Twentieth century Japan provides a remarkable laboratory for examining how an externally imposed institutional and regulatory intervention affects the ownership of corporations. In the first half of the century, Japan had weak legal protection but strong institutional arrangements. The institutions were dismantled after the war and replaced by a strong form of legal protection. This inversion resulted in a switch from Japan being a country in which equity markets flourished and ownership was dispersed in the first half of the century to one in which banks and companies dominated with interlocking shareholdings in the second half of the century.

This article is the first study of long-run evolution of investor protection and corporate ownership in the United Kingdom over the twentieth century. Formal investor protection emerged only in the second half of the century. We assess the influence of investor protection on ownership by comparing cross-sections of firms at different times in the century and the evolution of firms incorporating at different stages of the century. Investor protection had little impact on dispersion of ownership: even in the absence of investor protection, rates of dispersion of ownership were high, associated primarily with mergers. Preliminary evidence suggests that ownership dispersion in the United Kingdom relied more on informal relations of trust than on formal investor protection.

This paper provides evidence on the incidence, characteristics, and performance of activist engagements across countries. We find that the incidence of activism is greatest with high institutional ownership, particularly for U.S. institutions. We use a sample of 1,740 activist engagements across 23 countries and find that almost one-quarter of engagements are by multi-activists engaging the same target. These engagements perform strikingly better than single activist engagements. Engagement outcomes, such as board changes and takeovers, vary across countries and significantly contribute to the returns to activism. Japan is an exception, with high initial expectations and low outcomes.

We use large language models to analyze the content of 4,700 private meetings between a large active asset manager and its portfolio firms. The high‐level meetings convey mostly soft information about the firm, and little about industry or market. Fund manager meetings focus on business models and financial metrics, while governance specialist meetings focus on environmental, social, and governance risks; 0.4% of meetings discuss material nonpublic information. Trades by fund managers increase with meetings attended by senior management, rated as unusually good or bad, where the tone is significantly positive or negative, or assessed as creating consensus. Meeting‐informed portfolios can generate significant outperformance.

This article reports a unique analysis of private engagements by an activist fund. It is based on data made available to us by Hermes, the fund manager owned by the British Telecom Pension Scheme, on engagements with management in companies targeted by its UK Focus Fund. In contrast with most previous studies of activism, we report that the fund executes shareholder activism predominantly through private interventions that would be unobservable in studies purely relying on public information. The fund substantially outperforms benchmarks and we estimate that abnormal returns are largely associated with engagements rather than stock picking.

This article reports a unique analysis of private engagements by an activist fund. It is based on data made available to us by Hermes, the fund manager owned by the British Telecom Pension Scheme, on engagements with management in companies targeted by its UK Focus Fund. In contrast with most previous studies of activism, we report that the fund executes shareholder activism predominantly through private interventions that would be unobservable

We show that in countries with strong investor protection, developed financial markets, and active markets for corporate control, family firms evolve into widely held companies as they age. In countries with weak investor protection, less developed financial markets, and inactive markets for corporate control, family control is very persistent over time. While family control in high investor protection countries is concentrated in industries that have low investment opportunities and low merger and acquisition (M&A) activity, the same is not so in countries that have low investor protection, where the presence of family control in an industry is unrelated to investment opportunities and M&A activity.