This paper studies the consequences of a regulatory pay cap in proportion to assets on bank risk, bank value, and bank asset allocations. The cap is shown to lower banks’ risk and raise banks’ values by acting against a competitive externality in the labour market. The risk reduction is achieved without the possibility of reduced lending from a Tier 1 increase. The cap encourages diversification and reduces the need a bank has to focus on a limited number of asset classes. The cap can be used for Macroprudential Regulation to encourage banks to move resources away from wholesale banking to the retail banking sector. Such an intervention would be targeted: in 2009 a 20% reduction in remuneration would have been equivalent to more than 150 basis points of extra Tier 1 for UBS, for example.

This paper considers optimal executive pay regulations for banks that are too-big-to-fail. Theoretically, we map the consequences of a series of commonly-used pay schemes, describing their relative optimality and ultimate societal consequences. We argue that in a world of too-big-to-fail policy, simple equity-linked remuneration schemes maximise shareholder value by incentivising executives to choose excessively risky projects at the expense of the taxpayer. We find that paying the executive partly in debt fails to mitigate the project choice distortion when debt markets are informed. By contrast, both clawback rules and linking pay to interest rates can incentivise the executive to make socially optimal risk choices, but only if they are accompanied by appropriate restrictions on the curvature of pay with respect to the bank’s market value. Pay curvature can be generated by tools such as equity options and promotion policy. The policy implication is that unless regulators can enforce restrictions on pay curvature, bank shareholders can undermine the effectiveness of these pay regulations.

Misconduct is widespread. Practices such as misselling, pump and dump, and money laundering cause harm while raising profits. This paper presents a mechanism that can determine what sorts of misconduct can be sustained in competitive equilibrium in concentrated markets, oligopoly settings, and markets with many small competing firms. The model studied allows general demand and distinguishes types of ethical dilemma using current psychological understanding. The paper shows, for example, that markets with many small competing firms are not vulnerable to misconduct if firms respond to entry with niche strategies or if the ethical dilemma draws an emotional response.

This paper studies the default risk of banks generated by investment and remuneration pressures. Competing banks prefer to pay their banking staff in bonuses and not in fixed wages as risk sharing on the remuneration bill is valuable. Competition for bankers generates a negative externality, driving up market levels of banker remuneration and hence rival banks’ default risk. Optimal financial regulation involves an appropriately structured limit on the proportion of the balance sheet used for bonuses. However, stringent bonus caps are value destroying, default risk enhancing, and suboptimal for regulators who control only a small number of banks.

We study the impact of ring-fencing on bank riskiness using short-term money markets. Ring-fencing is when the government restricts some banking activities to a subsidiary of the group whilst restricting intra-group transfers. Exploiting confidential data on sterling-denominated repo transactions, we document that banking groups subject to ring-fencing are perceived to be safer—repo investors lend to ring-fenced groups at lower rates—and that the safety perception is amplified during times of market stress. We show that ring-fenced groups also intermediate more cautiously. Our article suggests that structural reforms can create a “safe-haven” bank in the financial system.

Stock sales during takeover negotiations weaken the target board's ability to recommend against the takeover, i.e., to resist. Sophisticated shareholders therefore face a coordination problem when deciding whether to sell-out early; and their actions generate a feedback loop between trading volumes and takeover outcomes. Bidding firms, anticipating the pressurising effect of future share sales on the target board, may reduce their bids. We study these tensions theoretically. We find that increasing the influence of shareholders during the bidding process lowers equilibrium bids; elongates the bidding process; but raises the overall probability of bid acceptance; and raises expected premia for unsophisticated shareholders.