Signaling is the most commonly cited explanation for stock repurchases in the academic literature. Yet, there is little evidence on whether managers intentionally use repurchases as signaling devices. Using a firm's financial reporting behavior to infer managerial intent, we find evidence suggesting that managers intentionally use fixed-price repurchase tender offers to signal undervaluation. In contrast, we find no evidence that managers use Dutch-auction tender offers to signal undervaluation. Instead, firms engaging in Dutch-auction repurchases act as if they are trying to deflate their earnings prior to the repurchases to further reduce the repurchasing price.

This paper examines whether portfolio disclosure requirements for actively managed investment funds affect the investment decisions of the firms they own. We argue that mandatory portfolio disclosures reduce fund managers' incentive to collect and trade on private information, which reduces the stock price informativeness of their portfolio, and thus portfolio firm managers' ability to learn from their firms' stock prices. Using a difference-in-differences design around the May 2004 SEC regulation requiring more frequent fund disclosure, we find that investment sensitivity to stock price declines for firms with significant ownership held by actively managed funds affected by the regulation. The decline in investment-price sensitivity is concentrated among firms that are (i) owned by funds with larger expected proprietary costs and (ii) more likely to learn from price. Our results suggest that portfolio disclosure requirements have spillover effects on corporate investment by curtailing managers’ opportunities to learn from price.

We hypothesize that the choice to obtain a financial statement audit provides external financiers with incremental information about the firm, which helps reduce information asymmetry and financing frictions. Using a natural experiment, we show that when external financiers observe a firm׳s choice to voluntarily obtain an audit, the firms obtaining an audit significantly increase their debt, investment, and operating performance, and become more responsive to their investment opportunities. Further, we find that these effects are stronger for firms that are financially constrained and weaker for firms with other means to reduce financing frictions. Overall, our evidence suggests that the audit choice conveys information to capital providers, which reduces financing frictions and improves performance.

This paper examines whether common ownership – i.e., instances where investors simultaneously own significant stakes in competing firms – affects voluntary disclosure. We argue that common ownership (i) reduces proprietary cost concerns of disclosure, and (ii) incentivizes firms to “internalize” the externality benefits of their disclosure for co-owned peer firms. Accordingly, we find a positive relation between common ownership and disclosure. Evidence from cross-sectional tests and a quasi-natural experiment based on financial institution mergers help mitigate concerns that our results are explained by an omitted variable bias or reverse causality. Finally, we find that common ownership is associated with increased market liquidity.

Public firms provide a large amount of information through their disclosures. In addition, information intermediaries publicly analyze, discuss, and disseminate these disclosures. Thus, greater public firm presence in an industry should reduce uncertainty in that industry. Following the theoretical prediction of investment under uncertainty, we hypothesize and find that private firms are more responsive to their investment opportunities when they operate in industries with greater public firm presence. Further, we find that the effect of public firm presence is greater in industries with better information quality and in industries characterized by a greater degree of investment irreversibility. Our results suggest that public firms generate positive externalities by reducing industry uncertainty and facilitating more efficient private firm investment.

ABSTRACT Corporate investment decisions require managers to forecast expected future cash flows from potential investments. Although these forecasts are a critical component of successful investing, they are not directly observable by external stakeholders. In this study, we investigate whether the quality of managers' externally reported earnings forecasts can be used to infer the quality of their corporate investment decisions. Relying on the intuition that managers draw on similar skills when generating external earnings forecasts and internal payoff forecasts for their investment decisions, we predict that managers with higher quality external earnings forecasts make better investment decisions. Consistent with our prediction, we find that forecasting quality is positively associated with the quality of both acquisition and capital expenditure decisions. Our evidence suggests that externally observed forecasting quality can be used to infer the quality of capital budgeting decisions within firms. JEL Classifications: D83, G31, M41 Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the paper.

Abstract Pre-IPO firms may “test the waters” by meeting privately with investors in order to allow access to management and more time to make an investment decision. However, these meetings have the potential to undermine the SEC’s objectives of protecting investors and supporting market efficiency by allowing institutional investors, but not retail investors, private access to management. We find lower retail trading after IPOs of firms that held testing-the-waters meetings, consistent with the meetings reducing retail investor participation. Moreover, retail investors that still participate in the market in the presence of testing-the-waters meetings have inferior investment outcomes. Nonetheless, we find no evidence of lower overall market liquidity or slower price discovery following testing-the-waters meetings. In fact, we observe a reduction in stock return volatility. Overall our evidence suggests that, while testing-the-waters meetings may harm retail investors, there does not appear to be a negative impact on overall market function.

ABSTRACT In 2005, the Securities and Exchange Commission enacted the Securities Offering Reform (Reform), which relaxes “gun‐jumping” restrictions, thereby allowing firms to more freely disclose information before equity offerings. We examine the effect of the Reform on voluntary disclosure behavior before equity offerings and the associated economic consequences. We find that firms provide significantly more preoffering disclosures after the Reform. Further, we find that these preoffering disclosures are associated with a decrease in information asymmetry and a reduction in the cost of raising equity capital. Our findings not only inform the debate on the market effect of the Reform, but also speak to the literature on the relation between voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry by examining the effect of quasi‐exogenous changes in voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry, and thus a firm's cost of capital.