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Torpedo Your Competition: Strategic Reporting and Peer Firm IPO

The Accounting Review 2024 99(6), 51-73
A firm’s initial public offering (IPO) generates negative externalities for industry competitors. To mitigate this threat, incumbent firms manage their earnings downward, issue more negative management forecasts, and use a more negative disclosure tone when their industry peers file for an IPO. Negative accruals reverse when the threat subsides. Incumbents manage earnings more aggressively when costs are small and benefits are large, and when they follow negative disclosures of industry leading incumbents. Such strategic disclosure lowers incumbent firm valuation multiples and associates with more negative IPO firm media sentiment. IPO firms obtain lower offer prices, raise less capital, and are more likely to withdraw from the offering. They also invest less, hoard more cash, and experience lower profitability post-IPO, whereas incumbents experience higher profitability and market share growth. Our results highlight the role of strategic reporting on product market competition and identify a new cost of going public.

An Examination of the Listing of Analyst Coverage on Corporate Websites

The Accounting Review 2024 99(2), 57-84
We examine firm decisions to provide listings of sell-side analyst coverage on corporate investor relations (IR) websites. These listings are related to three major areas of financial research—voluntary disclosure, investor relations, and analysts. Our hand-collected data permit cross-sectional and time-series analyses. Firms are more likely to have such listings when analysts are more important information intermediaries and when firms are directly involved in managing their IR websites. For firms with listings, the probability of an analyst being included on the listing is increasing in firm awareness of and familiarity with the analyst, how active and favorable the analyst is, and the analyst’s reputation. Additional analysis indicates similar results across self-hosting versus third-party hosting IR websites, with a notable exception that self-hosting firms exhibit a stronger preference for analysts who issue more favorable research about the firm. Decisions to add or drop analysts from listings reinforce the main results. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the text.

Merchants of Death: The Effect of Credit Supply Shocks on Hospital Outcomes

American Economic Review 2024 114(11), 3623-3668
This study examines the link between credit supply and hospital health outcomes. We use bank stress tests as exogenous shocks to credit access for hospitals that have lending relationships with tested banks. We find that affected hospitals shift their operations to increase resource utilization following a negative credit shock but reduce the quality of their care to patients across a variety of measures, including a significant increase in risk-adjusted readmission and mortality rates. The results indicate that access to credit can affect the quality of health care hospitals deliver, pointing to important spillover effects of credit market frictions on health outcomes.

CEO Incentives for Risk-Taking and Compensation Duration

The Accounting Review 2024 99(6), 247-270 open access
When determining new equity grants, corporate boards face a tradeoff between the CEO’s incentives generated from the grant’s duration versus those arising from the convexity of the embedded equity risk. We hypothesize and find that boards lengthen the horizon of new compensation grants in the presence of greater pre-existing compensation sensitivity to stock return volatility (vega). In addition, consistent with our hypothesis, we find stronger results in the presence of greater left-tail risk. Further, employing two exogenous shocks to left-tail risk, we provide evidence consistent with our hypothesis that grant horizons are related to risk incentives. Our analysis of the interaction of these two incentive mechanisms provides new insights on compensation contracting.

The Effects of Daylight Saving Time Adjustments on Investor Information Processing

The Accounting Review 2024 99(2), 249-277
Although daylight saving time (DST) is thought to provide economic benefits, extant research documents various adverse effects of DST adjustments. However, prior research provides little conclusive evidence about the effects of DST adjustments on capital market participants. We examine the effects of “spring forward” DST advances, which disrupt the human sleep cycle and economic activities, on investors’ processing of earnings news. We find a delayed price response to earnings news released during the first week following a DST advance. We also find that this effect is stronger among firms with investors who are more likely to be trading on earnings news and among firms with less sophisticated investors. Our findings contribute to research on the unintended consequences of DST adjustments and to the growing literature on intra-investor variation in disclosure processing costs. Our study may be of interest to legislators currently debating proposed legislation that would eliminate DST phasing. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text.

