This paper studies the effect of banking deregulation on credit risk. Its theoretical model shows that a bank is willing to invest more resources in screening borrowers when there is an entry threat, even though loan rates are driven lower. Thus, deregulation may result in improved loan quality and lower credit risk. This result is tested using bank-level balance sheet data and macroeconomic data for the European Union. The data reveal that competition intensified after the completion of the Second Banking Directive, while loan quality improved in most markets. Evidence is found that the loan quality improvement is associated with lower interest margin.

If prices of individual stocks are unbiased but noisy approximations to fundamental values, there will be a gap in returns between the standard cap-weighted market portfolio and the one based on fundamentals. The discrepancy occurs because, relative to fundamentals, cap-weights are too large (small) for stocks with positive (negative) deviations from fundamental values. It follows that the usual cap-weighted portfolio will underperform relative to the fundamental-based portfolio as long as prices revert to fundamental values. This has led Arnott et al. to propose new market indices based on a firm’s fundamental size as measured by its revenues, number of employees, and so on. In this paper we follow the same principle but propose to estimate fundamental weights using a smoothed average of standard cap-weights. Since the putative excess returns of a fundamentals-weighted portfolio requires reversion to fundamental values, and because fundamental values are likely to change slowly, we can estimate current fundamentals by smoothing the time series of a stock’s noisy prices. The determination of fundamental size in terms of accounting data is thereby replaced by a simple estimate based on price history. We derive expressions for expected returns of the market capitalization-based and fundamentals-based portfolios under various assumptions about (i) the random deviations from fundamental values and (ii) the change in fundamentals over time. We present empirical comparisons between portfolios and find the returns of the fundamentals-based portfolios exceed the standard indices by an amount comparable to the prior estimates that used accounting data to determine size.

[The article shows that two measures of the amount of private information in stock price-price nonsynchronicity and probability of informed trading (PIN)-have a strong positive effect on the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock price. Moreover, the effect is robust to the inclusion of controls for managerial information and for other information-related variables. The results suggest that firm managers learn from the private information in stock price about their own firms' fundamentals and incorporate this information in the corporate investment decisions. We relate our findings to an alternative explanation for the investment-to-price sensitivity, namely that it is generated by capital constraints, and show that both the learning channel and the alternative channel contribute to this sensitivity.]

Using a sample of hand-collected data on 821 firms, which dismissed Arthur Andersen as their auditor between October 15, 2001 and August 31, 2002, we investigate the role of audit committees and boards of directors in the auditor switch decisions by Andersen's clients. This provides a unique setting to examine auditor choice in a situation where the auditor's reputation is clearly tarnished. We investigate the impact of (a) audit committee size, independence, activity, financial expertise; and (b) board size and board independence on the timing of dismissal and choice of successor auditors by Andersen's clients. We find that firms with more independent audit committees, audit committees with greater financial expertise, and larger and more independent boards dismissed Andersen earlier. We also find that firms with larger and more active audit committees as well as more independent boards were more likely to choose a Big 4 successor auditor. We thus contribute to the understanding of the role of audit committees and boards of directors in the auditor switch decisions.

Active equity mutual funds managed by insurance companies underperform peer funds by over 1% per year. There is no evidence that insurance funds make less risky investments; instead they have lower risk-adjusted returns and their fund flows are less sensitive to performance when they perform poorly. Across insurance funds, those with heavy advertising, directly established by insurers or using parent firms' brandnames, and those whose managers simultaneously manage substantial non-mutual-fund assets, are more likely to underperform. We conclude that insurers' efforts to cross-sell mutual funds aggravate agency problems that erode fund performance.

This paper provides theory and evidence showing how accounting variables explain cross-sectional stock returns. Based on Zhang, G. [2000. Accounting information, capital investment decisions, and equity valuation: theory and empirical implications. Journal of Accounting Research 38, 271–295], who relates equity value to accounting measures of underlying operations, we derive returns as a function of earnings yield, equity capital investment, and changes in profitability, growth opportunities, and discount rates. Empirical results confirm the predicted roles of all identified factors. The model explains about 20% of the cross-sectional return variation, with cash-flow-related factors (as opposed to changes in discount rates) accounting for most of the explanatory power. The properties of the model are robust across various subsamples and periods.

In this paper we use a new method to rank finance journals and study the pattern of authorship/co-authorship across journals. Defined as the ratio of articles authored by faculty at the world's top 80 finance programs to the total number of articles by all authors, the Author Affiliation Index is a cost-effective and intuitively easy-to-understand approach to journal rankings. Forty-one finance journals are ranked according to this index. If properly constructed, the Author Affiliation Index provides an easy and credible way to supplement the existing journal ranking methods. Our ranking system reveals the journal–researcher clientele, and we find that collaboration (co-authoring) between faculty within elite programs exists only in top-tier and near-top-tier journals. Publications in lower-tier journals by researchers of elite programs are driven by their co-authors. Collaboration between faculty in elite and non-elite programs, however, is more prevalent than that within elite programs across all tiers of journals. Co-authorship among top 80 programs, nevertheless, is more common in top-tier journals, while co-authorship between top 80 and other programs is more dominant in lower-ranked journals.

This paper examines whether self-described market timing hedge funds have the ability to time the U.S. equity market. We propose a new measure for timing return and volatility jointly that relates fund returns to the squared Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio. Using a sample of 221 market timing funds during 1994–2005, we find evidence of timing ability at both the aggregate and fund levels. Timing ability appears relatively strong in bear and volatile market conditions. Our findings are robust to other explanations, including public information-based strategies, options trading, and illiquid holdings. Bootstrap analysis shows that the evidence is unlikely to be attributed to luck.

Compared to non-family firms, family firms face less severe agency problems due to the separation of ownership and management, but more severe agency problems that arise between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. These characteristics of family firms affect their corporate disclosure practices. For S&P 500 firms, we show that family firms report better quality earnings, are more likely to warn for a given magnitude of bad news, but make fewer disclosures about their corporate governance practices. Consistent with family firms making better financial disclosures, we find that family firms have larger analyst following, more informative analysts’ forecasts, and smaller bid-ask spreads.

This paper studies the role of conservative accounting standards in alleviating rational yet dysfunctional unobservable earnings manipulation. We show that when accounting numbers serve both the valuation role (in which potential investors use accounting reports to assess a firm's expected future payoff) and the stewardship role (in which current shareholders rely on the same reports to monitor their risk‐averse manager), current firm owners have incentives to engage in earnings management. Such manipulation reduces accounting numbers' stewardship value and leads to inferior risk sharing. We then show that risk sharing, and hence contract efficiency, can be improved under a conservative accounting standard where, absent earnings management, accounting earnings represent true economic earnings with a downward bias, compared with under an unbiased standard where, absent earnings management, accounting earnings represent true economic earnings without bias.