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Earnings management, stock issues, and shareholder lawsuits

Journal of Financial Economics 2004 71(1), 27-49
Abnormal accounting accruals are unusually high around stock offers, especially high for firms whose offers subsequently attract lawsuits. Accruals tend to reverse after stock offers and are negatively related to post-offer stock returns. Reversals are more pronounced and stock returns are lower for sued firms than for those that are not sued. The incidence of lawsuits involving stock offers and settlement amounts are significantly positively related to abnormal accruals around the offer and significantly negatively related to post-offer stock returns. Our results support the view that some firms opportunistically manipulate earnings upward before stock issues rendering themselves vulnerable to litigation.

State takeover legislation and share values: The wealth effects of Pennsylvania's Act 36

Journal of Corporate Finance 1995 1(3-4), 367-382
Proponents of state antitakeover legislation argue that previous empirical tests by financial economists of the wealth effects of Pennsylvania's 1990 antitakeover law are biased. We show that the proponents are correct. In particular, firm size, event-time clustering, and non-synchronous trading effects account for the wealth decreases reported in earlier studies. We also show, however, that both proponents and critics of the Pennsylvania legislation have ignored the earliest press release about it. The wealth effect associated with this announcement is negative, large, and statistically significant. These results therefore are consistent with the hypothesis that the Pennsylvania law decreased company values and with the hypothesis that the initial market reaction is an unbiased estimate of the law's effect on firm values.

The wealth effects of second-generation state takeover legislation

Journal of Financial Economics 1989 25(2), 291-322
We examine the stock-price effects of all second-generation state takeover laws introduced from 1982 through 1987 for which we find press announcements. On average, the announcements are associated with a small but statistically significant decrease in the stock prices of firms incorporated in the state and of large firms headquartered in the state. The stock-price effects are concentrated in firms without preexisting firm-level takeover defenses. Firms with prior defenses have no significant stock-price reactions.

Corporate governance and shareholder initiatives: Empirical evidence

Journal of Financial Economics 1996 42(3), 365-395
Shareholder-initiated proxy proposals on corporate governance issues became popular in the late 1980s as corporate takeover activity declined. We find firms attracting governance proposals have poor prior performance, as measured by the market-to-book ratio, operating return, and sales growth. There is little evidence that operating returns improve after proposals. The proposals also have negligible effects on company share values and top management turnover. Even proposals that receive a majority of shareholder votes typically do not engender share price increases or discernible changes in firm policies.

Corporate investment, government control, and financing channels: Evidence from China's Listed Companies

Journal of Corporate Finance 2012 18(3), 433-450
We investigate the relation between the internally generated cash flows and fixed asset investments of Chinese firms and find that it is U-shaped. Cash flow and investment are negatively related for low levels of cash flow but positively related for high levels of cash flow. We find that government controlled listed firms have greater investment–cash flow sensitivities than do privately controlled listed companies, especially on the left-hand side of the U-shaped curve where cash flow is negative. However, the difference in sensitivities appears only among firms that possess few profitable investment opportunities. We attribute this finding to the government having multiple socio-economic objectives, which leads to increased capital expenditures by the firms it controls when internal funds are abundant and when internal funds are negative. There is no evidence that access to finance and soft budget constraints explain the differences between the investment–cash flow sensitivities of government controlled and privately controlled listed firms.

Managerial succession and firm performance

Journal of Financial Economics 2004 74(2), 237-275
We examine CEO turnover and firm financial performance. Accounting measures of performance relative to other firms deteriorate prior to CEO turnover and improve thereafter. The degree of improvement is positively related to the level of institutional shareholdings, the presence of an outsider-dominated board, and the appointment of an outsider (rather than an insider) CEO. Turnover announcements are associated with significantly positive average abnormal stock returns, which are in turn significantly positively related to subsequent changes in accounting measures of performance. This suggests that investors view turnover announcements as good news presaging performance improvements.