I examine how CEO compensation is related to firms’ capital structures. My tests address the simultaneity of these decisions and distinguish between debt types with different theoretical implications for managerial incentives. Pay–performance sensitivity decreases in straight-debt leverage, but is higher in firms with convertible debt. Furthermore, stock option policy is the component of CEO pay that is most sensitive to differences in capital structure. The results strongly support the hypothesis that firms trade-off shareholder-manager incentive alignment in order to mitigate shareholder-bondholder conflicts of interest. The hypothesis that debt reduces manager-shareholder conflicts can explain some but not all of the results.

This article examines managerial ownership structure and at-issue yield spreads on corporate bonds. There is a positive relation between managerial ownership and borrowing costs, and this relation is weaker at higher levels of ownership. In addition, managerial stock options have a larger effect on yield spreads than stock ownership. These effects exist after controlling for firm and bond characteristics, and are robust to endogeneity and sample selection concerns. The evidence suggests that rational bondholders price new debt issues using the information about a firm's future risk choices contained in managerial incentive structures, and that lenders anticipate higher risk-taking incentives from managerial stock options than from equity ownership.

We study the role of pyramidal ownership structures in the creation of new firms. Our results suggest that pyramids arise because they provide a financing advantage in setting up new firms when the pledgeability of cash flows to outside financiers is limited. Parent companies supply inside funds to new firms that, due to large investment requirements and low pledgeable cash flows, cannot raise enough external financing. The financing advantage of pyramidal structures is pervasive in many countries, exists regardless of whether new firms are set up by business groups or by smaller organizations, and is an important underpinning of entrepreneurial activity.

We show that firms with more illiquid real assets have a higher cost of capital. This effect is stronger when real illiquidity arises from lower within-industry acquisition activity. Real asset illiquidity increases the cost of capital more for firms that face more competition, have less access to external capital, or are closer to default, and for those facing negative demand shocks. The effect of real asset illiquidity is distinct from that of firms’ stock illiquidity or systematic liquidity risk. These results suggest that real asset illiquidity reduces firms’ operating flexibility and through this channel their cost of capital.

The authors study the impact of a powerful nonfinancial stakeholder—unionized workers—on the pricing of corporate debt. Firms in more unionized industries have lower bond yields. This relation is stronger in firms with weaker financial conditions and cannot be explained by the correlation of unionization with industry characteristics, governance mechanisms, or financial leverage. Firms in unionized industries implement less risky investment policies and are less likely targets of acquisitions. Unionization reduces yields by more when firms’ takeover barriers are lower. Hence, unions are viewed favorably in the bond market because, through their influence on corporate affairs, they protect bondholders’ wealth.

Following state-level legal changes that increase labor dismissal costs, firms increase their innovation in new processes that facilitate the adoption of cost-saving production methods, especially in industries with a large share of labor costs in total costs. Firms with high innovation ability exhibit larger increases in process innovation and capital-labor ratios, an effect driven by both increases in capital investment and decreases in employment. By facilitating the adjustment of the input mix when conditions in input markets change, innovation ability allows firms to mitigate value losses and is a key driver of their performance.

We study whether the constraints on firms’ operations imposed by labor unions affect firms’ costs of equity. The cost of equity is significantly higher for firms in more unionized industries. This effect holds after controlling for several industry and firm characteristics, is robust to endogeneity concerns, and is not driven by omitted variables. Moreover, the unionization premium is stronger when unions face a more favorable bargaining environment and is highly countercyclical. Unionization is also positively related to various measures of operating leverage. Our findings suggest that labor unions increase firms’ costs of equity by decreasing firms’ operating flexibility.

We provide evidence that firms in more unionized industries strategically hold less cash to gain bargaining advantages over labor unions and shelter corporate income from their demands. Specifically, we show that corporate cash holdings are negatively related with unionization. We also find that this relation is stronger for firms that are likely to place a higher value on gaining a bargaining advantage over unions and weaker for those firms in which lower cash holdings provide less credible evidence that a firm is unable to concede to union demands. Additionally, we show that for unionized firms increases in cash holdings raise the probability of a strike. Finally, we show that unionization decreases the market value of a dollar of cash holdings. Overall, our findings indicate that firms trade-off the benefits of corporate cash holdings with the costs resulting from a weaker bargaining position with labor.

Firms strategically choose more conservative capital structures when they face greater competitive threats stemming from the potential loss of their trade secrets to rivals. Following the recognition of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine by US state courts, which exogenously increases the protection of a firm's trade secrets by reducing the mobility of its workers who know its secrets to rivals, the firm increases its leverage relative to unaffected rivals. The effect is stronger for firms with a greater risk of losing key employees to rivals, for those facing financially stronger rivals, and for those in industries where competition is more intense.

We examine whether location within a dense regional cluster of interconnected businesses affected firm performance during the Great Recession and the subsequent recovery. Firms in denser regional clusters experienced faster sales growth than their rivals in less dense clusters, especially firms operating in more competitive industries and those more able to reap agglomeration benefits. They also faced lower uncertainty, invested more in both physical capital and intangible capital, and maintained higher employment growth. Their greater resiliency and agility led to significant increases in their valuations. These results suggest that regional clusters provide competitive advantages during turbulent times.