We build an equilibrium model of commodity markets in which speculators are capital constrained, and commodity producers have hedging demands for commodity futures. Increases in producers' hedging demand or speculators' capital constraints increase hedging costs via price-pressure on futures. These in turn affect producers' equilibrium hedging and supply decision inducing a link between a financial friction in the futures market and the commodity spot prices. Consistent with the model, measures of producers' propensity to hedge forecasts futures returns and spot prices in oil and gas market data from 1979 to 2010. The component of the commodity futures risk premium associated with producer hedging demand rises when speculative activity reduces. We conclude that limits to financial arbitrage generate limits to hedging by producers, and affect equilibrium commodity supply and prices

We present a model of equilibrium allocation of capital for arbitrage. If asset prices may fall low enough, it is profitable to carry liquid capital to acquire assets in such states. Set against this, keeping capital in liquid form entails costs in terms of foregone profitable investments. This trade-off generates occasional fire sales and limited arbitrage capital as robust phenomena. With learning-by-doing effects, arbitrage capital moves in to acquire assets only if fire sales are steep. However, once arbitrage capital finds it profitable to acquire assets, it requires similar returns elsewhere, inducing contagious fire-sale prices even for unrelated assets

This paper uses a unique data set of trades in a unique pair of securities that enables the precise identification of individual broker activity and the trade direction of that activity. We find direct evidence that the imposition (removal) of short-sale constraints limits (generates) trading activity consistent with brokers exploiting apparent mispricing

Several recent studies document that sorting stocks first on certain stock-level characteristics and then on past returns results in elevated momentum profits. We show that such strategies enhance momentum profits simply by trading in stocks with more extreme past returns. Adjusted for this effect, elevated momentum profits resulting from characteristics (size, R2, turnover, age, analyst coverage, analyst forecast dispersion, market-to-book, price, illiquidity, credit rating) disappear almost entirely. Interaction patterns have been used to support behavioral and limits-to-arbitrage explanations of momentum; our findings imply that explanations of momentum should instead focus on the link between momentum profits and extreme past returns

Firms with higher asset growth rates subsequently experience lower stock returns in international equity markets, consistent with the U.S. evidence. This negative effect of asset growth on returns is stronger in more developed capital markets and markets where stocks are more efficiently priced, but is unrelated to country characteristics representing limits to arbitrage, investor protection, and accounting quality. The evidence suggests that the cross-sectional relation between asset growth and stock return is more likely due to an optimal investment effect than due to overinvestment, market timing, or other forms of mispricing

This paper presents a robust new finding that delta-hedged equity option return decreases monotonically with an increase in the idiosyncratic volatility of the underlying stock. This result cannot be explained by standard risk factors. It is distinct from existing anomalies in the stock market or volatility-related option mispricing. It is consistent with market imperfections and constrained financial intermediaries. Dealers charge a higher premium for options on high idiosyncratic volatility stocks due to their higher arbitrage costs. Controlling for limits to arbitrage proxies reduces the strength of the negative relation between delta-hedged option return and idiosyncratic volatility by about 40