We estimate how 1970–90 changes in an outcome‐based measure of school quality (state average test scores) affected changes in earnings for those leaving high school to enter a state’s labor force. We find that a one standard deviation deterioration in a state’s relative test score performance is associated with a 3% (or .5 SD) reduction in average wages of young entrants to the labor force. We also find a similar decline in college matriculation. There is weak evidence that the school quality effect on earnings diminishes as labor force entrants acquire experience.

Using a procedure that allows selective pooling of certain subsamples of the data, this study examines the determinants of state unemployment rates in the United States. By selectively pooling the data, more reliable parameter estimates result than could otherwise be obtained were the data disaggregated to the state level, and the specification error inherent in a complete pooling of the data is avoided. The models are estimated using two stage least squares, and the empirical results indicate considerable heterogeneity across areas in the ways in which unemployment rates are determined.

Very few business topics attract as much public attention as the paychecks of top executive officers in the largest U.S. companies. Undoubtedly, part of this interest has been fueled by the large and continuous increases in chief executive officers ’ (CEOs) compensation over the past three decades. Even ignoring the more recent escalation in the use of executive stock options (Brian Hall and Kevin J. Murphy, 2000, 2003), the base salaries and bonuses of Forbes 800 CEOs increased from an average of $700,000 in 1970 (in 2002-constant dollars) to over $2.2 million in 2000. 1 During the same period, the ratio of CEO cash compensation to average pay for production workers increased from about 25 in 1970 to nearly 90 in 2000. 2 The most prevalent explanation in popular press for this trend is the “fat cat ” theory, a variant of which has been espoused among academics by Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried, and

We present a model of the creation of social networks, such as political parties, trade unions, religious coalitions, or political action committees, through discussion and mutual persuasion among their members. The key idea is that people are influenced by those inside their network, but not by those outside. Once created, networks can be "rented out" to politicians who seek votes and support for their initiatives and ideas, which may have little to do with network members' core beliefs. In this framework, political competition does not lead to convergence of party platforms to the views of the median voter. Rather, parties separate their messages and try to isolate their members to prevent personal influence from those in the opposition.

We employ a certainty-equivalence framework to analyze the cost, value and pay/performance sensitivity of non-tradable options held by undiversified, risk-averse executives. We derive “executive value” lines, the risk-adjusted analogues to Black–Scholes lines. We show that distinguishing between “executive value” and “company cost” provides insight into many issues regarding stock option practice including: executive views about Black–Scholes values; tradeoffs between options, restricted stock and cash; exercise price policies; option repricings; early exercise policies and decisions; and the length of vesting periods. It also leads to reinterpretations of both cross-sectional facts and longitudinal trends in the level of executive compensation.

This paper studies optimal incentive contracts when workers have career concerns--concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation. The authors show that the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives: the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract. Thus, the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest for workers close to retirement because career concerns are weakest for these workers. The authors find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief-executive compensation and stock-market performance. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.

We define national security (NS) as public policies that protect the safety or welfare of a nation's citizens from substantial threats. NS capital provides societal insurance against widespread harm or catastrophe, so optimal NS investments may have very low expected rates of return. Investment targeted at extreme events (war) has spillovers, reducing potential harm in less threatening situations as well. Potential threats are highly uncertain, which raises the value of ex-post scalability of NS technologies. Higher probabilities of extreme events raise the demand for flexibility, so ex-post responses to threats are more elastic, but may reduce current precaution.

Murphy and Topel (2006, henceforth MT) develop methods for valuing health improvements based on individuals’ willingness to pay. Our results indicate that past health improvements have been enormously valuable. We estimate that gains in life expectancy over the twentieth century were worth more than $1.2 million per person to the current US population, and that rising longevity added about $3.2 trillion per year to national wealth between 1970 and 2000, as mortality rates among older adults fell sharply. Looking ahead, we estimate that even modest progress against major lifethreatening diseases would be extremely valuable. For example, the two most prominent causes of disease-related mortality in the United States are cardiovascular diseases (CVD) and cancer. We find that a permanent 10 percent reduction in mortality rates from CVD would be worth about $5.7 trillion to current and future Americans, while similar progress against cancer would be worth $4.7 trillion. A 10 percent reduction in overall mortality would be worth about $18 trillion. If past progress is an indication, there is little doubt that these or greater gains will eventually be realized. The questions are when and at what cost? In comparison to these prospective benefits of health progress, expenditures on basic and applied health research in the United States are modest. Public support for basic biomedical research—mainly through the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and associated grants to research universities—totals about $28 billion annually. Adding expenditures on health research and development (R&D) by private institutions and by pharmaceutical and medical products companies brings the total for basic and applied health research to about $60 billion Social Value and the Speed of Innovation

We develop a framework for valuing improvements in health and apply it to past and prospective reductions in mortality in the United States. We calculate social values of (i) increased longevity over the twentieth century, (ii) progress against various diseases after 1970, and (iii) potential future progress against major diseases. Cumulative gains in life expectancy after 1900 were worth over $1.2 million to the representative American in 2000, whereas post-1970 gains added about $3.2 trillion per year to national wealth, equal to about half of GDP. Potential gains from future health improvements are also large; for example, a 1 percent reduction in cancer mortality would be worth $500 billion.