Abstract Using intraday data, we document statistically strong, but temporary, impacts of commodity index trade flows on commodity futures prices. We also examine the previously documented positive returns around the issuance of commodity-linked notes and find that these returns are an order of magnitude too large to be caused by the small trades necessary to hedge the notes. We provide new evidence that they are instead the result of endogenous issuance. Our results provide novel support for commodity financialization but highlight the importance of measuring the magnitude of financial investment, since even large financial flows have economically modest impacts on prices.

We test whether limited cost pass-through encourages durable goods producers to build financial flexibility. We find that firms with more durable output have larger cash balances and marginal value of cash, lower propensity to pay dividends, and less financial leverage. The link between durable goods and financial flexibility is equally strong in low and zero leverage firms and is reduced in more concentrated industries and when the firm has captive financing activity. Consistent with high demand elasticity driving limited cost pass-through, we find that a large increase in input costs decreases markups and financial slack of durable goods firms in comparison to nondurable goods and services firms.

We study security issuers’ decisions on whether to pool assets when facing counterparties endowed with market power, as is common in over-the-counter markets. Our analysis reveals how buyers’ market power may render the pooling of assets suboptimal — both privately and socially — in particular, when the potential gains from trade are large. Pooling assets then reduces the elasticity of trade volume in the relevant part of the payoff distribution, exacerbating the inefficient rationing associated with the exercise of buyers’ market power. Our analysis provides insight on the determinants of asset-backed securities issuance, including regulatory reforms affecting financial institutions’ liquidity.

Several recent studies argue that the adoption of universal demand (UD) laws represent an exogenous decline in litigation risk by increasing the procedural hurdles associated with shareholder derivative litigation. This study examines how UD laws affect the incidence of derivative litigation risk and related decisions. We show that the adoption of UD laws had no meaningful impact on derivative litigation from 1996 to 2015. We also find no evidence that UD laws affect aggressive accounting, voluntary disclosure, executive compensation, or corporate governance decisions. Collectively, our findings cast doubt on the validity of using UD laws as an exogenous shock to litigation risk.

ABSTRACT Does personal litigation risk for independent directors materially affect firm valuation, compensation‐related issues for independent directors, and board composition decisions? We use the unexpected In re Investors Bancorp decision in 2017 by the Delaware Supreme Court, which lowered the liability threshold only for directors in derivative litigation over their own equity grants and increased their future litigation risk, to examine these issues. Understanding changes in independent director litigation risk is important because such changes may affect directors' willingness or ability to serve on boards and advise executives. Consistent with our predictions, investors and firms reacted to the decision. First, Delaware firms experienced significant negative short‐window returns, concentrated in high‐litigation‐risk firms where equity compensation is most important. Second, Delaware firms responded by increasing the use of director compensation caps, highlighting that they did not pay excessive amounts. Third, Delaware firms with higher abnormal director compensation decreased director compensation, while those with lower abnormal director compensation did not. Finally, Delaware firms added higher‐quality directors to the compensation committee, consistent with concerns about heightened litigation risk for those positions. Notably, these new, higher‐quality directors did not accept lower pay, unlike holdover directors who previously served on the committee. Overall, results are consistent with director litigation concerns having a significant effect on shareholder value and firm and director behavior.

ABSTRACT Audit regulators and commentators propose prompting auditors to more fully take an investor's perspective as a remedy to their concern that auditors underreact to material misstatements. By contrast, we predict that prompting auditors in this manner will backfire, making them less (more) heavily weight indicia that misstatements are (not) material. We further predict auditors will apply this asymmetric weighting instrumentally —to a greater degree as needed—to justify management‐preferred conclusions. We test these predictions in two experiments in which in‐charge audit seniors judge the likelihood that identified audit differences are material and choose required adjustment amounts. Between‐participants, we manipulate whether or not auditors are prompted to take an investor's perspective and, within‐participants, whether these audit differences would or would not violate a qualitative criterion—by breaking or not breaking a favorable profitability trend. Study 1 uses a context in which a relatively low degree of motivated perspective taking is needed, as the audit difference is just below tolerable misstatement (TM). Investor‐prompted auditors assess audit differences as less likely to be material than do unprompted auditors, but only when the qualitative criterion is not violated. Study 2 adds a between‐participant manipulation of misstatement tolerability—that is, whether the audit difference is just below or well above TM. Consistent with an instrumental increase in motivated perspective taking, investor‐prompted auditors assess audit differences that simultaneously are less tolerable and violate a qualitative criterion as significantly less likely to be material. Overall, our theory and experimental evidence suggest prompting auditors to take the investor perspective may have unintended consequences.

ABSTRACT This paper examines whether and how individual auditors are disciplined for audit errors. Taking advantage of the long history of auditor identity data from China, we find that signing auditors with client restatements are likely to lose the privilege of signing the audit reports of public clients. However, auditors can avoid this consequence by issuing a modified audit opinion to warn of the potential misstatement. We show that auditors are more likely to be disciplined when their firms operate in less concentrated audit markets. Finally, we find positive outcomes from the disciplinary action of the audit firms. Firms that discipline their auditors for restatements have a larger decrease in the rate of client restatements and a larger increase in market share, compared to nondisciplining firms. Their clients have a higher earnings response coefficient after the disciplinary action. In summary, our results suggest that individual auditors in China can face career setbacks when they produce poor quality audits.

Abstract This paper explores the aggregate economic effects from India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), which provides up to 100 days of labor to rural laborers at the mandated minimum wage. We examine the within-district change to nighttime lights, a proxy for economic development, and banking deposits using the staggered program rollout for identification. We find consistent and robust evidence that NREGS increased aggregate economic output by 1% to 2% per capita measured by nighttime lights. This effect, however, is not equal across districts. We observe no positive effect of the program in poorer districts, illuminating an important source of heterogeneity.

We apply a new methodology for identifying pervasive and discrete changes (“breaks”) in cross-sectional risk premia. Size, value, and investment risk premia have fallen off to the point where they are insignificantly different from zero at the end of the sample period. The market risk premium has also declined systematically over time but remains significant and positive as do the momentum and profitability risk premium. We construct a new instability risk factor from cross-sectional differences in individual stocks’ exposure to time-varying risk premia and show that this factor earns a premium comparable to that of commonly used risk factors.