Charles F. Walker, Allan H. Meltzer, Edgar Peske, Bion B. Howard, John P. Shelton, Ragnar D. Naess, Developments in the Curriculum and Teaching of Finance: Discussion, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 21, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association, New York, New York, December 28-30, 1965 (May, 1966), pp. 423-434

Press reports of investigations of fraud, indictments, and suspensions in military procurement are associated with significantly negative average abnormal returns in the stocks of affected firms. Abnormal stock returns are significantly less negative, however, for firms ranking among the top 100 defense contractors than for unranked contractors, even after one controls for firm size, the frauds' characteristics, and the firm's recidivism. Unranked contractors are penalized heavily for procurment frauds, experiencing both a decline in market value and a subsequent loss in government‐derived revenues. Furthermore, these losses are related to the percentage of the firm's revenues that derive from government contracts. Influential contractors, in contrast, are penalized lightly, experiencing negligible changes in share value and government contract revenue.

Who bears the consequences of administrative problems in health care? We use data on repeated interactions between a large sample of U.S. physicians and many different insurers to document the complexity of health care billing, and estimate its economic costs for doctors and consequences for patients. Observing the back-and-forth sequences of claim denials and resubmissions for past visits, we can estimate physicians’ costs of haggling with insurers to collect payments. Combining these costs with the revenue never collected, we estimate that physicians lose 18% of Medicaid revenue to billing problems, compared with 4.7% for Medicare and 2.4% for commercial insurers. Identifying off of physician movers and practices that span state boundaries, we find that physicians respond to billing problems by refusing to accept Medicaid patients in states with more severe billing hurdles. These hurdles are quantitatively just as important as payment rates for explaining variation in physicians’ willingness to treat Medicaid patients. We conclude that administrative frictions have first-order costs for doctors, patients, and equality of access to health care. We quantify the potential economic gains—in terms of reduced public spending or increased access to physicians—if these frictions could be reduced and find them to be sizable.

We develop metrics to assess the complexity of a bank holding company (BHC), based on its ownership structure. Large BHCs have intricate ownership hierarchies involving hundreds or even thousands of legal entities that may contribute to increased operational risk and greater opacity. Our measures are mathematically grounded, intuitive, and easy to implement. They may be particularly useful in the context of resolution, where regulators often face significant time pressure and coordination challenges. We use regulatory filing data from the Federal Reserve to validate the measures, demonstrating that they provide a useful complement to balance sheet information in assessing BHC complexity. Notably, the proposed measures are highly correlated with existing complexity indicators that are not based on organizational structure and are less correlated with size than these existing complexity measures. We show that the proposed measures provide additional explanatory power for the regulatory indicators, even after controlling for size.

Longstaff [Longstaff, F., 2000. The term structure of very short-term rates: new evidence for the expectations hypothesis. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 397–415] finds support for the expectations hypothesis at the very short end of the repurchase agreement (repo) term structure while other studies find calendar-time-based regularities cause rejection of the expectations hypothesis. Using Longstaff’s methods on a sample of repo rates that pre-dates Longstaff’s sample, we reject the expectations hypothesis for every maturity. The pre-Longstaff-sample repo data comes from a time period where the behavior of short-term interest rates is similar to the long-run average behavior of short-term interest rates. Our results imply that expectations hold when rates are less volatile and/or that we may be entering a period of lower volatility.

We examine the relation between debt contract renegotiation costs and contract design. We use a plausibly exogenous shock to expected renegotiation costs arising from a change in the taxation of debt renegotiations to show that, as renegotiation costs decline, the maturity of debt contracts lengthens, the initial likelihood of covenant violation increases, and the use of performance pricing provisions becomes less frequent. The evidence indicates that ex ante allocation of cash flow rights and ex post reallocation of decision rights through renegotiation are local substitutes, where the preference for one mechanism versus the other depends, at least in part, on renegotiation costs. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

We investigate how performance-to-target (exceeding versus missing prior target) and task type (ability-driven versus effort-driven) affect managers' target-setting decisions in a setting where a manager sets targets for multiple employees. To do so, we use an experiment that involves executives, who average more than 16 years of work experience. We predict and find stronger target adjustments when prior targets are exceeded than when they are missed, especially when tasks are ability-driven. We also predict and find targets are differentiated more between employees within a firm when tasks are ability-driven rather than effort-driven, but this effect is attenuated when prior targets are missed. As prior empirical findings are inconclusive in this area of research, we contribute to the literature by providing controlled experimental evidence about the asymmetric nature of target adjustments. Additionally, we identify an important factor affecting managers' target-setting decisions—task type—that has largely been neglected in prior work.

We provide new evidence on the codependence among the many country attributes previously linked to financial reporting quality. First, we show that the synchronicity of 21 changing country attributes spikes surrounding mandatory IFRS adoption. Thus, while IFRS adoption “explains” increased reporting quality, this finding disappears after including other changing country determinants of reporting quality. Second, a single underlying factor distills the numerous reporting quality measures used in the international literature. Finally, we document that four underlying country factors largely subsume the individual explanatory power of 72 candidate country attributes in explaining reporting quality levels across countries. We conclude with implications and suggestions for future research on international reporting quality. JEL Classifications: F30; G15; K22; M41. Data Availability: Data used in this paper are from publicly available sources and/or are drawn directly from data tabulated in published research papers.