Are Private Firms More Aggressive Tax Planners?

The Accounting Review 2024 99(4), 197-223 open access
Drawing on confidential Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data, we examine whether privately held corporations are more aggressive tax planners than their publicly held peers. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find no consistent evidence that private firms are more aggressive tax planners. We then examine whether private firms’ tax planning differs from that of public firms more generally. We find that private firms engage in more conforming tax planning (planning that also reduces pretax accounting income). However, tests of nonconforming tax planning reveal that private firms generally engage in the same or less planning relative to their public peers. Overall, our findings cast doubt on the belief that private firms are generally more aggressive tax planners than are public firms, but confirm that they engage in more of some forms of general (i.e., conforming) planning. Data Availability: The IRS provided confidential tax information to Michele S. Mullaney pursuant to an Intragovernmental Personnel Act of 1970 (IPA) agreement through the Statistics of Income (SOI) Joint Statistical Research Program (JSRP).

Lender Automation and Racial Disparities in Credit Access

Journal of Finance 2024 79(2), 1457-1512
Process automation reduces racial disparities in credit access by enabling smaller loans, broadening banks' geographic reach, and removing human biases from decision making. We document these findings in the context of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), where private lenders faced no credit risk but decided which firms to serve. Black‐owned firms obtained PPP loans primarily from automated fintech lenders, especially in areas with high racial animus. After traditional banks automated their loan processing procedures, their PPP lending to Black‐owned firms increased. Our findings cannot be fully explained by racial differences in loan application behaviors, preexisting banking relationships, firm performance, or fraud rates.

Does the Squeaky Wheel Get More Grease? The Direct and Indirect Effects of Citizen Participation on Environmental Governance in China

American Economic Review 2024 114(3), 815-850 open access
We conducted a nationwide field experiment in China to evaluate the direct and indirect impacts of assigning firms to public or private citizen appeals when they violate pollution standards. There are three main findings. First, public appeals to the regulator through social media substantially reduce violations and pollution emissions, while private appeals cause more modest environmental improvements. Second, public appeals appear to tilt regulators’ focus away from facilitating economic growth and toward avoiding pollution-induced public unrest. Third, pollution reductions by treated firms are not offset by control firms, based on randomly varying the proportion of treated firms at the prefecture level.

