Firms that initiate dividend payments have positive earnings changes both before and after the dividend policy change, while those omitting dividend payments have negative earnings changes. Subsequent earnings changes are positively related to the dividend announcement return, and stock price reactions at subsequent earnings announcements are smaller than usual, suggesting that these earnings changes are partially anticipated at the dividend announcement. The results indicate that investors interpret announcements of dividend initiations and omissions as managers' forecasts of future earnings changes.

Abstract This paper investigates whether firms benefit from expanded voluntary disclosure by examining changes in capital market factors associated with increases in analyst disclosure ratings for 97 firms. The disclosure rating increases are accompanied by increases in sample firms' stock returns, institutional ownership, analyst following, and stock liquidity. These findings persist after controlling for contemporaneous earnings performance and other potentially influential variables, such as risk, growth, and firm size. While it is difficult to draw unambiguous causal conclusions, these results are consistent with disclosure model predictions that expanded disclosure leads investors to revise upward valuations of the sample firms' stocks, increases stock liquidity, and creates additional institutional and analyst interest in the stocks.

We use a simulation model for a pharmaceutical R&D program to examine the tradeoff between objectivity and relevance of accounting information under various methods of R&D reporting. A simple capitalization rule, similar to the successful‐efforts method of capitalizing oil and gas exploration costs, provides a stronger relation between accounting information and economic values than immediate expensing of R&D outlays or capitalizing the full cost of outlays. The superior relevance of this “successful‐efforts” method persists even when earnings management is widespread.

We examine post-acquisition performance for the 50 largest U.S. mergers between 1979 and mid-1984. Merged firms show significant improvements in asset productivity relative to their industries, leading to higher operating cash flow returns. This performance improvement is particularly strong for firms with highly overlapping businesses. Mergers do not lead to cuts in long-term capital and R&D investments. There is a strong positive relation between postmerger increases in operating cash flows and abnormal stock returns at merger announcements, indicating that expectations of economic improvements underlie the equity revaluations of the merging firms.

This paper examines the effect of accounting procedure changes on cash salary and bonus compensation to CEOs. We estimate whether there is an adjustment to the statistical relation between compensation and corporate earnings following changes that lower earnings (FIFO to LIFO inventory valuation) and that raise earnings (accelerated to straight-line depreciation). The results indicate that (1) subsequent to these changes salary and bonus payments are based on reported earnings, rather than earnings under the original accounting method, and (2) the potential compensation effect of the changes is small compared to the effect of economy- or industry-wide changes in compensation.

We use proprietary data from a major investment bank to investigate factors associated with analysts’ annual compensation. We find compensation to be positively related to “All-Star” recognition, investment-banking contributions, the size of analysts’ portfolios, and whether an analyst is identified as a top stock picker by the Wall Street Journal. We find no evidence that compensation is related to earnings forecast accuracy. But consistent with prior studies, we find analyst turnover to be related to forecast accuracy, suggesting that analyst forecasting incentives are primarily termination based. Additional analyses indicate that “All-Star” recognition proxies for buy-side client votes on analyst research quality used to allocate commissions across banks and analysts. Taken as a whole, our evidence is consistent with analyst compensation being designed to reward actions that increase brokerage and investment-banking revenues. To assess the generality of our findings, we test the same relations using compensation data from a second high-status bank and obtain similar results.

This paper examines whether firms emerging from conglomerate stock breakups are able to affect the types of financial analysts that cover their firms as well as the quality of information generated about their performance. Our sample comprises 103 focus‐increasing spin‐offs, equity carve‐outs, and targeted stock offerings between 1990 and 1995. We find that, after these transactions, sample firms experience a significant increase in coverage by analysts that specialize in subsidiary firms’ industries, and a 30–50% increase in analyst forecast accuracy for parent and subsidiary firms. The improvement in forecast accuracy is partially attributable to expanded disclosure. However, forecast improvements for specialists exceed those for non‐specialists, leading us to conclude that corporate focus can facilitate improved capital market intermediation by financial analysts with industry expertise.

ABSTRACT We use Transparency International's ratings of self-reported anticorruption efforts to analyze factors underlying the ratings. Our tests examine whether these disclosures reflect firms' real efforts to combat corruption or are cheap talk. We find that the ratings are related to enforcement and monitoring, country and industry corruption risk, and governance variables. Controlling for these effects and other ratings determinants, we find that firms with lower residual ratings have higher subsequent citations in corruption news events. They also report higher future sales growth and show a negative relation between profitability change and sales growth in high corruption geographic segments, but not in low corruption segments. The net effect on valuation from sales growth and changes in profitability is close to zero. The findings are robust to a number of sensitivity tests, including analysis of disclosures for a larger sample over multiple years. We conclude that, on average, firms' disclosures signal real efforts to combat corruption.

Experimental economists currently lack a convention for how to pay subjects in experiments with multiple tasks. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing this question. Assuming statewise monotonicity and nothing else, we prove that paying for one randomly chosen problem—the random problem selection mechanism—is essentially the only incentive compatible mechanism. Paying for every period is similarly justified when we assume only a “no complementarities at the top” condition. To help experimenters decide which is appropriate for their particular experiment, we discuss empirical tests of these two assumptions.