We study the effects of becoming a supplier to multinational corporations (MNCs) using tax data tracking firm-to-firm transactions in Costa Rica. Event study estimates reveal that domestic firms experience strong and persistent gains in performance after supplying to a first MNC buyer. Four years after, domestic firms employ 26% more workers and have a 4% to 9% higher total factor productivity (TFP). These effects are unlikely to be explained by demand effects or changes in tax compliance. Moreover, suppliers experience a large drop in their sales to all other buyers except the first MNC buyer in the year of the event, followed by a gradual recovery. The dynamics of adjustment in sales to others suggests that firms face short-run capacity constraints that relax over time. Four years later, the sales to others grow by 20%. Most of this growth comes from the acquisition of new buyers, which tend to be “better buyers” (e.g., larger and with more stable supplier relationships). Finally, we collected survey data from domestic firms and MNCs to provide further insights into the wide-ranging benefits of supplying to MNCs. According to our surveys, these benefits range from better managerial practices to a better reputation.

We investigate the nexus between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firms' stock market liquidity. Using actual firm-level CSR expenditure data and a quasi-natural experiment setup of a mandated CSR regulation in India, we find that firms complying with the mandate experience significantly higher stock market liquidity, relative to non-CSR firms in the post-CSR mandate period. This effect seems to be more pronounced among CSR firms not affiliated to business groups, with concentrated promoter ownership, with low institutional ownership, with foreign sales and having operations in multiple locations. Further, we find that firms spending more on education and healthcare projects as part of their mandatory CSR engagement have higher stock market liquidity. Our results are in line with the conjecture that mandatory CSR regulation could lead to reduced information asymmetry and improved social and reputational capital, and thus improve the stock market liquidity of CSR firms. Finally, we show that mandated CSR firms, having superior stock market liquidity, obtain higher market valuations in the long run.

We examine the impact of creditor control rights on corporate acquisitions. Nearly 75% of loan agreements include restrictions that limit borrower acquisition decisions throughout the life of the contract. Following a financial covenant violation, creditors use their bargaining power to tighten these restrictions and limit acquisition activity, particularly deals expected to earn negative announcement returns. Firms that do announce an acquisition after violating a financial covenant earn 1.8% higher stock returns, on average, and do not pursue less risky deals. We conclude that creditors use contractual rights and the renegotiation process to limit value-destroying acquisitions driven by managerial agency problems.

Publicly traded firms contribute less to total nonfarm employment and GDP now than in the 1970s. Major reasons for this development are the decline of manufacturing, the shift towards more production abroad in manufacturing, and the growth of the service economy as firms providing services are less likely to be listed on exchanges. A firm's stock market capitalization is much less instructive about its employment now than earlier. Market capitalizations have not become systematically less informative about firms’ contribution to GDP. Listed stock market superstars account for less employment than they did in the 1970s.

The allegation that activist investors demand changes that increase short-term stock prices at the expense of long-term shareholder value (“short-termism”) has led to extensive research on interventions by hedge funds. Few studies include other private (non-hedge fund) activists, even though we find they constitute almost half of interventions. Using a 20-year sample that includes over 2000 interventions by each type of activist, we find that short- and long-window abnormal returns are positive and economically significant around ownership announcements for each activist, and they do not reverse. Importantly, positive returns are observed for both sale and most other (non-sale) demands. Demands to sell all, or part, of the targeted firms earn especially sizable returns, and interestingly, sale demands are made more frequently by other private activists than by hedge funds. Despite the sizable returns, informed users do not regard the equity as overvalued. Analysts' recommendations become more favorable—a reversal of the pre-announcement trend—and long-term, “dedicated” institutional investors increase their ownership. We also find post-intervention improvements in operating performance (ROA) and firm valuation (Tobin's Q), further justifying the positive response by market participants. Our study provides new evidence that activism increases long-term shareholder value and opens an avenue for a line of research on other private activists.

Using a broad panel of advanced economies, we document that increases in GDP per capita are associated with a systematic shift in the composition of value added to sectors that are intensive in high-skill labour, a process we label as skill-biased structural change. It follows that further development in these economies leads to an increase in the relative demand for skilled labour. We develop a quantitative two-sector model of this process as a laboratory to assess the sources of the rise of the skill premium in the U.S. and a set of ten other advanced economies, over the period 1977 to 2005. For the U.S., we find that the sector-specific skill neutral component of technical change accounts for 18–24% of the overall increase of the skill premium due to technical change, and that the mechanism through which this component of technical change affects the skill premium is via skill-biased structural change.

We find that an increase in a firm’s incentives to use trade secrets to protect its intellectual property results in a more actively managed capital structure. Exploiting U.S. states’ adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act as a positive “shock” in the protection afforded to trade secrets, we find that firms covered by the Act reduce debt levels while increasing investments in intangibles. Additional tests suggest that firms fund these financing and investment activities by issuing more equity. Consistent with an increase in overall intangibility magnifying contracting problems with creditors, we find that covered firms experience higher costs of debt.

Global practices such as offshoring and expatriation of employees increase cross-cultural interactions within and across firms. In this paper, we use three experiments to investigate the effects of cultural differences on employees' interpretations of employers' contract choices. Applying insights from attribution theory, we predict that cultural differences will reduce the likelihood for employees to attribute employers' choice of a more-trusting contract to trust. This in turn will reduce the ability of such contracts to motivate higher employee effort. However, we also suggest that three interventions will mitigate the negative effect of cultural differences: employees' prior and primed exposure to employers' culture and employees' interactional cultural intelligence. In our labor market setting, employers chose a hiring contract for employees who, in return, indicated their effort levels. In all experiments, dyads interacted in real-time either in the same country or across two countries with high cultural difference. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the effectiveness of a bonus contract in increasing employees' effort is reduced by high cultural difference (in experiment 1). We also find that employees' exposure to employers' culture, either due to prior exposure (in experiment 2) or by priming exposure through culture-specific training (in experiment 3) has a mitigating effect. Finally, we find partial support that employees’ interactional cultural intelligence (CQ) has a mitigating effect. Implications to theory and practice are discussed.

ABSTRACT This study examines the impact of control systems on corporate innovation. Innovation is key to firm performance and growth, allowing corporations to stay competitive in their industry. We expect control systems to improve information flows within the firm by allowing managers to better identify and patent their most valuable intellectual property. Despite our prediction that control systems positively impact innovation, a priori, this relation is unclear as these same control systems may create an overly restrictive bureaucratic environment that may mitigate the benefits of effective controls for innovation. Using various measures of control system quality, we find evidence that effective control systems are associated with more innovation. Overall, the results of our study suggest effective control systems are associated with the ability of a firm to leverage its innovative projects. Our results suggest that corporations with effective control systems are more likely to be able to react to market and technology changes by ensuring their best ideas are patented.