Nonstandard Errors

Albert J. Menkveld; Anna Dreber; Felix Holzmeister; Jürgen Huber; Magnus Johannesson; Michael Kirchler; SEBASTIAN NEUSÜß; Michael Razen; Utz Weitzel; DAVID ABAD-DÍAZ; Menachem Abudy; Tobias Adrian; Yacine Aït-Sahalia; Olivier Akmansoy; Jamie Alcock; Vitali Alexeev; Arash Aloosh; LIVIA AMATO; Diego Amaya; James J. Angel; ALEJANDRO T. AVETIKIAN; AMADEUS BACH; EDWIN BAIDOO; GAETAN BAKALLI; LI BAO; Andrea Barbon; OKSANA BASHCHENKO; Parampreet Christopher Bindra; Geir Høidal Bjønnes; Jeffrey R. Black; Bernard S. Black; DIMITAR BOGOEV; SANTIAGO BOHORQUEZ CORREA; Oleg Bondarenko; CHARLES S. BOS; Ciril Bosch-Rosa; ELIE BOURI; Christian T. Brownlees; ANNA CALAMIA; Viet Nga Cao; Gunther Capelle-Blancard; LAURA M. CAPERA ROMERO; Massimiliano Caporin; Allen Carrion; TOLGA CASKURLU; Bidisha Chakrabarty; Jian Chen; Mikhail Chernov; WILLIAM CHEUNG; LUDWIG B. CHINCARINI; Tarun Chordia; SHEUNG-CHI CHOW; BENJAMIN CLAPHAM; Jean-Edouard Colliard; Carole Comerton-Forde; EDWARD CURRAN; THONG DAO; WALE DARE; Ryan J. Davies; RICCARDO DE BLASIS; GIANLUCA F. DE NARD; Fany Declerck; OLEG DEEV; Hans Degryse; SOLOMON Y. DEKU; CHRISTOPHE DESAGRE; Mathijs A. van Dijk; Chukwuma Dim; Thomas Dimpfl; YUN JIANG DONG; PHILIP A. DRUMMOND; Tom L. Dudda; TEODOR DUEVSKI; Ariadna Dumitrescu; Teodor Dyakov; Anne Haubo Dyhrberg; Michał Dzieliński; ASLI EKSI; Izidin El Kalak; Saskia ter Ellen; Nicolas Eugster; Martin D. D. Evans; Michael Farrell; ESTER FELEZ-VINAS; Gerardo Ferrara; EL MEHDI FERROUHI; Andrea Flori; JONATHAN T. FLUHARTY-JAIDEE; Sean Foley; Kingsley Y. L. Fong; Thierry Foucault; TATIANA FRANUS; Francesco A. Franzoni; Bart Frijns; MICHAEL FRÖMMEL; SERVANNA M. FU; Sascha Füllbrunn; BAOQING GAN; GE GAO; Thomas Gehrig; ROLAND GEMAYEL; DIRK GERRITSEN; Javier Gil-Bazo; Dudley Gilder; Lawrence R. Glosten; THOMAS GOMEZ; Arseny Gorbenko; Joachim Grammig; Vincent Grégoire; Ufuk Güçbilmez; Björn Hagströmer; JULIEN HAMBUCKERS; ERIK HAPNES; Jeffrey H. Harris; Lawrence Harris; SIMON HARTMANN; JEAN-BAPTISTE HASSE; Nikolaus Hautsch; XUE-ZHONG (TONY) HE; Davidson Heath; SIMON HEDIGER; Terrence Hendershott; Ann Marie Hibbert; Erik Hjalmarsson; Seth A. Hoelscher; Peter Hoffmann; Craig W. Holden; Alex R. Horenstein; Wenqian Huang; DA HUANG; Christophe Hurlin; KONRAD ILCZUK; ALEXEY IVASHCHENKO; Subramanian R. Iyer; Hossein Jahanshahloo; NAJI JALKH; Charles M. Jones; SIMON JURKATIS; Petri Jylhä; ANDREAS T. KAECK; GABRIEL KAISER; ARZÉ KARAM; Egle Karmaziene; BERNHARD KASSNER; Markku Kaustia; EKATERINA KAZAK; Fearghal Kearney; Vincent van Kervel; SAAD A. KHAN; MARTA K. KHOMYN; Tony Klein; OLGA KLEIN; Alexander Klos; Michael Koetter; Aleksey Kolokolov; Robert A. Korajczyk; Roman Kozhan; Jan P. Krahnen; PAUL KUHLE; Amy Kwan; QUENTIN LAJAUNIE; F. Y. Eric C. Lam; Marie Lambert; Hugues Langlois; JENS LAUSEN; Tobias Lauter; Markus Leippold; VLADIMIR LEVIN; YIJIE LI; HUI LI; CHEE YOONG LIEW; THOMAS LINDNER; Oliver Linton; JIACHENG LIU; Anqi Liu; Guillermo Llorente; Matthijs Lof; ARIEL LOHR; FRANCIS LONGSTAFF; Alejandro Lopez-Lira; Shawn