We investigate the impact of directors' and officers' insurance (D&O insurance) on stock price crash risk. We find that D&O insurance in China is negatively associated with stock price crash risk. This association is robust to a series of robustness checks including the use of alternative sample, Heckman two-step sample selection model, propensity score matching procedure, fixed effects model, the inclusion of some possibly omitted variables, and bootstrap method. Further analyses show that the impact of D&O insurance on crash risk is more pronounced in firms with lower board independence, non-Big 4 auditors, lower institutional shareholdings, and weaker investor protection; and the negative relationship between D&O insurance and crash risk is not driven by the eyeball effect. Moreover, we find that D&O insurance purchase is associated with less financial restatements and more disclosure of corporate social responsibility reports. Our findings provide support to the notion that D&O insurance appears to improve corporate governance.

We use a novel experiment in China to examine the effects of having a quasi-official investor own a small number of shares on specific firm outcomes. We find that, relative to control firms, pilot firms experience an increase in dissenting votes from independent directors, a reduction in tunneling and earnings management activities, and an improvement in merger performance. Independent directors questioned by the quasi-official shareholder in activism events subsequently lose board seats in the director market. Overall, our results shed light on a new mechanism for enhancing the protection of minority shareholders.

Leveraging the China Securities Regulatory Commission’s annual random inspection exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we document that the risk scrutiny of preventive regulatory enforcement creates regulatory uncertainty about inspected firms to business partners, leading them to reduce the provision of trade credit. Reduced access to trade credit is more pronounced for firms with weak bargaining power, high opacity, or low financial resilience. Reduced access is also evident in both ‘compliant’ and non-compliant firms, though the reduction gradually subsides as uncertainty dissipates in different ways for the two types of inspected firms. Our findings uncover an important unintended effect of preventive regulation and have implications for policy making.