This paper extends a familiar model of competition and disclosure to incorporate the practical feature that firms may not only hold private information about consumer demand, but they can also influence demand by the investments they make in improving product quality. Such investments can reflect installing new product features, improving durability, adding design enhancements, and the like. This paper demonstrates that investments stand to significantly influence the firm's preference for disclosures and, in fact, become a determining feature of disclosure choice. In particular, under Cournot competition, a firm prefers disclosure when the industry‐wide effects of information and investments are concordant. That is, if both product quality and demand information have large positive industry spillovers, disclosure is desirable because it promotes implicit cooperation in investments; if both have low spillover, disclosure permits a firm to convey strength to a rival and then use quantity and quality in concert to dominate the market precisely when the firm's demand is at its peak.

The textbook make-or-buy decision is typically described as choosing the cheaper of the two sourcing options. However, research in accounting has consistently demonstrated that strategic and informational considerations often complicate such seemingly straightforward criteria. In a similar vein, this paper shows that when a firm becomes privy to accounting information pertaining to its profitability, its sourcing choice has powerful informational reverberations. This is because input procurement from an outsider serves to convey both profitability information and strategic positioning. Conveying profitability information refers to the fact that the size of the input order provides the supplier a credible signal of the firm's internal accounting information and, thus, its relative ability to compete in the marketplace. Conveying strategic positioning refers to the fact that the upfront placement of the input order also informs the supplier about the firm's chosen strategic choices in the marketplace. We demonstrate that both sources of information conveyance together can point to a firm preferring to buy inputs from a retail rival even when it can make them internally at a lower cost. This penchant for outsourcing to a rival is more pronounced the more accurate the firm's accounting system.

This paper studies information system design in a model of double moral hazard in which there is both a decision problem and a control problem. If either problem is considered in isolation, an information system that provides more public information is preferred. However, an information system that provides less public information can, in fact, be desirable because of an interaction between the two problems. The benefit of choosing an information system that provides less information is that it serves as a substitute for commitment for the principal. The cost is that neither the principal's decision (act) nor the agent's payments can be conditioned on the information. We provide sufficient conditions under which less information and more information are each optimal.

In this paper, we embed the double entry accounting structure in a simple belief revision (estimation) problem. We ask the following question: Presented with a set of financial statements (and priors), what is the reader's “best guess” of the underlying transactions that generated these statements? Two properties of accounting information facilitate a particularly simple closed form solution to this estimation problem. First, accounting information is the outcome of a linear aggregation process. Second, the aggregation rule is double entry.

When a firm's input supplier can acquire and misreport private information to gain an edge in negotiations, we show that the firm can blunt the supplier's informational advantage by permitting inefficiencies in its own internal production. Specifically, we establish that a modest increase in the cost of the input(s) a firm makes internally credibly commits it to be more aggressive in negotiations with a supplier for the input(s) the firm buys. Recognizing that its potential information rents will be limited, the supplier, in turn, becomes less aggressive in information acquisition. The paper fully characterizes the equilibrium—the firm's investments, the supplier's information acquisition and reporting decisions, and the terms of trade—to demonstrate that often-maligned internal bloat can be an endogenous facilitator of efficient outsourcing.

Organizations with a mission that extends “beyond profit” to achieve broader objectives are becoming increasingly common. This paper studies such hybrid entities—firms that value the profits they generate, as well as the utility they provide to customers—and details their implications for industry disclosure practices. The findings demonstrate that disclosure incentives are perturbed not just from being a hybrid entity, but also from competing with such entities. Accounting for both competitive and disclosure effects, the paper then assesses the circumstances under which a hybrid firm is economically viable and derives the ensuing equilibrium industry composition. As such, we show that the presence of firms with objectives beyond profit can be an endogenous characteristic of many industries.

It is well recognized that stock prices provide relevant feedback that can guide future firm decisions. This paper develops a model to examine how accounting disclosures affect the decision-usefulness of such stock market reactions. We demonstrate that information in accounting reports can prove useful because it helps observers better interpret and isolate the decision-relevant information embedded in the ensuing stock price reaction. This leads to natural synergies between accounting reports and stock prices in directing firm strategies—the more forward-looking information that can potentially be gleaned from stock prices, the more the firm will invest in improving precision of accounting disclosures even when such disclosures pertain to unrelated current activities.

In this paper, we embed the double entry accounting structure in a simple belief revision (estimation) problem. We ask the following question: Presented with a set of financial statements (and priors), what is the reader's “best guess” of the underlying transactions that generated these statements? Two properties of accounting information facilitate a particularly simple closed form solution to this estimation problem. First, accounting information is the outcome of a linear aggregation process. Second, the aggregation rule is double entry.