Mankad; NICOLA MANO; ALEXIS MARCHAL; Charles Martineau; Francesco Mazzola; Debrah Meloso; MICHAEL G. MI; Roxana Mihet; Vijay Mohan; Sophie Moinas; DAVID MOORE; Liangyi Mu; Dmitriy Muravyev; Dermot Murphy; GABOR NESZVEDA; CHRISTIAN NEUMEIER; Ulf Nielsson; Mahendrarajah Nimalendran; Sven Nolte; LARS L. NORDEN; Peter O’Neill; Khaled Obaid; BERNT A. ØDEGAARD; Per Östberg; EMILIANO PAGNOTTA; Marcus Painter; Stefan Palan; IMON J. PALIT; Andreas Park; Roberto Pascual; Paolo Pasquariello; Ľuboš Pástor; VINAY PA℡; Andrew J. Patton; Neil D. Pearson; Loriana Pelizzon; MICHELE PELLI; Matthias Pelster; Christophe Pérignon; CAMERON PFIFFER; Richard Philip; TOMÁŠ PLÍHAL; PUNEET PRAKASH; OLIVER-ALEXANDER PRESS; TINA PRODROMOU; Marcel Prokopczuk; Talis Putnins; YA QIAN; GAURAV RAIZADA; David Rakowski; Angelo Ranaldo; Luca Regis; Stefan Reitz; Thomas Renault; REX W. RENJIE; Roberto Renò; Steven J. Riddiough; Kalle Rinne; PAUL RINTAMÄKI; Ryan Riordan; THOMAS RITTMANNSBERGER; IÑAKI RODRÍGUEZ LONGARELA; Dominik Roesch; LAVINIA ROGNONE; Brian Roseman; Ioanid Roşu; Saurabh Roy; NICOLAS RUDOLF; STEPHEN R. RUSH; Khaladdin Rzayev; ALEKSANDRA A. RZEŹNIK; Anthony Sanford; Harikumar Sankaran; Asani Sarkar; Lucio Sarno; Olivier Scaillet; STEFAN SCHARNOWSKI; KLAUS R. SCHENK-HOPPÉ; ANDREA SCHERTLER; MICHAEL SCHNEIDER; FLORIAN SCHROEDER; Norman Schürhoff; Philipp Schuster; MARCO A. SCHWARZ; Mark S. Seasholes; Norman J. Seeger; Or Shachar; Andriy Shkilko; JESSICA SHUI; MARIO SIKIC; Giorgia Simion; Lee A. Smales; Paul Söderlind; Elvira Sojli; Konstantin Sokolov; JANTJE SÖNKSEN; Laima Spokeviciute; Denitsa Stefanova; Marti G. Subrahmanyam; BARNABAS SZASZI; Oleksandr Talavera; Yuehua Tang; Nick Taylor; Wing Wah Tham; Erik Theissen; Julian Thimme; Ian Tonks; Hai Tran; Luca Trapin; Anders B. Trolle; M. ANDREEA VADUVA; Giorgio Valente; Robert A. Van Ness; Aurelio Vasquez; Thanos Verousis; Patrick Verwijmeren; ANDERS VILHELMSSON; Grigory Vilkov; Vladimir Vladimirov; SEBASTIAN VOGEL; Stefan Voigt; Wolf Wagner; THOMAS WALTHER; Patrick Weiss; Michel van der Wel; Ingrid M. Werner; P. Joakim Westerholm; Christian Westheide; HANS C. WIKA; Evert Wipplinger; Michael Wolf; Christian C. P. Wolff; LEONARD WOLK; WING-KEUNG WONG; Jan Wrampelmeyer; Zhen-Xing Wu; Shuo Xia; Dacheng Xiu; KE XU; CAIHONG XU; Pradeep K. Yadav; JOSÉ YAGÜE; Cheng Yan; Antti Yang; Woongsun Yoo; WENJIA YU; YIHE YU; Shihao Yu; Bart Z. Yueshen; Darya Yuferova; MARCIN ZAMOJSKI; Abalfazl Zareei; STEFAN M. ZEISBERGER; LU ZHANG; S. Sarah Zhang; Xiaoyu Zhang; LU ZHAO; Zhuo Zhong; Z. IVY ZHOU; CHEN ZHOU; XINGYU S. ZHU; Marius Zoican; REMCO ZWINKELS
Journal of Finance 2024 79(3), 2339-2390 open access
In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data‐generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence‐generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty—nonstandard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for more reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer‐review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants.