We study the impact of financial advice on retirement savings. We document that advisors help clients to prepare for retirement by inducing them to take advantage of tax incentives offered on retirement accounts. Advisors particularly promote retirement funds as compared to savings accounts. After-tax returns of advisor-induced retirement fund investments exceed returns of plausible alternative investments. We find no indication that advisor-induced contributions to retirement accounts lead to negative side effects, such as reductions in other savings or liquidity constraints. Hence, we provide evidence of a bright side of financial advice. Furthermore, investments in retirement funds increase bank profits, pointing toward a win–win situation with rent-sharing between the bank and its clients. However, advisors do not in particular target clients that are at a higher risk of under-saving for retirement, such as female clients, clients with lower wealth, and less-educated clients.

We use a dataset from a large retail bank to examine the impact of financial advice on investors’ stock trading performance and behavioral biases. Our data allow us to classify each individual trade as either advised or independent and to compare them in a trade-by-trade within-person analysis. Thus, our study is not plagued by the endogeneity problems typically faced by studies on financial advice. We document that advisors hurt trading performance. However, they help to reduce some of the behavioral biases retail investors are subject to, but this does not overcompensate the negative performance effects of the bad stock recommendations.

We investigate whether the diversification discount occurs partly as an artifact of poor corporate governance. In panel data models, we find that the discount narrows by 16% to 21% when we add governance variables as regression controls. We also estimate Heckman selection models that account for the endogeneity of diversification and dynamic panel generalized method of moments models that account for the endogeneity of both diversification and governance. We find that the diversification discount persists even with these controls for endogeneity. However, in selection models the discount disappears entirely when we introduce governance variables in the second stage, and in dynamic panel GMM models the discount narrows by 37% when we include governance variables.

We use a unique data set from a large retail bank containing internal managerial Accounting data on revenues and costs per client to analyze how banks and their financial advisors generate profits with customers. We find that advised transactions are associated with higher profits than independently executed trades of the same client. The bank’s own mutual funds and structured products are most profitable for the bank, and profits increase with trade size. We show that advisors recommend exactly those transactions. Furthermore, we find that advised clients achieve a worse performance than independent clients, suggesting that advisors put their employer’s interest first.