This paper identifies five common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. There are three stock-market factors: an overall market factor and factors related to firm size and book-to-market equity. There are two bond-market factors, related to maturity and default risks. Stock returns have shared variation due to the stock-market factors, and they are linked to bond returns through shared variation in the bond-market factors. Except for low-grade corporates, the bond-market factors capture the common variation in bond returns. Most important, the five factors seem to explain average returns on stocks and bonds.

This paper asks whether market fundamentals can explain the recent run-up and decline of Japanese equity values and price-earnings ratios. Accounting differences explain about half of the long-run disparity between U.S. and Japanese P/Es. For example, if Japanese firms used U.S. accounting rules, the Japanese P/E ratio would have been 32.6, not 53.7, in 1989. Accounting differences cannot, however, explain the doubling of this ratio in 1986, nor its decline in 1990. Similarly, we are unable to isolate changes in required stock returns or growth expectations that are large enough to explain recent Japanese stock price movements.

Expected returns on common stocks and long-term bonds contain a term or maturity premium that has a clear business-cycle pattern (low near peaks, high near troughs). Expected returns also contain a risk premium that is related to longer-term aspects of business conditions. The variation through time in this premium is stronger for low-grade bonds than for high-grade bonds and stronger for stocks than for bonds. The general message is that expected returns are lower when economic conditions are strong and higher when conditions are weak.

The power of dividend yields to forecast stock returns, measured by regression R2, increases with the return horizon. We offer a two-part explanation. (1) High autocorrelation causes the variance of expected returns to grow faster than the return horizon. (2) The growth of the variance of unexpected returns with the return horizon is attenuated by a discount-rate effect - shocks to expected returns generate opposite shocks to current prices. We estimate that, on average, the future price increases implied by higher expected returns are just offset by the decline in the current price. Thus, time-varying expected returns generate ‘temporary’ components of prices.

Abstract Variation in monthly metro area house prices unrelated to expected rents clouds the information about future rents in price-rent ratios and lagged changes in house prices. The variation in house prices unrelated to expected rents is, however, correlated across areas, and the problem is mitigated by measuring rent growth regression variables net of their monthly cross-section (across-area) means. This control for price variation unrelated to expected rents substantially enhances the information about future rents that we extract from price-rent ratios and lagged changes in house prices.

Abstract We use the cross-section regression approach of Fama and MacBeth (1973) to construct cross-section factors corresponding to the time-series factors of Fama and French (2015). Time-series models that use only cross-section factors provide better descriptions of average returns than time-series models that use time-series factors. This is true when we impose constant factor loadings and when we use time-varying loadings that are natural for time-series factors and time-varying loadings that are natural for cross-section factors. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

A five-factor model that adds profitability (RMW) and investment (CMA) factors to the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) suggests a shared story for several average-return anomalies. Specifically, positive exposures to RMW and CMA (stock returns that behave like those of profitable firms that invest conservatively) capture the high average returns associated with low market β, share repurchases, and low stock return volatility. Conversely, negative RMW and CMA slopes (like those of relatively unprofitable firms that invest aggressively) help explain the low average stock returns associated with high β, large share issues, and highly volatile returns. Received November 11, 2014; accepted April 27, 2015 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

Confirming predictions shared by the trade-off and pecking order models, more profitable firms and firms with fewer investments have higher dividend payouts. Confirming the pecking order model but contradicting the trade-off model, more profitable firms are less levered. Firms with more investments have less market leverage, which is consistent with the trade-off model and a complex pecking order model. Firms with more investments have lower long-term dividend payouts, but dividends do not vary to accommodate short-term variation in investment. As the pecking order model predicts, short-term variation in investment and earnings is mostly absorbed by debt.

Journal Article Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order Predictions About Dividends and Debt Get access Eugene F. Fama, Eugene F. Fama University of Chicago Address correspondence to Eugene F. Fama, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 1101 East 58th St., Chicago, IL 60637, or e-mail: [email protected]. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Kenneth R. French Kenneth R. French Dartmouth College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 15, Issue 1, January 2002, Pages 1–33, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/15.1.1 Published: 16 June 2015

Stock index futures prices are generally below the level predicted by simple arbitrage models. This paper suggests that the discrepancy between the actual and predicted prices is caused by taxes. Capital gains and losses are not taxed until they are realized. As Constantinides demonstrates in a recent paper, this gives stockholders a valuable timing option. If the stock price drops, the investor can pass part of the loss on to the government by selling the stock. On the other hand, if the stock price rises, the investor can postpone the tax by not realizing the gain. Since this option is not available to stock index futures traders, the futures prices will be lower than standard no-tax models predict.