Capital flows increase in response to new public information. Conventional explanations typically conclude that this reflects a rational response to reduced risk. However, investors may also be overconfident in their ability to benefit from new information, even when it is publicly available and does not provide a relative advantage. We exploit two complementary settings to examine how this “better‐than‐average” mechanism affects capital flows. Archival evidence from horse race betting markets shows capital flows increase following the public provision of a summary measure of horse performance, even though more total parimutuel wagering necessarily implies a greater wealth transfer from bettors to tracks. A controlled lab experiment provides direct causal evidence of our proposed mechanism. Combined, our results suggest that new public information can increase capital flows due to investors’ overconfidence in their ability to benefit from information relative to others. Our findings inform regulators seeking to understand the consequences of expanding the public information available to individual investors.

We study biodiversity finance—the use of private capital to finance biodiversity conservation and restoration—which is a new practice in sustainable finance. First, we provide a conceptual framework that lays out how biodiversity can be financed by pure private capital and blended financing structures. In the latter, private capital is blended with public or philanthropic capital, whose aim is to de-risk private capital investments. The main element underlying both types of financing is the “monetization” of biodiversity, that is, using investments in biodiversity to generate a financial return for private investors. Second, we provide empirical evidence using deal-level data from a leading biodiversity finance institution. Our findings are consistent with a three-dimensional efficient frontier (return, risk, and biodiversity impact)—deals with a favorable risk-return profile tend to be financed by pure private capital, whereas for other deals the biodiversity impact needs to be sufficiently large for blended finance to be used. Overall, our results suggest that blended finance is an important tool for improving the risk-return profile of these projects, thereby increasing their appeal to private investors and crowding in private capital. Finally, our results suggest that private capital is unlikely to substitute for effective public policies in addressing the biodiversity crisis.

We study how risk management through hedging affects firms and competition among firms in the life insurance industry, an industry with over 7 trillion in assets and over 1,000 private and public firms. We examine firms after a staggered state-level reform that reduces the costs of hedging by granting derivatives superpriority in case of insolvency. We show that firms that are likely to face costly external finance increase hedging and reduce risk and the probability of receivership. Firms that are likely to face costly external finance also lower prices, increase policy sales, and increase their market share post-reform.

We investigate the effects of a qualitative tax disclosure mandate aimed at improving tax transparency and compliance by imposing reputational costs for firms. We use, as an exogenous shock, the 2016 UK reform that required large businesses to disclose their tax strategy. We find that treated firms—those that must publish a tax strategy report—also significantly increase the volume of tax strategy disclosure in their annual reports, but this disclosure contains more boilerplate. The standalone tax strategy reports contain narratives similar to those in the annual reports, are sticky, and their quality is correlated with those of disclosures on gender and human rights. Turning to real behavioral changes, we document no significant effect on tax planning across several proxies and firm characteristics. While we find that the mandate increased media attention on treated firms, our results suggest that this enforcement channel might not work in the context of qualitative disclosure, which may be hard to verify for outside stakeholders. Even in subsamples of firms for which we would expect higher reputational costs, we document similar responses. Taken together, our findings indicate that mandating qualitative tax disclosure has incentivized firms to portray themselves as good tax citizens without changing their practices.

We examine California Assembly Bill No. 979 (AB 979), the first law mandating racial, ethnic, and other forms of diversity on corporate boards. Conventional t-tests show that stock returns around the enactment of the law are negative, economically large, and statistically significant; returns are more negative for smaller firms and firms with no diverse directors, suggesting higher compliance costs. However, statistical significance disappears after controlling for event date cross-correlation, when comparing returns on event dates to the pre-event distribution of returns, and in multivariate regressions. At least 90 % of firms comply with the first stage of AB 979 and the qualifications of mandated directors are largely similar to those of benchmarks, suggesting compliance costs are low. We also find no evidence that compliance affects firm operating performance. Overall, our results suggest that the diversity mandate has statistically and economically small effects relative to typical variation in stock returns and firm outcomes, which highlights the importance of considering appropriate counterfactuals and examining multiple dimensions when analyzing the impact of such mandates.

We study markup cyclicality in a granular macroeconomic model with oligopolistic competition. We first characterize how firm, sectoral, and aggregate markups comove with output at different levels of aggregation in response to firm-level shocks. We quantify the model’s ability to reproduce salient features of the cyclical properties of measured markups in French administrative firm-level data from the bottom (firm) level to the aggregate level. We document that (i) firm-level markups rise with market share and sector-level markups with concentration, (ii) the relationship between markups and sectoral output varies by firm size—negative for small firms but positive for large ones, (iii) sector-level markups move positively with sectoral output, and (iv) sectoral markups show no systematic relationship with aggregate output. Our model helps rationalize these seemingly conflicting patterns of markup cyclicality in the data.

Corporate bonds’ book-to-market ratios predict returns computed from transaction prices. Senior bonds (even investment grade) with the 20% highest ratios outperform the 20% lowest by 3%–4% annually after non-parametrically controlling for numerous liquidity, default, microstructure, and priced-risk attributes: yield-to-maturity, bid–ask spread, duration/maturity, credit spread/rating, past returns, coupon, size, age, industry, and structural model equity hedges. Spreads for all-bond samples are larger. An efficient bond market would not exhibit the observed decay in the ratio’s predictive efficacy with implementation delays, small yield-to-maturity spreads, or similar-sized spreads across bonds with differing risks. A methodological innovation avoids liquidity filters and censorship that bias returns.

The world of capital markets is constantly evolving, driven by technological advancements and changing global economies, presenting challenges for accounting practitioners. Amid current dynamic capital markets, this paper proposes a pathway for generating innovative accounting research that addresses practitioners’ needs by focusing on three critical financial reporting areas: contingent claim securities, sustainability/ESG metrics, and cryptocurrencies/digital assets. Secondly, to address the complex research challenges before us, I propose that we, as accounting scholars, embrace educational changes that may enhance the early research career success of our doctoral students and junior scholars, given that the accounting industry is on the brink of a profound technological transformation. Finally, I urge us to foster academic change by leveraging our strengths within and across disciplines to meet the accounting challenges and opportunities ahead.

We demonstrate that predictable uninformed cash flows forecast aggregate market stock returns. Buying pressure from dividend payments (announced weeks prior) predicts higher value-weighted market returns, with returns for the top quintile of payment days four times higher than the lowest. This holds internationally and increases when reinvestment is high and market liquidity is low. We estimate a market-level price multiplier of 1.9. These results suggest price pressure is a widespread result of flows, not an anomaly.

We examine whether the local administration of sales taxes (as opposed to a more streamlined state administration) affects the real economy for businesses complying with the tax. We study this question in the Florida hotel industry, as counties in Florida can choose to locally administer the county‐level tourist tax or have the state administer the county‐level tax along with the state‐level tourist tax. Local administration is popular because it supports local employment (of tax administrators) and provides more stringent enforcement on non‐commercial operators (e.g., private rentals). State administration, however, has fewer compliance costs for hotels (e.g., reduced filings and fewer audits). Commentary from the profession suggests the incremental compliance costs of local administration can be considerable. We find that counties switching from state to local administration of tourist taxes is associated with slower growth in aggregate hotel payroll and employment, consistent with local tax administration increasing compliance costs to the point that affected businesses cut other services.