Business connections can mitigate agency conflicts by facilitating efficient information transfers, but can also be channels for inefficient favoritism. I analyze these two effects in the mutual fund industry and find that fund directors and advisory firms that manage the funds hire each other preferentially based on the intensity of their past interactions. I do not find evidence that stronger board-advisor ties correspond to better or worse outcomes for fund shareholders. These results suggest that the two effects of board-management connections on investor welfare—improved monitoring and increased potential for collusion—balance out in this setting.

This study asks whether investors learn differently from gains versus losses. I find experimental evidence that indicates that being in the negative domain leads individuals to form overly pessimistic beliefs about available investment options. This pessimism bias is driven by people reacting more to low outcomes in the negative domain relative to the positive domain. Such asymmetric learning may help explain documented empirical patterns regarding the differential role of poor versus good economic conditions on investment behavior and household economic choices.

Business connections can mitigate agency conflicts by facilitating efficient information transfers, but can also be channels for inefficient favoritism. I analyze these two effects in the mutual fund industry and find that fund directors and advisory firms that manage the funds hire each other preferentially based on the intensity of their past interactions. I do not find evidence that stronger board‐advisor ties correspond to better or worse outcomes for fund shareholders. These results suggest that the two effects of board‐management connections on investor welfare—improved monitoring and increased potential for collusion—balance out in this setting.

We empirically investigate the effect of uncertainty on corporate hiring. Using novel data from the labor market for MBA graduates, we show that uncertainty regarding how well job candidates fit with a firm’s industry hinders hiring and that firms value probationary work arrangements that provide the option to learn more about potential full-time employees. The detrimental effect of uncertainty on hiring is more pronounced when firms face greater firing and replacement costs and when they face less direct competition from other similar firms. These results suggest that firms faced with uncertainty use similar considerations when making hiring decisions as when making decisions regarding investment in physical capital.

Using administrative data for 63,000 individuals across 2,500,000 person‐month observations, we find that wealthier individuals have better life insurance coverage, controlling for the value of the asset insured, namely, the consumption needs of dependents. This positive wealth‐insurance correlation, which is surprising given the prevailing view that wealth substitutes for insurance, persists after allowing for wealth‐related differences in risk or bequest preferences, pricing, background risk, education, employment, or liquidity constraints. Our findings call for further investigation of this wealth‐coverage correlation but support theories emphasizing the consumption‐smoothing role of insurance across not only states of the world, but also time.

We investigate a novel determinant of financial distress, namely, individuals' self‐efficacy, or belief that their actions can influence the future. Individuals with high self‐efficacy are more likely to take precautions that mitigate adverse financial shocks. They are subsequently less likely to default on their debt and bill payments, especially after experiencing negative shocks such as job loss or illness. Thus, noncognitive abilities are an important determinant of financial fragility and subjective expectations are an important factor in household financial decisions.

Neuroeconomics research shows that brain areas that generate emotional states also process information about risk, rewards, and punishments, suggesting that emotions influence financial decisions in a predictable and parsimonious way. We find that positive emotional states such as excitement induce people to take risks and to be confident in their ability to evaluate investment options, while negative emotions such as anxiety have the opposite effects. Beliefs are updated so as to maintain a positive emotional state by ignoring information that contradicts individuals’ prior choices. Marketplace features or outcomes of past choices may change emotions and thus influence future financial decisions.

The majority of lower socioeconomic status (SES) households in the U.S. and Europe do not have stock investments, which is detrimental to wealth accumulation. Here, we examine one explanation for this puzzling fact, namely, that economic adversity may influence how people learn from financial information. Using experimental and survey data from the U.S. and Romania, we find that lower SES individuals form more pessimistic beliefs about the distribution of stock returns and are less likely to invest in stocks when these investments are likely to have good outcomes. SES-related differences in pessimism may help explain variation in investments across households.

There is widespread concern about whether Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are appropriately punished for poor performance. While CEOs are more likely to be forced out if their performance is poor relative to the industry average, overall industry performance also matters. This seems puzzling if termination is disciplinary, however, we show that both absolute and relative performance-driven turnover can be natural and efficient outcomes in a competitive assignment model in which CEOs and firms form matches based on multiple characteristics. The model also has new predictions about replacement managers' equilibrium pay and performance. We document CEO turnover events during 1992–2006 and provide empirical support for our model.

We show that individuals’ macroeconomic expectations are influenced by their socioeconomic status (SES). People with higher income or higher education are more optimistic about future macroeconomic developments, including business conditions, the national unemployment rate, and stock market returns. The spread in beliefs between high- and low-SES individuals diminishes significantly during recessions. A comparison with professional forecasters and historical data reveals that the beliefs wedge reflects excessive pessimism on the part of low-SES individuals. SES-driven expectations help explain why higher-SES individuals are more inclined to invest in the stock market and more likely to consider purchasing homes, durable goods, or cars. Received November 13, 2017; editorial decision February 12, 2019 by Editor Wei Jiang.