Contrary to Baker and Wurgler (2002), I find that the importance of historical average market-to-book ratios in leverage regressions is not due to past equity market timing. Although equity transactions may be timed to equity market conditions, they do not have significant long lasting effects on capital structure. Debt transactions exhibit timing patterns that are unlikely to induce a negative relation between market-to-book ratios and leverage. I also find that historical average market-to-book ratios have significant effects on current financing and investment decisions, implying that they contain information about growth opportunities not captured by current market-to-book ratios.

[Default probability plays a central role in the static trade-off theory of capital structure. We directly test this theory by regressing the probability of default on proxies for costs and benefits of debt. Contrary to predictions of the theory, firms with higher bankruptcy costs, i.e., smaller firms and firms with lower asset tangibility, choose capital structures with higher bankruptcy risk. Further analysis suggests that the capital structures of smaller firms with lower asset tangibility—which tend to have less access to capital markets—are more sensitive to negative profitability and equity value shocks, making them more susceptible to bankruptcy risk.]

Recent research has focused on the estimates of the speed of adjustment to target leverage as the indicators of the importance of dynamic trade-off behavior. We show that the observed corporate financing behavior and the resulting dynamics of corporate debt ratios are such that the speed of adjustment is not an economically meaningful measure of the importance of target debt ratios. We conclude that partial adjustment regressions that rely on the existence of a well-defined target debt ratio are ill-suited for quantifying the importance of dynamic trade-off behavior vis-a-vis alternative theories.

Simulation experiments show that both partial-adjustment and debt-equity choice models can generate spuriously significant estimates that are consistent with the hypothesis that firms have target debt ratios to which they periodically adjust. Regressions relying on full-sample fixed effects models of target leverage, in particular, produce results severely biased in favor of the target-adjustment hypothesis. Various target proxies and modifications to the standard methodologies are examined to identify partial-adjustment and debt-equity choice models that have power to reject the target-adjustment hypothesis. The resulting estimates of the speed of adjustment are in the range of five-eight percent per year.

We investigate the dynamics of observed and target leverage ratios and deviations from the targets. The cross-sectional persistence in leverage ratios is driven by persistent targets, whereas time-series variation is driven by transitory deviations from targets. Consistent with dynamic trade-off theories, persistence is higher when the costs of deviating from targets are lower and when the adjustment costs are higher. Deviations are less persistent for firms that are over-levered and firms that are smaller, younger, or more focused or that have lower credit ratings. In recessions, excess leverage is less persistent for larger firms and is more persistent for smaller firms.

We examine whether market and operating performance affect corporate financing behavior because they are related to target leverage. Our focus on firms that issue both debt and equity enhances our ability to draw inferences. Consistent with dynamic trade-off theories, dual issuers offset the deviation from the target resulting from accumulation of earnings and losses. Our results also imply that high market-to-book firms have low target debt ratios. On the other hand, consistent with market timing, high stock returns increase the probability of equity issuance but have no effect on target leverage.

This paper investigates the risk versus mispricing explanation of superior returns to contrarian strategies using the interactions between value-to-market indicators and corporate financing transactions that increase or decrease a firm's outstanding equity. Portfolio-level analyses and firm-level cross-sectional regressions indicate that the well-documented contrarian profits soar when value stocks which repurchase shares (value repurchasers) and growth stocks which issue shares (growth issuers) are considered. Various risk measures indicate that value repurchasers are not riskier than growth issuers. Furthermore, time-series of realized growth rates, analysts' long-term growth estimates, and sensitivity of portfolio returns to investor sentiment support the misvaluation explanation.

Pecking order and market timing theories assume that corporate financing decisions are made in the interests of existing shareholders. We find that existing institutional investors, on average, significantly increase their share ownership at the time of the SEO, including SEOs that would be classified as overpriced based on ex-ante measures of mispricing, such as pre-issue returns and market-to-book ratios. We further find that higher pre-existing institutional shareholdings lead to less SEO timing. Overall, the results question whether firms engage in equity timing to benefit existing shareholders at the expense of investors buying shares in the SEOs.

We document that firms’ financing decisions are affected by historical high prices. The ratio of the monthly high price to the 12-month historical high price positively affects the probability of a seasoned equity offering (SEO). Furthermore, the postannouncement market reaction is muted and the offering discount is smaller if the preannouncement stock price is high relative to its historical high price. The results suggest that historical high price reference points may help managers rationally time SEOs to take advantage of market reception and minimize issuance costs.

Higher first-year post-issue returns are associated with a significantly higher probability of follow-on equity issuance over the next 5 years. This result holds when we control for pre-issue returns and other factors known to affect the probability of equity issuance. The result is most consistent with the market feedback hypothesis that a high post-issue return encourages managers to increase the firm’s investment because it implies that, in the market’s view, the marginal return to the project is high.