only on the means and covariance matrix of the returns on n underlying assets. The bound is obtained by optimizing over the entries of a positive definite matrix A. This can be accomplished by a technique known as semidefinite programming. We demonstrate the methodology using two specific applications. The first concerns the valuation of a European call option on the maximum of several assets. This is known as an outperformance option and is of some practical interest. The second application concerns the valuation of a discretely adjusted lookback option. These lookback options are of interest in connection with certain equity annuity insurance products.

This paper provides a formal analysis of how managerial investment incentives are affected by alternative allocation rules when managerial compensation is based on accounting measures of income that include allocations for investment expenditures. The main result is that there exists a unique allocation rule that always induces the manager to choose the efficient investment level. The income measure created by this allocation rule is usually referred to as residual income or economic value added.

William R. Melick, Charles P. Thomas, Recovering an Asset's Implied PDF from Option Prices: An Application to Crude Oil during the Gulf Crisis, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Mar., 1997), pp. 91-115

We find reliable evidence that both book-to-market (B M) and dividend yield track time-series variation in expected real stock returns over the period 1926 91 (in which B M is stronger) and the subperiod 1941–1991 (in which dividend yield is stronger). A Bayesian bootstrap procedure implies that an investor with prior belief 0.5 that expected returns on the equal-weighted index are never negative comes away from the full-period B/M evidence with posterior probability 0.08 for the hypothesis (0.14 with the impact of the 1933 outlier tempered). Although this raises doubts about market efficiency, the post-1940 evidence is consistent with expected returns always being positive.

In this paper we present and estimate a model of short-term interest rate volatility that encompasses both the level effect of Chan, Karolyi, Longstaff and Sanders (1992) and the conditional heteroskedasticity effect of the GARCH class of models. This flexible specification allows different effects to dominate as the level of the interest rate varies. We also investigate implications for the pricing of bond options. Our findings indicate that the inclusion of a volatility effect reduces the estimate of the level effect, and has option implications that differ significantly from the Chan, Karolyi, Longstaff and Sanders (1992) model.

This paper presents evidence that “social capital” matters for measurable economic performance, using indicators of trust and civic norms from the World Values Surveys for a sample of 29 market economies. Memberships in formal groups—Putnam's measure of social capital—is not associated with trust or with improved economic performance. We find trust and civic norms are stronger in nations with higher and more equal incomes, with institutions that restrain predatory actions of chief executives, and with better-educated and ethnically homogeneous populations.

We analyze myopic trader models of noisy prices in financial markets. Unlike extant analysis, such as De Long et al. (1990a), a classical equilibrium exists in our analysis, e.g., a riskless perpetuity is priced by arbitrage and its price does not vary with noise. A unique noisy equilibrium exists only when i) noise traders' beliefs are rational regarding volatility and irrational regarding expected returns, and ii) noise traders can hold infinite positions. In the absence of these strong assumptions, multiple noisy equilibria can coexist with the classical equilibrium, but these equilibria exhibit conflicting comparative statics. Furthermore, the price of a long-lived asset with risky cash flows can vary with noise even when investors are not myopic. One conclusion is that myopia is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for noisy prices. A second is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to use myopic trader models to derive implications for investment or regulatory policy.

[Pownall et al. (1993) document that nearly 80 percent of their sample of voluntary management earnings forecasts are not precise point forecasts. Imprecise forecast forms include closed-interval forecasts (i.e., ranges), open-interval forecasts (i.e., minimums and maximums), and general impressions about firms' earnings prospects. We perform cross-sectional logistic regressions to document determinants of forecast precision. Our sample consists of 1,212 annual and interim management forecasts. After controlling for firm-specific and horizon-specific earnings uncertainty, we find that managers produce more precise forecasts of annual earnings for firms with greater analyst following (our proxy for private information) and for smaller firms (our proxy for public information). The results are robust across subsamples. The majority of the results, however, do not hold for interim forecasts.]

The introduction of exchange‐traded options in 1973 led to explosive growth in the stock options market, but put and call options on equity securities have existed for more than a century. Prior to the listing of option contracts, trading was conducted in an order‐driven over‐the‐counter market. From 1873 to 1875, quotes for options contracts were published weekly in The Commercial and Financial Chronicle during a period that saw extensive marketing efforts by a number of brokerage firms. In this article we examine these quotes to determine why this seemingly sophisticated market existed for only a brief period in financial history.