task in financial markets, and it has held the attention of academics and practitioners over the last two decades. At the time of

We provide evidence on the speed and accuracy of price discovery by studying stock returns and trading volume surrounding the crash of the space shuttle Challenger. While the event was widely observed, it took several months for an esteemed panel to determine which of the mechanical components failed during the launch. By contrast, in the period immediately following the crash, securities trading in the four main shuttle contractors seemingly singled out the firm that manufactured the faulty component. We show that price discovery occurred without large trading profits and that much of the price discovery occurred during a trading halt of the firm responsible for the faulty component. Finally, although we document what are arguably quick and accurate movements of the market, we are unable to detect the actual manner in which particular informed traders induced price discovery.

We find that dual-class firms experience less underpricing than single-class firms and explore several hypotheses which explain this phenomenon. Compared to single-class firms, dual-class companies have slightly higher post-IPO institutional ownership and experience fewer control events. Although dual-class firms achieve a lower underpricing cost, they trade at lower prices relative to earnings and sales than single-class IPOs. This pricing differential, combined with evidence that dual-class managers earn higher compensation and that dual-class shares are common among media and entertainment industry IPOs, suggests that dual-class ownership structures protect private control benefits.

We find that executives who jump to chief executive officer (CEO) positions at new employers come from firms that exhibit above-average stock price performance. This relationship is more pronounced for more senior executives. No such relationship exists for jumps to non-CEO positions. Stock options and restricted stock do not appear to significantly affect the likelihood of jumping ship, but the existence of an "heir apparent" on the management team increases the likelihood that executives will leave for non-CEO positions elsewhere. Hiring grants used to attract managers are correlated with the equity position forfeited at the prior employer and with the prior employer's performance.

We present a microstructure model of competition for order flow between exchanges based on liquidity provision. We find that neither a pure limit order market (PLM) nor a hybrid specialist/limit order market (HM) structure is competition-proof. A PLM can always be supported in equilibrium as the dominant market (i.e., where the hybrid limit book is empty), but an HM can also be supported, for some market parameterizations, as the dominant market. We also show the possible coexistence of competing markets. Order preferencing—that is, decisions about where orders are routed when investors are indifferent—is a key determinant of market viability. Welfare comparisons show that competition between exchanges can increase as well as reduce the cost of liquidity.

We present a microstructure model of competition for order flow between exchanges based on liquidity provision. We find that neither a pure limit order market (PLM) nor a hybrid specialist/limit order market (HM) structure is competition-proof. A PLM can always be supported in equilibrium as the dominant market (i.e., where the hybrid limit book is empty), but an HM can also be supported, for some market parameterizations, as the dominant market. We also show the possible coexistence of competing markets. Order preferencing—that is, decisions about where orders are routed when investors are indifferent—is a key determinant of market viability. Welfare comparisons show that competition between exchanges can increase as well as reduce the cost of liquidity.

Asymmetric information between corporate insiders and other market participants can lead to large bid‐ask spreads or even a collapse of trade in financial markets. In this paper, we discuss how voluntary disclosure by insiders can remedy this problem. When insiders make disclosure decisions after they become informed, other market participants update their prior beliefs on the basis of both the information disclosed and the information not disclosed. Insiders then give up some or all of their information advantage to weakly increase their profits. These results do not rely on ex ante commitments on the part of the insiders.

We use a unique set of equities in the when-issued market to provide new tests of the law of one price in financial markets. We compare the prices of when-issued and regular-way shares of publicly-traded subsidiaries and their parents around the time the subsidiaries are fully divested. In contrast to prior analyses of when-issued trading in equity markets, we find that the when-issued shares of the subsidiary trade at a discount. Some of the pricing differences stem from measurement factors such as exchange location and bid-ask clustering that bias the observed when-issued pricing differential away from zero. The remaining difference between the when-issued and regular-way prices is due to asymmetric movements in bid and ask quotes in the two markets. We also find evidence of temporary price pressures on the date of execution of the spinoff of the subsidiary firms that bear resemblance to the pricing in the when-issued market. We interpret the evidence as consistent with the law of one price in the presence of transaction costs.