Social Capital and Contributions in a Public-Goods Experiment by Lisa R. Anderson, Jennifer M. Mellor and Jeffrey Milyo. Published in volume 94, issue 2, pages 373-376 of American Economic Review, May 2004

The Role of the Family in Immigrants' Labor-Market Activity: An Evaluation of Alternative Explanations: Comment by Francine D. Blau, Lawrence M. Kahn, Joan Y. Moriarty and Andre Portela Souza. Published in volume 93, issue 1, pages 429-447 of American Economic Review, March 2003

New Evidence on the Money's Worth of Individual Annuities by Olivia S. Mitchell, James M. Poterba, Mark J. Warshawsky and Jeffrey R. Brown. Published in volume 89, issue 5, pages 1299-1318 of American Economic Review, December 1999

The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Reply by Colin M. Campbell, John H. Kagel and Dan Levin. Published in volume 89, issue 1, pages 325-334 of American Economic Review, March 1999

We analyze entry, pricing, and product design in a model with differentiated products. Market equilibrium can be “separating,” with multiple sellers and a sorting of heterogeneous consumers across goods, or “exclusionary,” with one seller serving all customer types. Entry into an initially monopolized market can occur because of cost reductions or product improvements, but entry need not lower the incumbent’s price, improve efficiency, or raise consumer welfare. Postentry design incentives favor a softening of price competition and stronger market segmentation, whereas exclusionary design changes typically raise consumer welfare. Potential, as distinct from actual, entry always benefits consumers.

Press reports of investigations of fraud, indictments, and suspensions in military procurement are associated with significantly negative average abnormal returns in the stocks of affected firms. Abnormal stock returns are significantly less negative, however, for firms ranking among the top 100 defense contractors than for unranked contractors, even after one controls for firm size, the frauds' characteristics, and the firm's recidivism. Unranked contractors are penalized heavily for procurment frauds, experiencing both a decline in market value and a subsequent loss in government‐derived revenues. Furthermore, these losses are related to the percentage of the firm's revenues that derive from government contracts. Influential contractors, in contrast, are penalized lightly, experiencing negligible changes in share value and government contract revenue.

Earlier work on U.S. import demand suggest that structural change may have occurred sometime in the mid-1960s. Since this evidence was based upon a somewhat arbitrary splitting of the sample period, the dating of change is uncertain. In this paper we investigate the question of structural change for both U.S. imports and exports, using a procedure that lets the data determine if and when structural change may have occurred. We find weak evidence of structural change for imports in the mid- to late 1960s and much stronger evidence in 1972:1 and thereafter. There is no evidence of structural change for exports.

A mathematical model is analyzed to determine the impact of two alternative monetary policies upon the rate of change of prices and the level of real national income. The first is a once and for all change in the rate of growth of the money supply to a new level; the second is found through an optimization analysis using the maximum principle of postaudit. It is found that the second policy not only leads to a final equilibrium position in less time than the first policy, but it also induces less variability in both prices and real income.

In this study, we examine whether sell-side security analysts gain access to value-relevant information through political connections. We measure analysts' political connections based on political contributions at the brokerage-house level. We argue that if brokerages are able to obtain private information through their political connections, then analysts at politically connected brokerages should issue more profitable stock recommendations, and this increased profitability should be more pronounced for politically sensitive stocks. Our evidence is consistent with these predictions. Analyses of recommendations issued surrounding the Affordable Care Act further support our main inferences. Moreover, our findings hold after we employ numerous tests to address correlated omitted variables and endogeneity. Collectively, these results suggest that brokerages obtain value-relevant, nonpublic information from their political connections.

We investigate the relation between corporate tax payments and corporate social responsibility. Because existing theory and empirical studies find inconsistent evidence on the relation between these constructs, we investigate whether the two activities act as complements or substitutes. We estimate the relation between measures of corporate social responsibility and (1) the amount of corporate taxes paid, and (2) the amount invested in tax lobbying activities using both ordinary least squares and a system of simultaneous equations. We find consistent evidence that corporate social responsibility is negatively related to five-year cash effective tax rates and positively related to tax lobbying expenditures. Our evidence suggests that, on average, corporate social responsibility and tax payments act as substitutes. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.