Derivatives valuation and risk management involve heavy use of quantitative models. To develop a quantitative assessment of model risk as it affects the basic option writing strategy that might be followed by a financial institution, we conduct an empirical simulation, with and without hedging, using data from 1976 to 1996. Results indicate that imperfect models and inaccurate volatility forecasts create sizable risk exposure for option writers. We consider to what extent the damage due to model risk can be limited by pricing options using a higher volatility than the best estimate from historical data.

There Appears to be significant diversity in the incidence of bureaucratic corruption across countries at different stages of economic development and under different political and economic regimes. Little theoretical or empirical analysis has been offered, however, on the link between corruption, government, and growth. The paper attempts to fill the void through equilibrium models of endogenous growth. “balanced growth” is derived as a balancing act between accumulating human capital, which engenders growth, and accumulating political capital, which mainly assures bureaucratic power. The analysis focuses on the interplay between investment in these two types of capital and its implications for long‐term growth under alternative political regimes. Some propositions are tested and confirmed empirically.

We examine the volatility‐volume relation in futures markets using volume data categorized by type of trader. We find that the positive volatility‐volume relation is driven by the general public, a group of traders who are distant from the trading floor and therefore without precise information on order flow. Clearing members and floor traders who observe order flow often decrease volatility. Our findings are consistent with Shalen's (1993) hypothesis that uninformed traders who cannot differentiate liquidity demand from fundamental value change increase volatility.

We examine the volatility‐volume relation in futures markets using volume data categorized by type of trader. We find that the positive volatility‐volume relation is driven by the general public, a group of traders who are distant from the trading floor and therefore without precise information on order flow. Clearing members and floor traders who observe order flow often decrease volatility. Our findings are consistent with Shalen's (1993) hypothesis that uninformed traders who cannot differentiate liquidity demand from fundamental value change increase volatility.

Using a logistic regression model, we identify the characteristics of firms whose shareholders are likely to benefit from bankruptcy resolution. That is, winners (losers) are firms whose shareholders experience positive (negative) excess returns after bankruptcy filing. We find that winners are relatively smaller firms with higher proportions of convertible debt, tend to file for bankruptcy for strategic reasons, have low share-ownership concentration, and suffer comparatively larger pre-filing stock price declines. Among winners, shareholder returns are greater for firms that have higher levels of private debt and research and development (R&D) expenditures, and operate in more concentrated industries. In addition, our analysis indicates that an ex ante trading strategy of purchasing bankrupt stocks with a greater than 50% probability of being a winner on the day after bankruptcy filing and holding the stocks for a year, on an average, can generate average compounded and excess compounded holding-period returns of +71% and +42%, respectively.

Two competing theories of initial engagement audit pricing are examined empirically. DeAngelo's (1981a) model predicts initial engagement discounts in all settings, while Dye's (1991) model specifically predicts discounting will not occur in settings where audit fees are publicly disclosed. Unlike the United States and most countries, audit fees are publicly disclosed in Australia. Our study examines initial engagement pricing in Australia during a time period when comparable U.S. studies report discounts of 25 percent (Ettredge and Greenberg 1990; Simon and Francis 1988). The Australian evidence finds initial engagement discounting only for upgrades from non-Big 8 to Big 8 auditors. Discounting for upgrades to Big 8 auditors is consistent with economic theories of discount pricing by sellers of higher-priced, higher-quality experience goods as an inducement to purchase when uncertainty about product quality is resolved through buying (experiencing) the goods. The evidence in our study is generally consistent with Dye's (1991) conclusion that public disclosure of audit fees precludes initial engagement discounting and the potential independence problems arising from such discounting.

We find that firms protected by “second generation” state antitakeover laws substantially reduce their use of debt, and that unprotected firms do the reverse. This result supports recent models in which the threat of hostile takeover motivates managers to take on debt they would otherwise avoid. An implication is that legal barriers to takeovers may increase corporate slack.

Are Risk Regulators Rational? Evidence from Hazardous Waste Cleanup Decisions by W. Kip Viscusi and James T. Hamilton. Published in volume 89, issue 4, pages 1010-1027 of American Economic Review, September 1999

This paper develops a simple macroeconomic model that shows that combin-ing capital market imperfections together with unequal access to investment opportunities across individuals can generate endogenous and permanent fluctua-tions in aggregate GDP, investment, and interest rates. Reducing inequality of access may be a necessary condition for macroeconomic stabilization. Moreover, countercyclical fiscal policies have a role to play: in our model savings are underutilized in slumps because of the limited debt capacity of potential investors. Therefore, the government should issue public debt during recessions in order to absorb those idle savings and finance investment subsidies or tax cuts for investors. The most important single fact about saving and investment activities is that in our industrial society they are generally done by different people and for different reasons. (...) For years there might tend to be too little investment, leading to deflation, losses, excess capacity and unemployment. For other years, there might tend to be too much investment, leading to periods of chronic inflation—unless prudent and proper public policies in the fiscal and monetary fields are followed [Paul A. Samuelson, Economics 8th edition, 1970, pp. 196–198].

We point to the vast empirical literature in banking to argue that the current expansion of scale and scope in banking represents a puzzle. We then present two explanations that help us to understand why banks are getting bigger and doing more. Our explanations suggest that banks may be doing this to increase their shareholders' wealth and/or merely to enhance the reputation of their management (CEOs). The latter could lead to herd behavior involving banks that increase size and scope despite a dissipation of shareholders' wealth. Alternatively, increasing size and scope may offer strategic benefits (and hence increase shareholder wealth) in an environment with sufficient profitability in current operations and substantial uncertainty about future core competencies. We explore conditions under which either one of these competing explanations may dominate.