Value maximization requires either that knowledge is transferred to those with the right to make decisions, or that decision rights are transferred to those who have the knowledge. A tradeoff of knowledge transfer costs and control costs is required. Characteristics of firms' investment opportunity sets (IOSs) that affect knowledge transfer costs and control costs are identified. Testable predictions about the relations between these characteristics and firms' decentralization decisions are developed and tested. The evidence presented is consistent with our predictions and is robust to different ways of measuring variables.

There has been considerable controversy over unsolicited credit ratings in recent years. Some dissatisfied issuers allege that unsolicited ratings are biased downward in contrast to solicited ratings. This is the first empirical study to analyze the controversy using pooled time-series cross-sectional data of 265 firms in 15 countries from Standard and Poor’s Ratings Services (S&P’s) during the period of 1998–2000. The results demonstrate that unsolicited ratings are lower. On the other hand, I also find that those issuers who choose not to obtain rating services from S&P’s have weaker financial profiles. Although the difference in ratings can be explained by this significant self-selection bias, results of the Japanese sub-sample indicate that unsolicited ratings are still lower than solicited ratings after controlling for differences in sovereign risk and key financial characteristics.

Fama and French (1992) show that size and book-to-price dominate CAPM beta and other variables such as the price-earnings ratio and dividend yield in explaining the cross-section of US stock returns. Comparable evidence for the UK points to a book-to-price effect, but not a size effect (Chan and Chui, 1996; Strong and Xu, 1997). In this paper, our first contribution is to show that a measure of research and development (RD) helps explain cross-sectional variation in UK stock returns. Our cross-sectional results on the association between stock returns and RD are consistent with recent US evidence reported by Lev and Sougiannis (1996, 1999) and Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (2001).Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996) also show that a three-factor model captures a high proportion of the time series variation in portfolio returns, again for the US. Our second contribution is to show, for the UK, that a modification to the three-factor model to take account of RD activity can significantly enhance the explanatory power of the three-factor model. We show that, as a practical matter, estimated risk premia based on the modified three-factor model can differ considerably from risk premia estimated using the CAPM or the three-factor model. In particular, risk premia for industries in which few firms undertake RD activities tend to be over-estimated.

Mortgage overage pricing is little understood by consumers and has received little academic scrutiny. We consider the impact of the market power of individual loan officers on overages paid by borrowers, particularly minorities. We include numerous borrower and lender characteristics unavailable previously. We find that minorities who purchase homes pay larger overages than whites, but our evidence suggests that this traces to differences in the pools of borrowers rather than to racial discrimination. We conclude that a more effective way to eliminate racial differences in overages is to increase minorities’ ability to bargain rather than to enact additional anti-discrimination laws.

This paper develops an extremely simple formulation of the Laffont-Tirole principal agent model of cost-based procurement and regulation which is suitable for applied uses by restricting the principal to using a two item menu where one item is a cost-reimbursement contract and the other item is a fixed price contract.Menus of this form are called fixed-price-cost-reimbursement (FPCR) menus.In the case where the agent's utility is quadratic and the agent's type is distributed uniformly, it is shown that the optimal FPCR menu always captures at least three quarters of the gain that the optimal complex menu achieves.Therefore, at least for the uniform quadratic case, extremely simple menus with low informational requirements perform nearly as well as the fully optimal complex menu.

Journal Article Global Integration in Primary Equity Markets: The Role of U.S. Banks and U.S. Investors Get access Alexander P. Ljungqvist, Alexander P. Ljungqvist New York University and CEPR Address correspondence to Alexander Ljungqvist, New York University, Stern School of Business, 44 West Fourth Street, #9-190, New York, NY 10012-1126, or e-mail: [email protected]. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Tim Jenkinson, Tim Jenkinson Oxford University and CEPR Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar William J. Wilhelm, Jr. William J. Wilhelm, Jr. Oxford University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 16, Issue 1, January 2003, Pages 63–99, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/16.1.0063 Published: 16 June 2015

Many social scientists presume that the quality of the neighborhood to which children are exposed affects a variety of long-run social outcomes. I examine the effect on long-run labor market outcomes of adults who were assigned, when young, to substantially different public housing projects in Toronto. Administrative data are matched to public housing addresses to track children from the program to when they are more than 30 years old. The main finding is that, while living conditions and exposure to crime differ substantially across projects, neighborhood quality plays little role in determining a youth's eventual earnings, unemployment likelihood, and welfare participation. Living in contrasting housing projects cannot explain large variances in labor market outcomes but family differences, as measured by sibling outcome correlations, account for up to 30 percent of the total variance in the data.

Recent immigrants tend to locate in ethnic “enclaves” within metropolitan areas. The economic consequence of living in such enclaves is still an unresolved issue. We use data from an immigrant policy initiative in Sweden, when government authorities distributed refugee immigrants across locales in a way that we argue is exogenous. This policy initiative provides a unique natural experiment, which allows us to estimate the causal effect on labor market outcomes of living in enclaves. We find substantive evidence of sorting across locations. When sorting is taken into account, living in enclaves improves labor market outcomes for less skilled immigrants: the earnings gain associated with a standard deviation increase in ethnic concentration is 13 percent. Furthermore, the quality of the enclave seems to matter. Members of high-income ethnic groups gain more from living in an enclave than members of low-income ethnic groups.

Prior research on justification has typically focused on the differences in judgments between auditors required, or not required, to justify their decisions. However, justification memos can be prepared using different approaches. In this study we examine the impact of using three justification memos: supporting, balanced, and component. Using a comprehensive control environment case based on an actual client that experienced fraud, we find that the justification memo used can affect the judgments of auditors preparing the memos as well as the judgments of auditors who review their work. Specifically, the results indicate that auditors using an unrestricted component memo, who were required to write memos for components of their task by providing important positive and negative evidence, thought that the firm's control environment was more likely to prevent fraud as compared with the supporting and balanced memo groups. Additional analyses suggest that the reason for this result is that an unrestricted component memo focuses auditors’ attention on a larger percentage of positive control environment characteristics when a firm's underlying evidence set is mostly positive. This may be problematic because firms can have more positive than negative control environment characteristics, even when fraud is present.

Firms selling multiple quality-differentiated products frequently alter their product lines when a competitor enters the market. We present a model of multiproduct monopoly and duopoly using a general “upgrades” approach that yields a powerful analytical framework. We provide an explanation for the common strategies of using “fighting brands” and of product line “pruning.” The optimal strategy depends on whether entry prompts an incumbent to expand or contract its total output. We also present a general condition that guarantees that a monopolist will sell but a single product. Our model addresses other issues, including intertemporal price discrimination and “damaged goods.”