This study investigates how adopting new performance measures affects the decision process through which supervisors make subjective adjustments. In our setting, the Chinese government substituted economic value added (EVA) for return on equity (ROE) in the performance score formula it uses to evaluate State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). In accordance with the Chinese government's objective to increase the capital efficiency of SOEs, supervisors shifted the weight in subjective adjustment decisions from ROE to EVA after EVA adoption. Consistent with EVA adoption creating fairness concerns, however, supervisors did not penalize SOEs for performing poorly on EVA when they performed well on ROE, and accomplished this by shifting the weight from EVA back to ROE. Additional analyses suggest that personal preferences motivated supervisors to make these lenient subjective adjustments. Overall, our findings indicate that adopting new performance measures creates fairness concerns that motivate supervisors to consider their personal preferences in subjective adjustment decisions.

We examine the stock price impact of corporate site visits using a unique data set of site visits to listed firms in China. Our main findings are as follows. First, the market reaction around corporate site visits is statistically and economically significant and is stronger for group visits, visits conducted by mutual fund managers, visits covering accounting and finance topics, visits to firms with poor information environments, and visits to manufacturing firms. Second, the stock returns around site visits are positively associated with firms’ future performance. Third, the changes in visiting funds’ holdings are more predictive of firms’ future performance than those of nonvisiting funds. Overall, this study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that site visits are important venues for investors to collect information about firms and make informed trades.

We examine whether firms that imitate peer companies’ strategies (copycats) profit from such behavior and how their success may cause competitive harm to disclosing companies. We identify copycat companies by tracking the digital footprints of investment companies that view disclosures on the SEC EDGAR Web site. We find that copycat companies are able to identify profitable trades that outperform other trades disclosed by the copycatted companies by 5.5% annually. Such stock‐screening skills are related to investment sophistication and research intensity. Furthermore, copycats inflict greater damage on the performance of disclosing companies when they possess superior copycat skills, when disclosed trading strategies take longer to complete, and when disclosed stock holdings are characterized by high information asymmetry.

We investigate how a state's political corruption affects a resident firm's debt contracting and how a change in anti-corruption regulation alters the relation between corruption and loan contracting. Firms in more corrupt states are associated with significantly higher loan spreads and tighter loan covenants than firms in less corrupt states. Furthermore, the passage of the Dodd–Frank whistleblowing provision amplifies the conhcerns of banks about the detrimental impact of corruption due to the increased exposure of firms to whistleblowing threats. The detrimental impact of corruption is further amplified when a state has a higher level of whistleblowing involvement, when firms are located in more corrupt states or closer to the SEC office, and when the bank's state is less corrupt than the firm's state. In general, we document the externality of corruption in the debt financing of firms and the response of banks to changes in regulation.

We identify a positive effect of patent pledgeability on corporate patenting. Our tests exploit staggered city-level policy changes that allow firms to use patents as collateral for financing. We find a significant increase in patents and patent citations for firms headquartered in cities that have adopted such policies relative to firms headquartered in cities that have not. We further show that patent pledgeability increases corporate patenting by inducing firms to shift from secrecy-based innovation to patent-based innovation, rather than by mitigating financial constraints.

Unlike traditional asset categories (e.g., industry classifications) that are generally defined clearly, some groups of stocks are tied to certain loosely defined “concepts” (e.g., e-commerce). When investors find it difficult to analyze ambiguous concept-oriented information, information diffuses slowly, creating “concept momentum”. Based on unique concept data in the Chinese stock market, this study constructs a concept-momentum strategy that involves buying stocks from past winning concepts and selling stocks from past losing concepts, which can generate pronounced abnormal returns. Neither risk factors, firm-level momentum, nor industry-level momentum can explain concept momentum. Furthermore, we find that both the underreaction and cross-stock lead-lag effect channels can cause slow information diffusion and drive concept momentum. Moreover, the concept momentum effect is stronger for relatively ambiguous concepts, for concepts that attract less investor attention, and following high-sentiment periods.

Using data from a large telecom service provider in China between 2014 and 2019, we examine the impact of being passed over for promotion on subsequent performance for middle managers. Specifically, we find that there is a negative association between high promotion probability and post-pass over performance changes. Such negative association is less pronounced when bonus incentives are stronger and when promotions are more predictable. Our research highlights a hidden cost of promotion incentives and strategies organizations can use to mitigate this unintended negative effect for promotion pass over on high performers. Data Availability: The data used in this study are proprietary. Access to the data may be granted upon request, subject to the approval of the data providers and compliance with confidentiality agreements.

Using a dataset constructed through textual analysis and manual data collection, we show that, prior to ASC 606, firms with principal-versus-agent (PA) exposure face heightened GAAP compliance risk, reflected in a greater likelihood of receiving revenue-related SEC comment letters and higher audit fees. Following the adoption of ASC 606, these differences decline, consistent with the standard’s stated goal of simplifying PA assessments and reducing implementation challenges. Overall, our findings provide the first large-sample evidence on PA considerations and show that ASC 606 mitigates compliance risk, although further analyses suggest additional disclosure may be needed to mitigate information challenges associated with PA assessments. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Revenue-sharing contracts allow firms that are distant from their target markets to leverage sellers' local expertise. Although these contracts align incentives in operational decisions, they also introduce the potential for sellers to underreport revenues. We analyze film-level box office data from 7,309 Chinese cinemas and find that cinemas report significantly lower revenues for foreign films than for comparable domestic films, consistent with foreign producers being less able to monitor reported revenues due to geographic distance. The underreporting of foreign films is lower in cities with widespread mobile payments, in multi-unit cinemas, and when foreign films have more predictable revenues, suggesting institutional factors that increase detection likelihood can mitigate underreporting. Further tests indicate the lower reported box office revenues of foreign films is not due to government intervention. Our findings provide novel evidence of product-level misreporting under revenue-sharing contracts and offer insights on mitigating these risks in international markets. Data availability: Data are available via the sources specified in the paper. The authors greatly appreciate the data supplied by EntGroup (http://english.entgroup.com.cn/enbase.html) but are not able to share the data based on the agreement with Entgroup.