Multi-asset class, multimarket central counterparties (CCPs) are becoming less uncommon as a result of merges between specialized (single-asset class, single market) CCPs and market demands for greater capital efficiency. Yet, traditional CCP risk management models often lack the necessary sophistication to estimate potential losses relative to the closeout process of a defaulter’s portfolio in a multi-asset class, multimarket environment. As a result, multi-asset class, multimarket CCPs usually rely on a simplified silo approach for risk calculation which not only fails to deliver efficiency, but may also increase systemic risk. The CORE (Closeout Risk Evaluation) approach, on the other hand, provides conceptual and mathematical tools necessary for robust and efficient central counterparty risk evaluation in multi-asset class and multimarket environments, acknowledging the portfolio dynamics involved in the closeout process as well as important “real life” market frictions.

We derive a foreign ownership return as the weighted average return of foreign stocks that are connected to a stock through common ownership. The foreign ownership return is of similar economic significance as traditional country and industry factors in explaining international stock returns. It is not related to omitted fundamentals or wealth effects but shifts substantially around ADR and index listings when the investor habitat changes. A decomposition shows that the foreign ownership return is driven by active reallocations of global institutions as opposed to fund flows from end investors. Our findings have important implications for international portfolio diversification.

Gross profit scaled by book value of total assets predicts the cross section of average returns. Novy-Marx (2013) concludes that it outperforms other measures of profitability such as bottom line net income, cash flows, and dividends. One potential explanation for the measure׳s predictive ability is that its numerator (gross profit) is a cleaner measure of economic profitability. An alternative explanation lies in the measure׳s deflator. We find that net income equals gross profit in predictive power when they have consistent deflators. Deflating profit by the book value of total assets results in a variable that is the product of profitability and the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of total assets, which is priced. We then construct an alternative measure of profitability, operating profitability, which better matches current expenses with current revenue. This measure exhibits a far stronger link with expected returns than either net income or gross profit. It predicts returns as far as ten years ahead, seemingly inconsistent with irrational pricing explanations.

This study investigates whether the market for audit clients penalizes auditors following association with low-quality audits. Specifically, we examine whether audit offices experience a loss in local market share following client restatements. We document that the frequency of restatement announcements within an office-year (“contamination”) is inversely related to subsequent year-over-year change in local market share. Further analysis indicates that restatements impair the office's ability to both attract and retain audit clients. We find that this effect is strongest in high competition markets and diminished in low competition markets. We also examine auditor retention decisions at the client level and find that the likelihood of auditor dismissal increases with contamination, even for non-restating clients. We also find that, on average, clients dismissing their auditor select less contaminated audit offices. Taken together, our results suggest that market forces penalize auditors for association with audit failures, thereby providing an incentive to maintain high-quality audits and protect reputational capital.

In this study, we examine whether interacting hierarchical teams outperform nominal hierarchical teams in electronic brainstorming. Our hierarchical audit teams were composed of 111 managers and seniors from two Big 4 accounting firms. We compare fraud brainstorming outcomes between nominal and interacting teams for two tasks of varying complexity: a simpler task of fraud risk factor identification and a more complex task of fraud hypothesis generation. We find that nominal teams generate a significantly larger number of unique fraud risk factors and fraud hypotheses than interacting teams. Nominal teams also generate higher-quality fraud hypotheses. We provide evidence that social loafing by less experienced auditors in interacting teams drives the differences between nominal and interacting teams in the fraud hypothesis generation task. In addition, less experienced auditors have less developed mental simulations for frauds in interacting teams compared to those in nominal teams. A key contribution of our study is that it identifies the underlying mechanisms of the differential fraud brainstorming outcomes between nominal and interacting teams.

We develop a model of selection that incorporates a key element of recent health reforms: an individual mandate. Using data from Massachusetts, we estimate the parameters of the model. In the individual market for health insurance, we find that premiums and average costs decreased significantly in response to the individual mandate. We find an annual welfare gain of 4.1% per person or $51.1 million annually in Massachusetts as a result of the reduction in adverse selection. We also find smaller post-reform markups.

We specify measures of accounting consistency both across time and across firms based on the textual similarity of accounting policy footnotes disclosed in 10-K filings. We first examine how these measures relate to earnings quality. Accounting consistency over time is positively associated with a number of earnings quality proxies, including earnings persistence, predictability, accrual quality, and absolute discretionary accruals. We also find that lower consistency relative to other firms in the industry is associated with larger absolute accrual model residuals. Finally, we examine the information processing effects of accounting consistency. We find that greater accounting consistency in the time-series and the cross-section is associated with lower information asymmetry, as proxied by bid-ask spread and illiquidity. Greater cross-sectional consistency is also associated with greater analyst coverage, more accurate analyst forecasts, decreased dispersion in analyst forecasts, and stronger stock return synchronicity. Data Availability: The accounting consistency measures developed in this study are available upon request. All other data are available from the sources cited in the text.

We investigate the role of accounting and audit quality in the allocation of international development aid loans provided by the World Bank. This aid is crucial to improve governance functions, infrastructure, and capital markets, and the accounting and audit environments in a country can provide the World Bank with confidence that aid is being used as intended rather than being diverted for personal or political gain. We find that development aid loans are higher for countries with stronger accounting quality, where IFRS use is mandated, and where the audit environment is stronger. However, we also find that United States geo-political interests influence these results. Specifically, the World Bank appears to “overlook” accounting and audit quality in countries where geo-political interests are relatively aligned with those of the U.S. Finally, we find that accounting and auditing matter only in countries with relatively high corruption levels, indicating that the World Bank has greater trust that accounting and auditing are of relatively high quality in low-corruption countries. Data Availability: All data are publicly available.

Participants in defined contribution (DC) retirement plans rarely adjust their portfolio allocations, suggesting that their investment choices and consequent money flows are sticky and not discerning. However, participants’ inertia could be offset by DC plan sponsors, who adjust the plan's investment options. We examine these countervailing influences on flows into U.S. mutual funds. We find that flows into funds from DC assets are more volatile and exhibit more performance sensitivity than non‐DC flows, primarily due to adjustments to the investment options by the plan sponsors. Thus, DC retirement money is less sticky and more discerning than non‐DC money.

Accounting rules, through their interactions with capital regulations, affect financial institutions’ trading behavior. The insurance industry provides a laboratory to explore these interactions: life insurers have greater flexibility than property and casualty insurers to hold speculative‐grade assets at historical cost, and the degree to which life insurers recognize market values differs across U.S. states. During the financial crisis, insurers facing a lesser degree of market value recognition are less likely to sell downgraded asset‐backed securities. To improve their capital positions, these insurers disproportionately resort to gains trading, selectively selling otherwise unrelated bonds with high unrealized gains, transmitting shocks across markets.