We examine the relation between the overall corporate governance structure and managerial risk-taking behavior. We find that the overall governance structure has a significant impact on how managers make decisions on investment policy: strong bondholder governance motivates more low-risk investments such as capital expenditure and lower high-risk investments such as R&D expenditures, whereas weak shareholder governance (entrenched managers) leads to more R&D expenditures. Moreover, we find that the effects of governance on investment policy differ significantly between speculative and investment-grade firms. For speculative firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to more capital expenditures and low R&D investments. For investment-grade firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to low capital expenditures and an insignificant impact on R&D investments. Furthermore, financing and investment covenants exhibit strong binding power to deter risky investments. Finally, a more dependent (or a less independent) board is associated with low capital expenditures and high R&D investments.
We examine the effects of the world's first comply-or-explain dividend regulation in China's Shanghai Stock Exchange, which requires firms to either pay at least 30% of profits as dividends or explain the use of funds. We find that many firms increased their payout ratio to comply, by increasing dividends or decreasing earnings. Firms with high profitability, state ownership, and fewer agency conflicts were more likely to comply. However, complying firms subsequently issued more debt and had a decline in accounting performance and firm valuation. The evidence suggests that the comply-or-explain regulation increased firms' dividends at substantial costs.
We study the dynamics of trading volume and bid-ask spread using a multiperiod trading model with oligopolistic market makers. Traders smooth out their trading even though they are not strategic, and thus trading persists after the arrival of information or liquidity shocks. Traders act quickly on their private information while postponing hedging trades until later periods. The market power of market makers enables them to widen bid-ask spreads when trading incentives are heightened. Consequently, both trading volume and bid-ask spread may exhibit U-shaped patterns. Our model calibration aligns with the empirical intraday patterns observed in bid-ask spreads and trading volumes.
Young Americans are heavily reliant on debt and have clear financial literacy shortcomings. In this paper, we study the effects of exposure to financial training on debt outcomes in early adulthood among a large and representative sample of young Americans. Variation in exposure to financial training comes from statewide changes in high school graduation requirements. Using a flexible event study approach, we find that both mathematics and financial education, by and large, decrease reliance on nonstudent debt and improve repayment behavior. Economics training, on the other hand, increases both the likelihood of holding outstanding debt and the prevalence of repayment difficulties.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis201449(4), 879-901
Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006) document that aggregate earnings changes in the United States are negatively related to contemporaneous market returns. In this study we show that this negative aggregate earnings-returns relation is unique to the United States. In 28 non-U.S. markets, aggregate earnings changes are positively associated with contemporaneous market returns. Further evidence shows that the aggregate earnings-returns relation becomes less positive in countries with more transparent financial disclosure that helps investors forecast earnings more precisely. Our result supports Sadka and Sadka’s (2009) argument that predictability of aggregate earnings leads to the negative relation between aggregate earnings and market returns in the United States.
Recent evidence shows that option volatility skews and volatility spreads between call and put options predict equity returns. This study investigates whether such predictive ability is driven by option traders’ information advantage. We examine the predictive ability of volatility skews and volatility spreads around significant information events including earnings announcements, other firm‐specific information events, and events that trigger significant market reactions. Consistent with option traders having an information advantage relative to equity traders before information events, we find that the option measures immediately before these events have higher predictive ability for short‐term event returns than they do in a more dated window or before a randomly selected pseudo‐event. We also find that option measures have predictive ability after information events. However, this predictive ability holds only for unscheduled corporate announcements, which suggests that, relative to equity traders, option traders have superior ability to process less anticipated information.
We examine whether the average earnings surprises announced yesterday affect investors’ responses to earnings news announced today. We find that in the short window surrounding an earnings announcement, the market rewards today's earnings news that is above yesterday's average earnings surprises with a premium, consistent with yesterday's average becoming a reference point for investors to classify today's earnings news as a gain or a loss. The price premium for an above-average earnings surprise is larger when more earnings announcements are made on the same day and when investors face greater uncertainty in assessing firms’ performance. We interpret this evidence as suggesting that investors rely more on the average as a reference point when they are more likely to be subject to cognitive constraints in processing information. We also find that firms announcing above-average earnings surprises exhibit a greater abnormal trading volume, consistent with the notion that beating reference points prompts investors to trade.
We find that firms experiencing improvements in crowdsourced employer ratings significantly outperform firms with declines. The return effect is concentrated among reviews from current employees, stronger among early firm reviews, and also stronger when the employee works in the headquarters state. Decomposing employer ratings, we find the return effect is related to changing employee assessments of Career Opportunities and views of senior management. It is unrelated to work-life balance. Employer rating changes are associated with growth in sales and profitability and help forecast one-quarter-ahead earnings announcement surprises. The evidence is consistent with employee reviews revealing fundamental information about the firm.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis2026open access
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