Using proprietary data from AngelList Talent, we study how startup job seekers’ search and application behavior changed during the COVID-19 downturn. We find that workers shifted their searches and applications away from less-established startups and toward more-established ones, even within the same individual over time. At the firm level, this shift was not offset by an influx of new job seekers. Less-established startups experienced a relative decline in the quantity and quality of applications, ultimately affecting their hiring. Our findings uncover a flight-to-safety channel in the labor market that may amplify the procyclical nature of entrepreneurial activities.

We demonstrate that a financial intermediary-based asset pricing model offers a compelling explanation for a new set of conditional moments of equity term structure and convenience yields. The model’s key mechanism is that the time-varying tightness of intermediaries’ leverage constraints drives significant mean reversion in the price of risk. This model guides us in devising a novel empirical methodology to estimate the tightness of these constraints (i.e., the Relative Tightness Index) from cross-sectional returns of various asset classes. Our findings affirm that this measure significantly drives the dynamics of equity yield slope and convenience yields, both empirically and quantitatively.

This paper studies tax-minimizing investment, whereby firms tilt capital purchases toward year-end to reduce taxes. We use this pattern to characterize how taxes affect investment behavior. We exploit variation in firm tax positions from administrative data to confirm that tax minimization causes spikes. Spikes increase when firms face financial constraints or higher option values of waiting. Cumulative investment does not completely reverse after spikes. We develop an investment model with tax asymmetries to rationalize these patterns. Both depreciation motives (later investments face lower effective tax rates) and option value motives (tax asymmetry implies time-varying opportunities to minimize taxes) are necessary to fit the data.

We present a theory in which the interaction between limited sharing of idiosyncratic labor income risk and labor adjustment costs (that endogenously arise through search frictions) determines interest rate dynamics. In the general equilibrium, the interaction of these two ingredients relates bond risk premiums, cross-sectional skewness of income growth, and labor market tightness. Our model rationalizes an upward-sloping average yield curve and predicts a negative relation between labor market tightness and bond risk premiums. We provide evidence for our theory’s mechanism and predictions.

Previous research on calculative intermediaries shows how these effectively challenge, distort, and disrupt accounting practices in ways that policy‐makers might not anticipate. The promises of surveillance capitalism—with its attendant data architectures, datafication processes, and technological sophistication—are different, supposing more accurate ways of reading individuals and greater calculative certainty overall. Yet there is little empirical research to explore how surveillance capitalism manifests itself at the organizational level, either conceptually or operationally. As a result, it remains uncertain whether such specters of omniscience are as haunting in reality as they appear in theory. We explore these themes by way of an ethnographic study into credit scoring in China, showing how intermediary organizations developed a multiplicity of credit scoring models based on machine learning and big data that differed both from original expectations and from each other. These different “renditions” of credit scoring suggest that the data architectures of surveillance capitalism are just as much subject to challenge and adaptation by intermediary organizations as calculative practices, such as accounting, are in more analog environments.

We study the political determinants of the world's largest privatization program by exploiting an age-related discontinuity of politician promotion in China. As a local politician's age exceeds 58, his promotion likelihood quickly diminishes. Consistent with changes in the politician's incentives, we find that Chinese cities whose top officials were older than age 58 were less likely to privatize local state-owned enterprises. Using the promotion discontinuity as an instrument, we report that privatization has significant effects on the firm's efficiency.

Using a sample of A-listed companies from 2010 to 2020, this paper investigates how investor–firm interactions on Easy Interaction and E-interaction affect corporate investment efficiency measured as investment-to-Tobin's Q sensitivity. The empirical results show that investor–firm interactions are positively correlated with corporate investment efficiency. Possible economic channels include information asymmetry and corporate governance channels. Moreover, investor–firm interactions have a greater impact on firms with fewer financial constraints, higher stock price efficiency, higher media coverage, and higher analyst coverage. When interaction sentiment is more positive, interaction quality is higher, and the topic pertains to technology research and development, the impact of investor–firm interactions is also more pronounced. The main conclusion still holds after adopting a series of endogeneity tests and robustness tests.

Exploiting two quasi-natural experiments, we find that firms increase emissions of toxic pollution following decreases in analyst coverage. The effects are stronger for firms with low initial analyst coverage, poor corporate governance, and firms subject to less stringent monitoring by environmental regulators. Decreases in environmental-related questions raised in conference calls, an increased cost of monitoring to institutional shareholders, reductions in pollution abatement investment, and the weakening of internal governance related to environmental performance are channels through which reduced analyst coverage contributes to increases in firm pollution. Our study highlights the monitoring role analysts play in shaping corporate environmental policies.